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Round One of the Presidential 1776 Award is now closed. Thank you to all who participated! Regional finalists will be announced by March 30, 2026. See Competition Rules for details.
Round One of the Presidential 1776 Award is now closed. Thank you to all who participated! Regional finalists will be announced by March 30, 2026. See Competition Rules for details.
Brutus, in Constitutionalism and Resistance in the Sixteenth Century (ed. J. H. Franklin)
Are subjects bound to obey princes if their orders contradict the Law of God?
At first sight this question may seem utterly idle and profitless, since it implies that uncertainty exists about an indubitable axiom of Christianity, which is stated very frequently in Holy Scripture, which has been exemplified continuously throughout the centuries, and which has been attested by the pyres of many martyrs. For why, it may be asked, have the faithful endured so many painful trials if they did not all believe that only God is to be obeyed absolutely and implicitly-kings, on the other hand, only insofar as their commands are not in conflict with God's Law? Or how are we to interpret the maxims of the Apostles that we are to obey God rather than men? And since only the will of the one God is invariably just and injustice is always possible in the will of every other being, how can we doubt that our obedience to God must be implicit and that our obedience to men must always be conditional? Yet there are princes today, professing to be Christians, who brazenly arrogate a power so unlimited that it cannot be from God at all; and they have a swarm of flatterers, who worship them as gods on earth and who, from fear or other pressure, believe, or pretend to believe, that there is no occasion in which princes ought not to be obeyed. The vice of our times, it thus appears, is that there is nothing so firm as to pass uncontradicted, or so certain as to pass undoubted, or so sacred as .o go unviolated. Hence anyone who reflects on the matter will conclude, I fear, that this question is not only useful but even highly necessary, especially in our age. . . .
One should obey God rather than man. God is the proprietor of all, men are only usufructuaries of their possessions. The relationship of kings to God may be compared to that of vassals to their lords. The vassal's fief is forfeited for felony, i.e., for breach of faith.]
In short, if the vassal does not keep the fealty he swore, his fief is forfeited and he is legally deprived of all prerogatives. So also with the king. If he neglects God, if he goes over to His enemies and is guilty of felony towards God, his kingdom is forfeited of right and is often lost in fact. And this principle is clearly shown in the covenant that is regularly concluded between the king and God (for God sees fit to honor His servants by accepting them as partners to a covenant). At the coronation of kings, then, we read of a twofold covenant: the first, between God, the king, and the people that the people will be God's people; the second, between the king and the people that if he is a proper ruler, he will be obeyed accordingly. We will consider the second of these later and here take up the first.
We read that at the coronation of Joash a covenant was concluded between God, the king, and the people-or, as it is related elsewhere, between the high priest Jehoiada, the whole people, and the king-that they would be God's people; and in yet another place that Josiah and the whole people entered into a covenant with God. We also learn that in making this covenant the high priest, speaking in God's name, expressly asked the king and the people, first, whether they were willing to guarantee that God would be purely worshipped in the Jewish kingdom according to His ritual; second, whether the king, in ruling, would permit the people to serve God and also hold them to God's Law; and finally, whether the people in obeying the king would obey God no less and first of all. Thus the king and the people, like joint underwriters of a promise, swore to keep the Law of God, and obliged themselves by solemn oath to worship God above all. Hence, as soon as this covenant was solemnized, Josiah and Joash extirpated the 'platrous cult of Baal and restored the service of God.
The articles of this covenant were, in sum, as follows: the king and the entire people would worship God according to the prescription of His Law as individuals and would act collectively to protect that worship; that if they did so, God would be with them and preserve their commonwealth. If not, he would despise and abandon them. And this is evident from a great many passages in Scripture. . . .
[Cases from the Old Testament are cited in which kings lost their kingdoms because they broke their oath to God.]
But since the form of the church and the kingdom of the Jews has changed, and what was formerly bounded by Judea has spread throughout the world, we should now consider Christian kings. Just as the Gospels succeeded to the Law, Christian rulers have replaced the Jewish kings. The covenant remains the same; the stipulations are unaltered; and there are the same penalties if these are not fulfilled, as well as the same God, omnipotent, avenging perfidy. And as the Jews were bound to keep the Law, so are Christians to observe the Gospels, and each Christian is sworn to propagation of the Gospels as his first and chief concern. . . .
[Warning is given to contemporary kings who persecute Protestant defenders of the true religion.]
What, then, of heathen kings? Although not anointed by God, they are undoubtedly His vassals, and have received their power from Him alone, whether by lot or any other means. For if by vote, it is God who rules the hearts of men and guides them to the one He wills. And if by lot, it is thrown into the midst, says Solomon, and sorted out by God. It is always by Him only, and by His judgment, that kings are raised up, established, confirmed, and overthrown. For which reason Isaiah calls Cyrus the "anointed of the Lord," and Daniel, also, says that Nebuchadnezzar and the rest received their power from God, which is what [St.] Paul says of any magistrate whatever. For although God did not entrust His Law to them expressly, they acknowledge that they owe their reign to God, the highest king. Hence, if they do not see that the tribute owed to God is paid or, even worse, if they divert and seize what is due God from His proper subjects, or arrogate divine jurisdiction to themselves in any other way, it is truly a crime of the kingdom so affected, for which God has grievously punished even pagan kings. . . .
[The principle of rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar's and unto God what is God's is restated in several formulations, and additional examples and analogies are given. The principle is then established by citation of authorities, including the First Table of the Law, which is even more sacred than the Second.]
