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James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, May 25 – June 19, pp. 23-154; August 6-August 17, pp. 379-477.
James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, May 25 – June 19, pp. 23-154; August 6-August 17, pp. 379-477.
1 Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the federal system of Government. On that day a small number only had assembled. Seven States were not convened till, Friday 25 of May, when the following members 2 appeared to wit: see Note A.3
viz,3 From Massachusetts Rufus King. N. York Robert Yates,4 Alex: Hamilton. N. Jersey, David Brearly, William Churchill Houston,4 William Patterson. Pennsylvania, Robert Morris, Thomas Fitzsimmons, James Wilson,4 Govurneur Morris. Delaware, George Read, Richard Basset,4 Jacob Broome. Virginia, George Washington, Edmund Randolph, John Blair, James Madison, George Mason, George Wythe,4 James McClurg. N. Carolina, Alexander Martin, William Richardson Davie, Richard Dobbs Spaight,4 Hugh Williamson. S. Carolina, John Rutlidge, Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, Charles Pinckney,4 Pierce Butler. Georgia, William Few.
Mr Robert Morris informed the members assembled that by the instruction in behalf, of the deputation of Penr he proposed George Washington Esq! late Commander in chief for president of the Convention. Mr Jn? Rutlidge seconded the motion; expressing his confidence that the choice would be unanimous, and observing that the presence of Gen! Washington forbade any observations on the occasion which might otherwise be proper.
General Washington was accordingly unanimously elected by ballot, and conducted to the Chair by M. R. Morris and M. Rutlidge; from which in a very emphatic manner he thanked the Convention for the honor they had conferred on him, reminded them of the novelty of the scene of business in which he was to act, lamented his want of better qualifications, and claimed the indulgence of the House towards the involuntary errors which his inexperience might occasion.
6[The nomination came with particular grace from Penna. as Doc! Franklin alone could have been thought of as a competitor. The Doc! was himself to have made the nomination of General Washington, but the state of the weather and of his health confined him to his house.]
M: Wilson moved that a Secretary be appointed, and nominated M: Temple Franklin.
Col Hamilton nominated Major Jackson.
On the ballot Maj: Jackson had 5 votes M: Franklin 2 votes.
On reading the credentials of the deputies it was noticed that those from Delaware were prohibited from changing the article in the Confederation establishing an equality of votes among the States.
The appointment of a Committee, consisting of Messrs Wythe, Hamilton C. Pinckney, on the motion of Mr C. Pinckney7, to prepare standing rules orders was the only remaining step taken on this day.
9From Mass: Nat: Gorham Caleb Strong. From Connecticut Oliver Elseworth. From Delaware, Gunning Bedford. From Maryland James MoHenry. From Penne B. Franklin, George Clymer, The Mifflin Jared Ingersol took their seats.
Mr WYTHE from the Committee for preparing rules made a report which employed the deliberations of this day.
Mr King objected to one of the rules in the Report authorising any member to call for the yeas nays and have them entered on the minutes. He urged that as the acts of the Convention were not to bind the Constituents, it was unnecessary to exhibit this evidence of the votes; and improper as changes of opinion would be frequent in the course of the business would fill the minutes with contradictions.
Col. Mason seconded the objection; adding that such a record of the opinions of members would be an obstacle to a change of them on conviction; and in case of its being hereafter promulged must furnish handles to the adversaries of the Result of the Meeting.
The proposed rule was rejected nem. contradicente. The standing rules*10 agreed to were as follow: [see the Journal copy here the printed rules] 11
[viz. 12 A House to do business shall consist of the Deputies of not less than seven States; and all questions shall be decided by the greater number of these which shall be fully represented: but a less number than seven may adjourn from day to day.
Immediately after the President shall have taken the chair, and the members their seats, the minutes of the preceding day shall be read by the Secretary.
Every member, rising to speak, shall address the President; and whilst he shall be speaking, none shall pass between them, or hold discourse with another, or read a book, pamphlet or paper, printed or manuscript—and of two members rising 13 at the same time, the President shall name him who shall be first heard.
A member shall not speak oftener than twice, without special leave, upon the same question; and not the second time, before every other, who had been silent, shall have been heard, if he choose to speak upon the subject.
A motion made and seconded, shall be repeated, and if written, as it shall be when any member shall so require, read aloud by the Secretary, before it shall be debated ; and may be withdrawn at any time, before the vote upon it shall have been declared.