But on this matter, we are not without an express law stated in specific terms. Whenever the Christian apostles enjoin obedience to kings and magistrates, they take special pains to warn us that we must obey God first of all, so they do not provide the slightest ground for that preposterous servility that the sycophants of princes urge upon the simpleminded. "Let every soul," says [St.] Paul, "be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God." (He says "every soul" so that no rank may seek exemption.) These words are enough to make it clear that we are to obey God before the king, that we obey the king because of God and surely not against Him. But wishing to avoid all ambiguity, he adds that the prince is God's minister for our good and to do justly-from which we may again conclude that we are to obey God rather than His minister. But even this, he thought, was not enough. Render, he says, tribute to whom tribute is due; honor, to whom honor is due; reverence, to whom reverence is due; as if to say, with Christ, render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, unto God what is God's. . . .
[Consideration of the first question concludes with further citations of authority, elaborations, and reformulations.]
Is it permissible to resist a prince who violates God's Law and desolates His Church? Who may resist, in what manner, and to what extent?
. . . The question here is whether it is permissible to resist a prince who is a violator of God's Law and is trying either to destroy His Church or to obstruct its propagation. Holy Scripture, if only we accept its verdict, will provide us with an answer. For if, as may readily be shown, the Jewish people taken as a whole were not only so permitted but enjoined, none, I believe, will deny that the same must surely apply to the whole people of a Christian kingdom.
The prime consideration here is that God, in choosing the Jews from all the other nations as His chosen people, made a covenant with them that they would be God's people, which is documented throughout the Book of Deuteronomy. . . . Hence, we see that the whole people was obligated to maintain God's Law, to defend His Church, and thus to drive the idols of the gentiles from the Land of Canaan, which stipulation cannot apply to individuals, but only to the people as a whole. And it is significant, in this respect, that all the tribes encamped around the Ark of the Lord, so that what was entrusted to the care of all all were obliged to protect. . . .
[Examples are given of collective action taken by the Jews to punish violations of God's Law.]
When kings were given to the people, this compact did not lapse but was instead confirmed and constantly renewed. We have said that at the coronation of a king a twofold covenant was made. The first was between God, the king, and the people. (Indeed, the people are put first in Chronicles 2:23.) And its purpose was that the people should become God's people, that is, that they should be God's Church. Why God covenanted with the king we have already shown; why, with the whole people we must now inquire. For its is certain that God did not require this in vain. And it would have been an empty covenant if there were not some authority remaining in the people to make a promise and to keep it. It seems, therefore, that God did what creditors so often do with borrowers of doubtful credit, which is to obligate several for the same amount so that there are two or more co-signers for the single loan, each one of whom may be held responsible for the entire sum as though he were the principal debtor. Since it was dangerous to entrust the Church to a single, all-too-human individual, the Church was committed and entrusted to the people as a whole. The king, situated on a slippery height, could easily have fallen into irreligion. Hence, God wished to have the people intervene, so that the Church might not be ruined with the king.
In the stipulation we are now discussing, God, or the high priest acting as His representative, is the stipulating party; the king and the people as a whole-that is, Israel-are the promissory parties, both being conjointly obligated of their own accord for one and the same thing. The high priest asks the people whether they will promise to become God's people and to assume the obligation of maintaining His Temple and His Church among them, wherein He will be duly worshipped. Then the king gives his promise, and the people give their promise (the corporate body of them here acting as a single individual). And it is clear, from the very wording of their oaths, that these promises are given conjointly, and not separately, at the same and not at different times. The king and Israel, therefore, are established as two co-signers equally obligated for the entire promise. And just as Caius and Titus, who have jointly promised Seius the same stipulated sum of money, are each individually bound by law for the entire sum, and the whole may be demanded of either one of them; so the king, on his part, and the people, on their part, are bound to see that no harm is suffered by the Church. If one of them is negligent, God may demand the whole from either, and from the people sooner than the king, since many men are less likely to default than one and have more resources. . . . So, if Israel turns away from God and the king does not correct them, the guilt of the people falls on him. Conversely, if the king goes over to false gods and not only goes over but takes others with him and seeks to destroy the Church in every way he can; and if Israel fails to drag him back from this defection, by use of force if necessary, then his guilt falls on them. . . .
[Examination of the Biblical accounts shows that the Covenant did in fact anticipate that kings would be corrected by the people.]
For how can we understand why the consent of the whole people was required, why they were constrained to observe God's Law, and why they gave a solemn promise to be the people of God forever unless we understand that they were also accorded the authority, and the capacity, to defend themselves from perjury and the Church from devastation? Why, in other words, a Covenant with the people to be God's people if they may, and even must, allow themselves to be led by their kings to the worship of strange gods? Why an agreement that God is to be worshipped purely if the people, in the position of slaves, can contract no obligation? And, finally, if the people may not act to discharge their obligation as they promised, why then did God make a solemn Covenant with persons who have no right either to promise or perform? The truth, rather, is that, in making a Covenant with the people, God wished to give us clear-cut evidence that the people had the right, not only of making a Covenant, but also of performing it and of enforcing its performance. For if we agree that contracts made with slaves and servants are ridiculous and will not be noticed by the courts [in civil law], it would be impudent of us to attribute a compact of this sort to God. . . .
[Prophets appealed to the people, or rather the assembled estates of the people, to act against idolatrous kings. Failure of the people to act was punished by God. There are many examples of the punishment of the Israelites for their failure to correct a wicked king.]
It is, furthermore, the part of a good legislator not only to make sure that delinquencies are punished, but to prevent them from being committed, just as good physicians would rather prescribe diets to prevent disease than remedies for the symptoms. Hence, a religious people not only will restrain a prince in the act of doing violence to God's Law, but will, from the beginning, prevent gradual changes arising from his guilt or negligence, for the true worship of God may be slowly corrupted over extended periods of time. Moreover, they will not only refuse to tolerate crimes committed against God's majesty in public, but will constantly strive to remove all occasions for such crimes. We, thus, read that King Hezekiah, with Israel convened in public assembly, warned those who lived beyond the Jordan to smash the bronze serpent they had made and also the altar they had built for it.
It is, then, not only lawful for Israel to resist a king who overturns the Law and the Church of God, but if they do not do so, they are guilty of the same crime and are subject to the same penalty. Hence, if they are attacked with words, they will resist with words, but if with force, with force, and with strategems, I say, as well as open warfare. For if deception is encountered, they will resort to licit deception of their own. If a war is just, it makes no difference whether one fights in the open or through ruses, as long as trickery is always distinguished carefully from treachery, which is never permissible.
But here an objection is to be anticipated. Do you really mean, it will be said, that the entire multitude, that many-headed monster, should go rushing into matters of this sort like a raging flood? Can order be expected from the mob? Or wisdom for settling affairs?
When we speak of the people collectively, we mean those who receive authority from the people, that is, the magistrates below the king who have been elected by the people or established in some other way. These take the place of the people assembled as a whole and are ephors to kings and associates in their rule. And we also mean the assembly of the Estates, which are nothing less than the epitome of a kingdom to which all public matters are referred. The seventy elders of the kingdom of Israel were magistrates of this sort. They were originally chosen from the tribes that went into Egypt, six from each, and, with the high priest presiding, they decided all important questions. And there were also the chiefs or heads of the individual tribes, the judges and officials of the several districts, i.e., the captains of the thousands and captains of the hundreds, who presided over groups of families; and finally the nobles and the notables and so on. All of these composed the public council, the meetings of which are very often reported in terms like "the elders were assembled at Raman" as in the election of Saul, or "all Israel," or "all Judah," or "all Benjamin," etc., when it is unlikely that the entire multitude assembled.
In every properly constituted kingdom, this is the character of the officers of the crown, the peers, the lords, the patricians, the notables, and others chosen by the several estates who, in various combinations, make up the membership of the ordinary or the extraordinary council-the parliament (parlamentum), diet, and other such assemblies, which have different names in different regions. The office of all of these is to see that no harm is suffered either by the commonwealth or by the Church. For although these officers are severally below the king, they are collectively above him. Just as an Ecumenical Council is above the Pope, as was rightly decided at the Councils of Basel and Constance, and just as the cathedral chapter is above the bishop; a corporation, above its representative (actor); a court above its president; and as generally one who receives authority from an aggregate is inferior to the aggregate even if superior to each individual member; so there can be no doubt that Israel, which chose and established its king as a kind of public representative (actor), was superior to Saul, who was established at Israel's initiative and for Israel's benefit, as we shall further show below. Since, therefore, good government depends on a degree of order that cannot be maintained in a large multitude, and since affairs of state often cannot be communicated publicly without danger to the common interest, everything that we have maintained was granted and entrusted to the people as a whole applies rather to the officers of the kingdom; and whatever we say is granted and entrusted to Israel refers to its princes and its elders, and this is indicated by the way they act. . . .
[The point is illustrated by the deposition and execution of Athaliah, who, as queen mother, had taken control of the government in violation of a fundamental law of Judah excluding women from the throne, and who had also governed tyrannically. Punishment was at the hand of Jehoiada, the high priest, who had rallied certain notables.]
She [Athaliah] was therefore justly punished-and by one who was acting in accordance with his office. For Jehoiada was not a private subject but the high priest, whose jurisdiction extended to civil matters also. Furthermore, he had all the princes of Judah and the Levites on his side and was himself related to the [infant] king. Although he did not summon the customary assembly at Mizpah, he was not criticized for this; nor was he criticized for planning and conspiring in secret. A conspiracy is good or bad as its aim is good or bad, and as those involved in it are good or not. The princes of Judah were, therefore, right in proceeding as they did and would have been wrong if they had acted otherwise. For just as a guardian must look to the welfare of his ward and is subject to legal action for neglect, so these officials must protect the safety of the people, which has put itself in their collective care and stewardship, and which has, in a sense, given them all of its own power of initiative.
Thus, as a whole people is permitted to oppose a tyrant, so also are the principal persons of the kingdom, who represent the body of the people, in the same manner that municipal officials may make contracts for the good of the entire corporation. And as the decisions of the majority of a corporation publicly arrived at are taken as the decisions of the entire body, so the action of the majority of princes and notables is taken to be that of all of them, and what all of them have done is regarded as an act of the people as a whole.
But here we face another question. Let us suppose that a king is aiming to abolish the Law of God and His Church, and that the people generally, or a clear majority, has consented, and that all the principal persons, or the greater part of them, have failed to act against the tyrant. Now let us also suppose that a very small part of the people, and just one of the principal persons and magistrates, wish to maintain and preserve God's Law and worship God correctly. What may they do if the king should try to force that part of the people to practice idolatry or to keep them from true worship?
Now we are not speaking here of private individuals, who are not to be regarded as the basic parts of a community any more than planks, nails, and pegs are taken as the parts of a ship; or stones, beams, and mortar as the parts of a house. We are speaking rather of a province or a town, which is a part of the kingdom in the same way the prow, deck, and rudder are the parts of a ship, or the roof, walls, and foundation are the parts of a house. And we are also speaking of the magistrate who is in charge of that province or town. . . .
[The revolt of Libnah against Jehoram, of the Maccabees against Antiochus, and of Deborah against Jagin, the king of the Canaanites, are cited as cases in which parts of Israel repudiated a ruler in the name of religion.]