Orders of the day shall be read next after the minutes, and either discussed or postponed, before any other business shall be introduced.
When a debate shall arise upon a question, no motion, other than to amend the question, to commit it, or to postpone the debate shall be received.]
[A question which is complicated, shall, at the request of any member, be divided, and put separately on the propositions14, of which it is compounded.
The determination of a question, altho' fully debated, shall be postponed, if the deputies of any State desire it until the next day.
A writing which contains any matter brought on to be considered, shall be read once throughout for information, then by paragraphs to be debated, and again, with the amendments, if any, made on the second reading; and afterwards, the question shall be put on the whole, amended, or approved in its original form, as the case shall be.
15 Committees shall be appointed by ballot; and 15 the members who have the greatest number of ballots, altho' not a majority of the votes present, 16 shall be the Committee— When two or more members have an equal number of votes, the member standing first on the list in the order of taking down the ballots, shall be preferred.
A member may be called to order by any other member, as well as by the President ; and may be allowed to explain his conduct or expressions supposed to be reprehensible.— And all questions of order shall be decided by the President without appeal or debate.
Upon a question to adjourn for the day, which may be made at any time, if it be seconded, the question shall be put without a debate.
When the House shall adjourn, every member shall stand in his place, until the President pass him.]17
A letter from sundry persons of the State of Rho. Island addressed to the Honorable 18 The Chairman of the General Convention was presented to the Chair by Govr Morris, and being read, was ordered to lie on the table for further consideration. [For the letter see Note in the Appendix] 19
Mr Butler moved that the House provide agst interruption of business by absence of members, and against licentious publications of their proceedings—to which was added by—Mr Spaight motion to provide that on the one hand the House might not be precluded by a vote upon any question, from revising the subject matter of it when they see cause, nor, on the other hand, be led too hastily to rescind a decision, which was the result of mature discussion.— Whereupon it was ordered that these motions be referred to 20 the consideration of the Committee appointed to draw up the standing rules and that the Committee make report thereon.
Adjd till tomorrow 21. OClock.
John Dickenson, and Elbridge Gerry, the former from Delaware, the latter from Massts took their seats. The following rules were added, on the report of Mr Wythe from the Committee [see the Journal] 23
Additional rules, [s'ee preceding page]23
That no member be absent from the House, so as to interrupt the representation of the State, without leave.
That Committees do not sit whilst the House shall be or ought to be, sitting.
That no copy be taken of any entry on the journal during the sitting of the House without leave of the House.
That members only be permitted to inspect the journal.
That nothing spoken in the House be printed, or otherwise published or communicated without leave.
That a motion to reconsider a matter which had 24 been determined by a majority, may be made, with leave unanimously given, on the same day on which the vote passed; but otherwise not without one day's previous notice: in which last case, if the House agree to the reconsideration, some future day shall be assigned for the 25 purpose.
Mr C. Pinkney moved that a Committee be appointed to superintend the Minutes.
Mr Govr Morris objected to it. The entry of the proceedings of the Convention belonged to the Secretary as their impartial officer. A committee might have an interest bias in moulding the entry according to their opinions and wishes.
The motion was negatived, 5 noes, 4 ays.
Mr Randolph then opened the main business.
[Here insert his speech 26 including his resolutions.] 27
(Mr R. Speech A. to be inserted Tuesday May 29) 27
He expressed his regret, that it should fall to him, rather than those, who were of longer standing in life and political experience, to open the great subject of their mission. But, as the convention had originated from Virginia, and his colleagues supposed that some proposition was expected from them, they had imposed this task on him.
He then commented on the difficulty of the crisis, and the necessity of preventing the fulfilment of the prophecies of the American downfal.
He observed that in revising the foederal system we ought to inquire 1. 28 into the properties, which such a government ought to possess, 2.28 the defects of the confederation, 3.28 the danger of our situation 4.28 the remedy.
The Character of such a government ought to secure 1.28 against foreign invasion: 2.28 against dissentions between members of the Union, or seditions in particular states: 3.28 to procure to the several States, various blessings, of which an isolated situation was incapable: 4.28. 29 to be able to defend itself against incroachment: 5.28 to be paramount to the state constitutions.
In speaking of the defects of the confederation he professed a high respect for its authors, and considered them, as having done all that patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science, of constitutions, of confederacies,—when the inefficiency of requisitions was unknown—no commercial discord had arisen among any states—no rebellion had appeared as in Massts—foreign debts had not become urgent—the havoc of paper money had not been foreseen—treaties had not been violated—and perhaps nothing better could be obtained from the jealousy of the states with regard to their sovereignty.