We have already said that the king took an oath to maintain the Law of God as far he was able, and that Israel as a whole, taken as a single entity, likewise gave its promise to observe God's stipulations. We now say that each of the towns that form part of the kingdom, and also the magistrates of each, have individually and expressly sworn to do the same insofar as they were directly affected. And this is a rule that all Christian cities and communities have tacitly observed. . . .
[The Biblical citations that follow are designed to show that the presence in the assembly of the whole people, of the towns and communities, or the magistrates thereof, was taken as implying the responsibility of each. The basic argument is the same as in the following example.]
When an emperor is to be inaugurated in the German Empire, the electors and princes, lay and ecclesiastical, are present either in person or through deputies; as are the prelates, counts, and barons; and, finally, delegates from all the towns of the Empire with special mandates to submit and bind themselves, as well as those they represent, to the Emperor. Hence if someone who has recognized the Emperor should now drive him from office and seize his place, the princes and the barons must surely deny this usurper the aids and tributes owed the emperor, unless they would not only connive in his misfortune, but actually conspire with his adversaries, in violation of their faith. But if this be so, do not the people of Strasbourg or of Nuremberg have a perfect right to shut their gates against the outlaw and to keep him out? Indeed, were they not to do so, and were they to give no aid to their Emperor in his distress, could it possibly be said that they fulfilled the faith they pledged? Indeed, the rule [of civil law] is that anyone who does not protect his superior when he is able to do so is as guilty as the attacker. But if this is so (and it is surely plain enough), do not the people of Libnah and of Modin have the same right and duty if God, whom they know they are bound to obey above all, is deserted by the other estates (ordines) of the kingdom? What, then, shall we say is the proper course for a town that desires to worship God in purity if a Jehoram or Antiochus should appear, who would suppress worship of the true God and would raise himself above God, and if Israel should cooperate or look the other way? . . .
[The town should not only persist in its worship but, if threatened by the tyrant, should close its gates against him and resist. The towns are not, as some would argue, the king's property. They have individually joined in the covenant with God. Furthermore, it is not the town that rebels, but the king who provokes resistance by rebelling against God. The town will return to obedience as soon as the king desists from his disobedience. The town's action, in shutting its gates, is an act of self-defense that ceases when the threat has passed, and so the Maccabees recognized King Demetrius once he accorded them freedom of worship. In addition, the right of a subdivision to resist is even confirmed by the doctors of the Sorbonne, who legitimized many actions by French kings to protect the French Church against the Pope. The Sorbonnists argued that resistance to Boniface VIII (among others) was not schismatic, since the separation was not from the Church or from the Pope, but from Boniface, and the separation could continue without taint of schism until an honest Pope was named.]
Hence, we may say in summary that a people, acting through the authorities that have the power of the people in them, or through the greater part of these authorities, can and should use force against a prince who commands unholy action or prohibits holy ones. Also, all, or at least the leading citizens, of the several towns, acting under their chief magistrates, may rightfully drive out idolatry from their walls and foster true religion. Furthermore, since the Church is ever one, they may extend its confines, and if they do not do so when they have the power, they are guilty of treason against God.
It only remains to consider the case of private persons. In the first place, individuals in their private capacity are not bound by the Covenant between God and the people as a whole in which it promises to be God's people. For what is owed a corporation is not owed to any single individual, and the debts of a corporation are not owed by any single individual. In the second place, private individuals are not obligated [to resist] by any office. Each individual is bound to serve God in the vocation to which he is called. But private persons have no power, discharge no magistracy, and have no dominion [imperium] or right of punishment [ius gladii]. And since God did not give the sword to private persons, He does not require them to use it. To private persons it is said: "Put thy sword into its scabbard"; to magistrates, however: "You do not bear the sword in vain." The first are guilty if they draw the sword, the latter bear a heavy burden of guilt for neglect of duty if they do not draw it when the need arises.
What, it will be said, does God not covenant with private individuals as well as with the generality, and with humble men as well as magistrates? Why then circumcision? Why baptism? And why such frequent mention of the Covenant throughout the Bible? All of this is right, but very much beside the point. For just as the subjects of a good prince are all bound to obey no matter what their rank, and yet some, the magistrates, are specially obliged to make sure the rest obey, so all men are bound to serve God, but some, whose rank is higher, take on an even greater burden in that, if they neglect their duty, they are in some measure responsible for the guilt of all the others. Kings and magistrates, who have received the sword from the people as a whole, should make sure that the general body of the Church is rightly governed; private individuals, that they are members of the Church. The former must see that the Temple of God is not ruined or polluted and is safe against corruption from within and damage from without; the latter, that their own body, which is God's Temple, is not impure and is fit for the dwelling of God's Spirit. "Whosoever shall destroy God's Temple, which you are," says [St.] Paul, "himshall God destroy." For this reason, the authorities are armed with the visible sword. To private persons, only the sword of the spirit is commended. And this is the Word of God, with which [St.] Paul arms all Christians against the onslaught of the devil.
But what may private subjects do if the king would drive them to idolatry? If the leading men, who hold authority from the people as a whole, or else the local magistrates, should intervene, private persons should obey and follow and use all their energy and zeal as soldiers on the side of God to support these holy enterprises. And as one example among many, they may take the unhesitating obedience of the officers and soldiers to the princes of Judah, who, at Jehoiada's urging, saved the kingdom from the tyranny of Athaliah. But if the notables and magistrates go on doing honor to a maddened king or simply initiate no effort to resist him, private persons should follow the advice of Christ and go to another city. An example for them is the faithful of the ten tribes of Israel, who went to the kingdom of Judah, where the worship of the true God continued, after it had been suppressed in Israel by Jeroboam with the connivance of the other authorities. And if they cannot flee, they should rather give up life than God and rather be crucified themselves than again crucify Christ, as the Apostle says. . . .