He then proceeded to enumerate the defects: 1.30 that the confederation produced no security against foreign invasion; congress not being permitted to prevent a war nor to support it by their own authority—Of this he cited many examples; most of which tended to shew, that they could not cause infractions of treaties or of the law of nations, to be punished: that particular states might by their conduct provoke war without controul; and that neither militia nor draughts being fit for defence on such occasions, inlistments only could be successful, and these could not be executed without money.
2.30 that the fœderal government could not check the quarrels between states, nor a rebellion in any, not having constitutional power nor means to interpose according to the exigency:
3.30 that there were many advantages, which the U. S. might acquire, which were not attainable under the confederation—such as a productive impost—counteraction of the commercial regulations of other nations—pushing of commerce ad libitum— c c.
430 that the foederal government could not defend itself against the 31 incroachments from the states.
5.30 that it was not even paramount to the state constitutions, ratified, as it was in may of the states.
He next reviewed the danger of our situation32 appealed to the sense of the best friends of the U. S. —the prospect of anarchy from the laxity of government every where; and to other considerations.
He then proceeded to the remedy; the basis of which he said must be the republican principle
He proposed as conformable to his ideas the following resolutions, which he explained one by one [Here insert ye Resolutions annexed.]33
Resolutions proposed by Mr Randolph in Convention May 29, 1787 33
Resolved that the Articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, "common defence, security of liberty and general welfare."
Resd therefore that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the Quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases.
Resd that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
Resd that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States every for the term of ; to be of the age of years at least, to receive liberal stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to 1 public service; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch, during the term of service, and for the space of after its expiration; to be incapable of reelection for the space of after the expiration of their term of service, and to be subject to recall.
Resold that the members of the second branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by those of the first, out of a proper number of persons nominated by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of years at least; to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency; 2 to receive liberal stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to 3 public service; and to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States, except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch, during the term of service, and for the space of after the expiration thereof.
Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts; that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation; to negative all laws passed by the several States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union; 4 and to call forth the force of the Union again any member of the Union failing to fulfill its duty under the articles thereof.
Resd that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of years,5 to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no increase or 6 diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution, and to be ineligible a second time; and that besides a general authority to execute the National laws, it ought to enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Confederation.
Resd that the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary, ought to compose a Council of revision with authority to examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, every act of a particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final; and that the dissent of the said Council shall amount to a rejection, unless the Act of the National Legislature be again passed, or that of a particular Legislature be again negatived by of the members of each branch.
Resd that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution, that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.
Resolve that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a volimtary junction of Government Territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National legislature less than the whole.
11 . Resd that a Republican Government the territory of each State, except in the instance of a voluntary junction of Government territory, ought to be guarantied by the United States to each State
Resd that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privileges, until a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted, and for the completion of all their engagements.
Resd that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary, and that the assent of the National Legislature ought not to be required thereto.
Resd that the Legislative Executive Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union
Resd that the amendments which shall be offered to the Confederation, by the Convention ought at a proper time, or times, after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of Representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people, to consider decide thereon.7
He concluded with an exhortation, not to suffer the present opportunity of establishing general peace, harmony, happiness and liberty in the U. S. to pass away unimproved.*
It was then Resolved—That the House will tomorrow resolve itself into a Committee of the Whole House to consider of the state of the American Union.—and that the propositions moved by Mr Randolph be referred to the said Committee.
Mr Charles Pinkney laid before the house the draught of a federal Government which he had prepared, to be agreed upon between the free and independent States of America. 35—Mr P. plan 36 ordered that the same be referred to the Committee of the Whole appointed to consider the state of the American Union.
adjourned.
Roger Sherman (from Connecticut) took his seat.
The House went into Committee of the Whole on the State of the Union. Mr. Gorham was elected to the Chair by Ballot.
The propositions of Mr. Randolph which had been referred to the Committee being taken up. He moved on the suggestion of Mr. G. Morris, that the first of his propositions to wit "Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected enlarged, as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely, common defence, security of liberty general welfare: 37 —should be postponed, in order to consider the 3 following:
1 . that a Union of the States merely federal will not accomplish the objects proposed by the articles of Confederation, namely common defence, security of liberty, gen? welfare.
that no treaty or treaties among the whole or part of the States, as individual Sovereignties, would be sufficient.
that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Uegislative, Executive Judiciary.
The motion for postponing was seconded by Mr Govr Morris and unanimously agreed to.
Some verbal criticisms were raised agst the first proposition, and it was agreed on motion of Mr Butler seconded by Mr Randolph, to pass on to the third, which underwent a discussion, less however on its general merits than on the force and extent of the particular terms national supreme.
Mr Charles Pinkney wished to know of Mr Randolph whether he meant to abolish the State Governst altogether. Mr R. replied that he meant by these general propositions merely to introduce the particular ones which explained the outlines of the system he had in view.
Mr Butler said he had not made up his mind on the subject, and was open to the light which discussion might throw on it. After some general observations he concluded with saying that he had opposed the grant of powers to Cong? heretofore, because the whole power was vested in one body. The proposed distribution of the powers into different bodies changed the case, and would induce him to go great lengths.
Genl Pinkney expressed a doubt whether the act of Congs recommending the Convention, or the Commissions of the Deputies to it, could 39 authorise a discussion of a System founded on different principles from the federal Constitution.
Mr Gerry seemed to entertain the same doubt.
Mr Govr Morris explained the distinction between a federal and national, supreme, Govt; the former being a mere compact resting on the good faith of the parties; the latter having a cornpleat and compulsive operation. He contended that in all Communities there must be one supreme power, and one only.
Mr Mason observed that the present confederation was not only 40 deficient in not providing for coercion pimishment agst delinquent States; but argued very cogently that punishment could not in the nature of things be executed on the States collectively, and therefore that such a Govt was necessary as could directly operate on individuals, and would punish those only whose guilt required it.
Mr Sherman who took his seat today,41 admitted that the Confederation had not given sufficient power to Congs and that additional powers were necessary; particularly that of raising money which he said would involve many other powers. He admitted also that the General particular jurisdictions ought in no case to be concurrent. He seemed however not 42 be disposed to make too great inroads on the existing system; intimating as one reason that it would be wrong to lose every amendment, by inserting such as would not be agreed to by the States.
It was moved by Mr Read 43 2ned by Mr Chs Cotesworth Pinkney, to postpone the 3d proposition last offered by Mr Randolph viz that a national Government ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive and Judiciary,” in order to take up the following—viz. "Resolved that in order to carry into execution the Design of the States in forming this Convention, and to accomplish the objects proposed by the Confederation a more effective Government consisting of a Legislative, Executive and Judiciary ought to be established." The motion to postpone for this purpose was lost:
Yeas 44 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Delaware, S. Carolina—44 4 Nays. 45 N. Y. Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina—45 4.
On the question as moved by Mr Butler, on the third proposition it was resolved in Committee of the whole that a national govern‡ ought to be established consisting of a supreme Legislative Executive Judiciary." Massts being ay—Connect.—no. N. York divided [Col. Hamilton ay Mr Yates no] Pena ay. Delaware ay. Virga ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. 46
Resol: 2. of Mr R's proposition towit—see May 29.47
The following Resolution being the 2d of those proposed by Mr Randolph was taken up, viz—"that the rights of suffrage in the National Legislature ought to be proportioned to the quotas of contribution, or to the number of free inhabitants, as the one or the other rule may seem best in different cases." 48
Mr Madison observing that the words "or to the number of free inhabitants," might occasion debates which would divert the Committee from the general question whether the principle of representation should be changed, moved that they might be struck out.
Mr King observed that the quotas of contribution which would alone remain as the measure of representation, would not answer, because waving every other view of the matter, the revenue might hereafter be so collected by the general Govt that the sums respectively drawn from the States would not appear; and would besides be continually varying.
Mr Madison admitted the propriety of the observation, and that some better rule ought to be found.
Col. Hamilton moved to alter the resolution so as to read "that" the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned to the number of free inhabitants. Mr Spaight 2ded the motion.
It was then moved that the Resolution be postponed, which was agreed to.
Mr RANDOLPH and Mr MADISON then moved the following resolution—"that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought to be proportioned."
It was moved and 2ded to amend it by adding "and not according to the present system"—which was agreed to.
It was then moved and 2ded to alter the resolution so as to read "that the rights of suffrage in the national Legislature ought not to be according to the present system."