[The resistance of Moses against Pharaoh, of Ehud against Eglon, and of Jehu against Jehoram were not, as they might perhaps appear, the deeds of private individuals. Since all of them were specially called by God, they possessed an authority surpassing even that of magistrates. At least in principle, therefore, private persons may initiate resistance if they are specially summoned for that purpose.]
But where God has not spoken with His own mouth or through His prophets in extraordinary fashion, we must be extremely circumspect and sober. Let any man who would assume a responsibility like that, as though he felt the inspiration of God's Spirit, make sure that it is not his own arrogance that swells within him, that he does not confuse himself with God, that these great inspirations of his are not creations of his own, and that he does not, therefore, conceive vanities and beget lies. And let the people be sure that, in hastening to enlist under the banners of Christ, they are not enrolling with some Theudas of Galilee or Bar-Kochba-and bring evil on themselves (which is what happened to the inhabitants of Münster not so long ago in Germany). I do not say that the same God who has sent us Pharaohs and Ahabs in this age may not inspire liberators also, in some extraordinary way. For His justice and His mercy are the same in any age. And if we are given no evident external signs, we should at least look for these internal signs through their effects-absence of all ambition, genuine and earnest zeal, conscientiousness, and finally, learning-which indicate a man who will not be led by error to the service of false gods or be driven by the passions of ambition to worship of himself rather than the true God.
But to remove all scruple we must answer those who believe that the Church may not be defended by force or, more probably, would at least have it appear that this is their belief. . . .
[Old Testament examples of resort to arms in defense of religion are advanced. The coming of Christ does not remove the rights of magistrates. There have been, furthermore, many wars by Christians to defend true religion.]
Thus, although the Church is not enlarged by arms, by arms may it justly be defended. Nor are those who died in holy wars any less martyrs than those who suffered on the cross. Indeed, the path of the first would even seem to be the better one. The merit of the latter is only not to have objected to the death that threatened them. The former knowingly, yet prudently, assumed the risk.
The Turks attempt to spread their doctrine by the force of arms. Whenever they subject a country, they introduce the unholy dogmas of Mohammed, relying upon force exclusively, for in his Koran Mohammed recommends the use of force so highly that he does not shrink from calling it the path to Heaven, although the Turks force no one to convert. But much worse, by far, are those enemies of Christ and true religion, and of the kings they have won over by their spells, who oppose the Gospel's light with flames, the Word of God with blows, and the sword of the Spirit with a battle line of steel, who use threats of torture to herd everyone they can to their unholy rites and are not ashamed to defend what they please to call the faith by faithlessness and to promote belief by endless treacheries.
Defense of true religion, on the contrary, is when pious magistrates and princes fence in and fortify the vine of Christ, where it exists or is to be implanted, against the depredations of wild boars; when they make sure that those converted to the true religion by the preaching of the Word are protected by their shields and guarded by their swords; and when, with wall, trench, and rampart, they fortify God's Temple built of living flesh against the violent onslaughts of the wicked, until it has reached its fullest height.
So much, then, to remove all qualms about our second question. We have shown that the people as a whole, or the officers of the kingdom whom the people have established, or the majority of these, or any one of them, very gravely sin against the Covenant with God if they do not use force against a king who corrupts God's Law or prevents its restoration, in order to confine him to his proper bounds. Residents of towns and provinces, which are the individual parts of a kingdom, are subject to the same penalty if they do not at least drive idolatry beyond their borders, when the ruler seeks to introduce it, and maintain true doctrine by whatever means they can, even if it means seceding temporarily at some point. Private persons, finally, have no excuse to obey sacrilegious commands. But beyond this they have no right whatsoever to take up arms on their own initiative unless they have clearly received an extraordinary calling. And all of this is evidenced by Holy Scripture.
May a prince who oppresses or devastates a commonwealth be resisted; and to what extent, by whom, in what fashion, and by what principle of law?
[What follows will be approved by proper kings and give offense to tyrants only.]
... We have already shown that it is God who makes kings, gives kingdoms, and selects rulers. And now we say that it is the people that establishes kings, gives them kingdoms, and approves their selection by its vote. For God willed that every bit of authority held by kings should come from the people, after Him, so that kings would concentrate all their care, energy, and thought upon the people's interests. And kings are not to think that they are of a higher nature than the rest of men and rule as men rule over cattle. Born the same as all the rest of men, they are always to remember that they were raised up from below to their estates, upon all others' shoulders, as it were, so that thereafter the burdens of the commonwealth should fall, for the most part, upon theirs.
In ages past, when the people of Israel asked God for a king. God laid the foundation of their kingdom as we read in Deuteronomy 17:14-15. "When," says Moses, "you have come into the land that the Lord thy God has given you to possess, and when you have dwelt in it, you will say, 'Establish a king over me, like the kings of the other peoples living roundabout," Then will you establish the king whom thy God will choose for you from amongst thy brethren ... " Here we see the King's selection attributed to God, his establishment to the people. And this, we read, is exactly how it happened in the actual event. The elders of Israel, who represented the people as a whole (for in this passage and throughout, the term "elders" also includes the captains of the thousands, the captains of the hundreds, the captains of the fifties, the captains of the tens, the judges and officers of all the tribes of Israel, as well as the princes and chiefs of each tribe more especially), met with Samuel at Ramah. And partly because they were tired of Samuel's sons, whose judgments were inequitable, and partly because they believed that their wars would be conducted better, they demanded a king of Samuel. Upon Samuel's request for counsel; God revealed that He had selected Saul to rule the people, And so Samuel anointed Saul. All of this, so far, bears on the selection of a king at the people's request, and it might have seemed sufficient for Samuel to present the people with the king whom God had chosen and to command them to obey. But in order that the king might know that he was established by the people, Samuel called an assembly at Mizpah, and there-as if the entire transaction had to be redone, as if, that is, the choice of Saul had not occurred-the lot was drawn. And it fell on someone from the tribe of Benjamin, and from the family of Matri, and within this family on Saul, whom God had chosen. Then only, with the acclamation of the people as a whole, was Saul considered king. But God also willed that royal status should not be attributed solely to lot. After Saul had given a token of his virtue by liberating Jabesh-Gilead from a siege by the Ammonites, he was confirmed as king in the presence of God by the whole people assembled at Gilgal, even though some of them dissented. We see, then, that the king whom God had chosen, who had been selected from all the rest by lot, became king by the votes of the people. . . .