It was then moved & 2ded to postpone the Resolution moved by Mr Randolph Mr Madison, which being agreed to:
Mr Madison, moved, in order to get over the difficulties, the following resolution—"that the equality of suffrage established by the articles of Confederation ought not to prevail in the national Legislature, and that an equitable ratio of representation ought to be substituted." This was 2ded by Mr Govr Morris, and being generally relished, would have been agreed to; when,
Mr Reed moved that the whole clause relating to the point of Representation be postponed; reminding the Come that the deputies from Delaware were restrained by their commission from assenting to any change of the rule of suffrage, and in case such a change should be fixed on, it might become their duty to retire from the Convention.
Mr Govr Morris observed that the valuable assistance of those members could not be lost without real concern, and that so early a proof of discord in the Convention as a secession of a State, would add much to the regret; that the change proposed was however so fundamental an article in a national Govt that it could not be dispensed with.
Mr Madison observed that whatever reason might have existed for the equality of suffrage when the Union was a federal one among sovereign States, it must cease when a national Govermt should be put into the place. In the former case, the acts of Congs depended so much for their efficacy on the cooperation of the States, that these had a weight both within without Congress, nearly in proportion to their extent and importance. In the latter case, as the acts of the Genl Govt would take effect without the intervention of the State legislatures, a vote from a small State wd have the same efficacy importance as a vote from a large one, and there was the same reason for different numbers of representatives from different States, as from Counties of different extents within particular States. He suggested as an expedient for at once taking the sense of the members on this point and saving the Delaware deputies from embarrassment, that the question should be taken in Committee, and the clause on report to the House be postponed without a question there. This however did not appear to satisfy Mr. Read.
By several it was observed that no just construction of the Act of Delaware, could require or justify a secession of her deputies, even if the resolution were to be carried thro' the House as well as the Committee. It was finally agreed however that the clause should be postponed: it being understood that in the event the proposed change of representation would certainly be agreed to, no objection or difficulty being started from any other quarter than from Delaware.
The motion of Mr Read to postpone being agreed to.
The Committee then rose. The Chairman reported progress, and the House having resolved to resume the subject in Committee tomorrow.
Adjourned to lo OClock.
William Pierce from Georgia took his seat.
In Committee of the whole on Mr. Randolph's propositions.
The 3d Resolution " that the national Legislature ought to consist of two branches" was agreed to without debate or dissent, except that of Pennsylvania, given probably from complaisance to Doc? Franklin who was understood to be partial to a single House of Legislation.
Resol: 4.50 first clause "that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States" being taken up,
Mr Sherman opposed the election by the people, insisting that it ought to be by the State Legislatures. The people he said, immediately should have as little to do as may be about the Government. They want information and are constantly liable to be misled.
Mr Gerry. The evils we experience flow from the excess of\ democracy. The people do not want virtue, but are the dupes of pretended patriots. In Massts* *it had been fully confirmed by/ experience that they are daily misled into the most baneful measures and opinions by the false reports circulated by designing men, and which no one on the spot can refute. One principal evil arises from the want of due provision for those employed in the administration of Governmt It would seem to be a maxim of democracy to starve the public servants. He mentioned the popular clamour in Massts for the reduction of salaries and the attack made on that of the Govr though secured by the spirit of the Constitution itself. He had he said been too republican heretofore: he was still however republican, but had been taught by experience the danger of the levilling spirit.
Mr Mason, argued strongly for an election of the larger branch by the people. It was to be the grand depository of the democratic principle of the Govtt It was, so to speak, to be our House of Commons—It ought to know sympathise with every part of the community; and ought therefore to be taken not only from different parts of the whole republic, but also from different districts of the larger members of it, which had in several instances particularly in Virga, different interests and views arising from difference of produce, of habits c c. He admitted that we had been too democratic but was afraid we sd incautiously run into the opposite extreme. We ought to attend to the rights of every class of the people. He had often wondered at the indifference of the superior classes of society to this dictate of humanity policy; considering that however affluent their circumstances, or elevated their situations, might be, the course of a few years, not only might but certainly would, distribute their posterity throughout the lowest classes of Society. Every selfish motive therefore, every family attachment, ought to recommend such a system of policy as would provide no less carefully for the rights and happiness of the lowest than of the highest orders of Citizens.
Mr. Wilson contended strenuously for drawing the most numerous branch of the Legislature immediately from the people. He was for raising the federal pyramid to a considerable altitude, and for that reason wished to give it as broad a basis as possible. No government could long subsist without the confidence of the people. In a republican Government this confidence was peculiarly essential. He also thought it wrong to increase the weight of the State Legislatures by making them the electors of the national Legislature. All interference between the general and local Govemmts should be obviated as much as possible. On examination it would be found that the opposition of States to federal measures had preceded much more from the officers of the States, than from the people at large.