[The role of the people in confirming David and Solomon is even clearer. The purpose of these elections, it is again pointed out, was less to give the people a choice than to remind rulers of their obligation. Election of kings, furthermore, was also practiced among the Medes and early Romans, and also by the Romans of the Empire until the custom was broken by the tyrant Nero.]
And since no one is born a king, and no one is a king by nature; and since a king cannot rule without a people, while a people can rule itself without a king, it is clear, beyond all doubt, that the people is prior to the king and that kings were originally established by the people. By adhering to the virtues of their forebears, the sons and relatives of kings sometimes seem to have rendered a kingdom hereditary, and in certain regions the right of free elections almost seems no longer to exist. And yet in all properly constituted kingdoms, the practice still remains inviolate. Children do not properly succeed to the fathers' thrones until they are established, as if de novo, by the people. They are not kings by birth, or by inheritance, but become kings only when they have received the office, together with the sceptre and the crown, from those who represent the people's majesty.
In Christian kingdoms now reputed to descend by succession, these traces of election are quite evident. The kings of France, Spain, England, and other countries are normally inaugurated by the estates of the realm-that is, by the peers, patricians, and magnates, who represent the people as a whole and who put the king into possession of the kingdom, as it were. In Germany, the emperors are chosen by the electors, and the king of Poland by the Wojewodowie, or palatines, since in both of these countries the right of election is preserved intact. Furthermore, the cities of a kingdom do not accord an incumbent regal honors until he has been properly inaugurated. And in ancient times the beginning of a reign was dated from the day of coronation, a practice followed very strictly in France. But so that we are not misled by recurrent series of direct successions in these kingdoms, it should be noted that the Estates have often preferred the uncle to the son, the younger brother to the elder-as in France Louis was preferred over his brother, Robert, Count of Evreux; and Henry, the king's brother, over Robert Capet, the surviving son of Henry's older brother. And in France the crown was also transferred from family to family by the authority of the people-from the Merovingians to the Carolingians and from these to the Capetians.
[Additional evidence of election in early French history is given.]
Thus, at the beginning all kings were elected. And even those who seem today to come to the throne by succession must first be inaugurated by the people. Furthermore, even if a people has customarily chosen its kings from a particular family because of its outstanding merits, that decision is not so unconditional that if the established line degenerates, the people may not select another. Indeed, even the nearest kin of the selected family are not born kings but are made such. At their birth they are considered not kings but rather candidates for kingship.
Since kings, then, are created by the people, it seems to follow that the people as a whole is greater than the king. This is an implication of the term itself, since one who is created by another is considered his inferior. Potiphar set Joseph over his family; Nebuchadnezzar set Daniel over his provinces of Babylon; Darius created 180 governors to superintend his kingdom. Masters set up slaves; kings, ministers. And the people sets up a king as a kind of minister to the commonwealth. . . .
[Kings are made for the people, not the people for the king. The people are compared to the owner, the king to the pilot of a ship. The conquests of a king belong not to him but to the people. There can be no king without a people, but a people can exist without a king. A king is powerless if the people do not support him.]
Moreover, what we have said of the whole people also applies, as was shown in our second question, to those who lawfully represent the whole people of the kingdom or of a single region, and who are commonly called officers, not of the king, but of the kingdom. Officers of the king are created kings that are described in the foregoing passage, but the right that kings so often arrogate; not what kings are permitted by their office, but what most of them usurp from wickedness. . . .
[The point is elaborated with further citations. It is argued that, in emphasizing the corruptibility of one man, Samuel was suggesting that the people of Israel should put a bridle on their kings, which, in fact, they did.]
[*Foedus sive pactum. Here and throughout foedus and pactum are used as equivalent. Foedus is the favored term where the agreement with God is mentioned. I have most often translated it as "covenant."]
We have already said that the creation of a king involved a double compact. The first, between God, the king, and the people, has been discussed above. The second, between the king and the people, we shall now take up.
When Saul is made king, he accepts a lex regia** [Here used in a general sense as the "fundamental law of a kingdom." Cf. above, note on p. 12.] as the condition of his rule. David at Hebron, in the presence of God—with God, that is, as witness—enters into a covenant with all the elders of Israel, who represented the people as a whole. Joash, too, covenanted with the people of the land in the House of the Lord, with the high priest Jehoiada presiding. We are told, indeed, that a "testimony" was imposed on him, and many interpreters take this to mean the Word of God which, in many passages, is called the "testimony." And Josiah also promises that he will observe the precepts, testimonies, and commandments included in the Book of the Covenant, and he is thus referring to the precepts of religion and justice.
In all the relevant passages, the compact is said to be made with the whole people, or the entire multitude, or all the elders, or all the men of Judah—so that we may understand, even if it were not expressly stated, that not only did the chiefs of the tribes attend, but also the lesser military chiefs and lower magistrates acting in the name of the towns, each of which covenanted of its own right with the king.
This compact created the king. For the people made the king, not the king the people. Therefore, there is no doubt that the people was the stipulator and the king the promiser. And the position of the stipulator is considered stronger under civil law. The people asked, by way of stipulation, whether the king would rule justly and according to the law. He then promised to do so. And the people, finally, replied that they would faithfully obey, as long as his commands were just. Hence, the promise of the king was absolute, that of the people was conditional; and if he does not perform, the people, by the same principle of civil law, are released from any obligation.
By the first covenant, or compact, religious piety becomes an obligation; by the second, justice. In the first the king promises to obey God religiously, in the second, to rule the people justly; in the former, to maintain God's glory, in the latter, to preserve the people's welfare. The condition in the first is: "If you will observe My Law"; the condition in the second is: "If you will render each his own." If the king does not perform the conditions of the first, God is properly the avenger, while the whole people may lawfully punish non-performance of the second.
In all legitimate governments a compact is always to be found. After sacrifices were performed, the Persians made the following covenant with Cyrus: "Do you, Cyrus, promise to support your country with all your might against anyone who wars against the Persians or violates their laws?" After he responds, they said, "We Persians will support you if anyone refuses to obey, as long as your commands are for the defense of the country." Xenophon calls this agreement a "symmachia," that is, a mutual agreement (confoederationem), just as Isocrates calls his oration on the duty of subjects toward a prince Symmachion Logon. The covenant between the kings of Sparta and the ephors was renewed each month, even though the kings were always from the line of the Hercules. The kings swore that they would rule according to the law; the ephors, that they would maintain the kings in possession of their kingdom if they kept their promise. In the Roman kingdom, similarly, Romulus made a compact with the Senate and the people that the people would make the laws and he would enforce them, that the people would declare wars and he would conduct them. And even though most Roman emperors came to power more by force and fraud than by lawful procedure, and even though they arrogated every species of power in the name of the lex regia,*[See above, note on p. 12.] as it is called, it is sufficiently clear from the fragments of that law found in books and in Roman inscriptions that the power which it granted was to protect and administer the commonwealth, not to disrupt and oppress it tyrannically. The good emperors, indeed, avowed that they were bound by law. They accepted their office from the Senate, referred the most important questions to it, and considered it improper to make any great decision until the Senate was consulted.
And if we look at modern kingdoms, we find none deemed worthy of the name in which this kind of compact between the prince and his subjects is not a regular procedure. In the German Empire, not so long ago, the King of the Romans,** [The title of the emperor-elect before his coronation.] who was about to be crowned emperor, used to pledge fealty and homage to the Empire, like a vassal to his lord when the vassal is invested with a fief. And although the form of the oath has been somewhat altered by the Popes, the substance still remains the same. We know, for example, that Charles V of Austria, and his successors, were elected emperors under definite rules and conditions, the sum of which is as follows: that the emperor would maintain established law, that he would not make new ones without consulting the electors, and that he would neither alienate nor mortgage any of the domain belonging to the Empire-all of which articles are expressly enumerated by historians. Further, when an emperor is crowned at Aachen, the Archbishop of Cologne, speaking first as the stipulator, asks, "Will you defend the Church, do justice, and preserve the Empire? And will you make sure that orphans and all others who deserve our pity are protected?" And he is not anointed and does not receive the sword as defender of the Empire or any of the other imperial insignia until he has taken that oath. It is therefore clear enough that the emperor is obligated absolutely, the princes of the Empire, but conditionally.
In the kingdom of Poland the practice is similar, as none will doubt who is familiar with the ritual very recently performed at the election and coronation of Henry of Anjou. Its character was revealed with special clarity when the king's obligation to protect both the Evangelical and the Catholic religions was solemnized, the nobles formally stipulating thrice, and he responding thrice. In Hungary, Bohemia, and so on, the custom is the same, but it would take too long to report the details.
This practice, furthermore, is not confined only to kingdoms where the rule of election has remained intact, since a stipulation of this sort is also a regular procedure even in kingdoms where it is commonly thought that pure succession obtains. When a king of France is inaugurated, the bishops of Laon and Beauvais, as peers of the Church, ask all the people present whether it is their will and pleasure to have the designee as king, and there is, accordingly, a statement in the coronation formula itself that the people have elected him. After the people have indicated their consent, he swears that he will maintain the law and privilege of France and the rights of all men generally, that he will not alienate the domain, and so forth. Interpolations have crept into these articles, and they are now very different from the ancient formula, which is extant in the library of the cathedral chapter at Beauvais, and which, it has been discovered, was used by Philip I. But despite these changes, the main point is eloquently expressed. And the king is not presented the sword, anointed, or crowned by the peers (who are adorned with wreaths themselves); and he does not receive the sceptre or the rod, and is not called "king" until the people have so ordered. Furthermore, the peers do not swear fealty until he has given them his pledge that he will strictly keep the law, i.e., that he will not waste the public patrimony; that he will not, on his own discretion, impose or collect taxes, duties, or subsidies, declare war, or make peace; and, finally, that he will not pass public decrees except in the public council. It is also understood that the Senate, the assembly, and the officers of the kingdom are each to retain its own authority and all other privileges that have customarily been recognized in the French kingdom. Hence, when the king visits any town or province, he is obliged to confirm its privileges and to bind himself by oath to maintain their law and custom. This particularly applies to Toulouse, Dauphiné, Brittany, and Provence, which have special agreements with the king that do not make sense unless they are considered the equivalents of contracts.
The oath taken by the early kings of Burgundy is still extant word for word. "I will maintain law, justice, and protection for all." In England, Sweden, and Denmark the custom is almost the same as in France. In the kingdom of Aragon a king who is about to be inaugurated pledges fealty and homage to the person who represents the justice of Aragon, or the public majesty, and who is seated on a higher throne. After many ceremonies involving the justicia and the king, there is a reading of the laws and conditions that the king is obligated to fulfill, and then, finally, the magnates address the king in the vernacular as follows: "We who are worth as much as you, and can do more than you, elect you king on these and these conditions. Between you and us there is one whose command is more than yours." Moreover, it is their custom to repeat this formula every three years in the public assembly, lest the king should think it perfunctory or regard his oath as a mere gesture toward ancient usage. And if the king, inflated with pride of station, should grow insolent and should break the law despite his oath, then, by that same law, he is declared anathema, just as Julian the Apostate was once declared anathema by the Church. Prayers are then no longer offered for him, but against him, and all persons are released from their fealty and obligation to him, by the same rule under which the vassal of a lord who has been excommunicated has no duty to obey and is no longer bound by his oath.
[There are similar practices in Castile, Portugal, Leon, and other parts of the Iberian peninsula, as well as in Belgium, Austria, Carinthia, and so on. The custom of Brabant is held especially interesting, since there is an express warning to the king that he will be deposed if he does not perform the specified conditions. The general rule, then, is that almost all kings take an oath that formalizes a compact between king and people.]
But even if these ceremonies, these vows, these oaths did not take place, is it not clear, from the very nature of the case, that kings are created by the people on condition that they govern well, just as judges are established on condition that they do justice, and military commanders on condition that they lead their armies against foreign foes? And if kings become oppressors, if they commit injustices, if they become the enemy, they are no longer kings and should not be so regarded by the people. But, you may ask, what if a ruler forcibly compels a people to take an oath in his favor? What, I answer, if a robber, pirate, or tyrant-with whom, it is held, no legal bonds exist-should extort a promise at the point of a sword? Or are you unaware that a pledge elicited by force is void, and especially when the promise is against good custom and the laws of nature? And what is more at war with nature than for a people to promise a prince that it will put chains and fetters on itself, will put its throat beneath the knife, and will do violence to itself (for this is what that promise really means)? Thus, between king and people there exists a mutual obligation which, whether civil or only natural, explicit or tacit, cannot be superseded by any other compact, or violated in the name of any other right, or rescinded by any act of force. So great is its force that a king who breaks it willfully may properly be called a "tyrant," while a people that breaks it may be properly called "seditious."
Now that we have described a king, let us continue with a more detailed description of a tyrant. A king, we have said, is someone who has obtained the kingdom in due form, either by descent or by election, and who rules and governs in accordance with the law. Since a tyrant is the opposite of a king, it follows either that he has seized authority by force or fraud, or that he is a king who rules a kingdom freely given him in a manner contrary to equity and justice and persists in that misrule in violation of the laws and compacts to which he took a solemn oath. A single person can, of course, be both of these at once. The former is commonly called a "tyrant without title" (tyrannus absque titulo), the latter, "a tyrant by conduct" (tyrannus exercitio). But it sometimes happens that a kingdom occupied by force is governed justly; a kingdom legally conveyed, unjustly. And since justice is here more important than inheritance, and performance more important than title to possession, it appears that a ruler who performs his office badly is more properly a tyrant than one who did not receive his office in due form. Similarly, a Pope who enters office illegally is called an "intruder," one who governs badly, an "abuser."...
[The last point is illustrated by further analogies. The usurper (tyrannus absque titulo) who governs well is to be preferred to the tyrant-king. Usurpers are subdivided into foreign conquerors; elective kings who illegally make their crown hereditary; generals who turn their arms against their own country; women who have themselves made queen or regent in countries where women are legally excluded from the throne; and high officials who gradually accumulate powers under indolent kings. In this presentation the ungrateful general and the ambitious woman are treated with special revulsion.]
The tyrant-king (tyrannus exercitio) is described at length, with all of the traditional commonplaces. The tyrant by conduct is self-willed, is devious, lops off the taller stalks of corn, pretends that there are conspiracies against him, shows no respect for princes of the blood, advances low and vicious men, is suspicious of wise and virtuous men, fears public assemblies of any sort, encourages factions among his subjects to weaken them, uses foreign mercenaries, disarms his own countrymen, surrounds himself with bodyguards, foments foreign wars to distract the people, imposes oppressive taxes to keep his subjects impoverished, wastes the public revenue on his favorites, counterfeits religion and concern for the public welfare, and gives the appearance of virtue by deceit. The description of the tyrant-king then concludes as follows:
Furthermore, as a well-constituted kingdom contains all the advantages of the other good regimes, tyranny contains all the evils of the bad ones. A kingdom resembles aristocracy in that the best men are invited to the royal council, whereas tyranny resembles oligarchy in inviting the worst and most corrupt. If the council of the first is like a gathering of kings, that of the second is a gang of tyrants. A kingdom also resembles constitutional democracy (politia) in that there is an assembly of all the orders to which the best men are sent as deputies to deliberate the affairs of the commonwealth. Tyranny resembles lawless democracy, or mob-rule (democratia seu ochlocratia), because, insofar as it cannot prevent assemblies, it bends every effort, uses every device of electioneering and deception, to insure that the worst of men are sent to them. Thus does the tyrant affect the posture of a king, and tyranny, the appearance of a kingdom. The shrewder it is at this, the longer it is able to survive. For, as Aristotle says, we scarcely read of any tyranny that has endured a hundred years.
In sum, a king promotes the public interest, a tyrant seeks his own. But since men are only human, no king can have the public interest in view on every question, and no tyrant can exist for long who seeks his own advantage in all respects whatever. Therefore, if the public interest is generally uppermost we may speak of a king and of a kingdom, and if the ruler's interest generally predominates, we speak of a tyrant and a tyranny. . . .