Mr Madison considered the popular election of one branch of the National Legislature as essential to every plan of free Government. He observed that in some of the States one branch of the Legislature was composed of men already removed from the people by an intervening body of electors. That if the first branch of the general legislature should be elected by the State Legislatures, the second branch elected by the first—the Executive by the second together with the first; and other appointments again made for subordinate purposes by the Executive, the people would be lost sight of altogether; and the necessary sympathy between them and their rulers and officers, too little felt. He was an advocate for the policy of refining the popular appointments by successive filtrations, but thought it might be pushed too far. He wished the expedient to be resorted to only in the appointment of the second branch of the Legislature, and in the Executive judiciary branches of the Government. He thought too that the great fabric to be raised would be more stable and durable, if it should rest on the solid foundation of the people themselves, than if it should stand merely on the pillars of the Legislatures.
Mr. Gerry did not like the election by the people. The maxims taken from the British constitution were often fallacious when applied to our situation which was extremely different. Experience he said had shewn that the State legislatures drawn immediately from the people did not always possess their confidence. He had no objection however to an election by the people if it were so qualified that men of honor character might not be unwilling to be joined in the appointments. He seemed to think the people might nominate a certain number out of which the State legislatures should be bound to choose.
Mr Butler thought an election by the people an impracticable mode.
On the question for an election of the first branch of the national Legislature by the people.
Masstst ay. Connect divd N. York ay. N. Jersey no. Pena ay. Delawe divd Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Georga ay.
The remaining Clauses of Resolution 4th 51 relating to the qualifications of members of the National Legislature,51 being pospd nem. con., as entering too much into detail for general propositions:
The Committee proceeded to Resolution 5.52 "that the second, [or senatorial] branch of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the first branch out of persons nominated by the State Legislatures."
Mr Spaight contended that the 2d branch ought to be chosen by the State Legislatures and moved an amendment to that effect.
Mr Butler apprehended that the taking so many powers out of the hands of the States as was proposed, tended to destroy all that balance and security of interests among the States which it was necessary to preserve; and called on Mr Randolph the mover of the propositions, to explain the extent of his ideas, and particularly the number of members he meant to assign to this second branch.
Mr Randf observed that he had at the time of offering his propositions stated his ideas as far as the nature of general propositions required; that details made no part of the plan, and could not perhaps with propriety have been introduced. If he was to give an opinion as to the number of the second branch, he should say that it ought to be much smaller than that of the first; so small as to be exempt from the passionate proceedings to which numerous assemblies are liable. He observed that the general object was to provide a cure for the evils under which the U. S. laboured ; that in tracing these evils to their origin every man had found it in the turbulence and follies of democracy: that some check therefore was to be sought for agst this tendency of our Governments: and that a good Senate seemed most likely to answer the purpose.
Mr. King reminded the Committee that the choice of the second branch as proposed (by Spaight) viz. by the State Legislatures would be impracticable, unless it was to be very numerous, or the idea of proportion among the States was to be disregarded. According to this idea, there must be 8o or loo members to entitle Delaware to the choice of one of them. Mr Spaight withdrew his motion.
Mr. Wilson opposed both a nomination by the State Legislatures, and an election by the first branch of the national Legislature, because the second branch of the latter, ought to be independent of both. He thought both branches of the National Legislature ought to be chosen by the people, but was not prepared with a specifie proposition. He suggested the mode of chusing the Senate of N. York to wit of uniting several election districts, for one branch, in chusing members for the other branch, as a good model.
Mr Madison observed that such a mode would destroy the influence of the smaller States associated with larger ones in the same district; as the latter would chuse from within themselves, altho' better men might be found in the former. The election of Senators in Virga where large small counties were often formed into one district for the purpose, had illustrated this consequence Local partiality, would often prefer a resident within the County or State, to a candidate of superior merit residing out of it. Less merit also in a resident would be more known throughout his own State.
Mr Sherman favored an election of one member by each of the State Legislatures.
Mr PINKNEY moved to strike out the "nomination by the State Legislatures." On this question.
*Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pena no. Del divd Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg no.53
On the whole question for electing by the first branch out of nominations by the State Legislatures, Mass. ay. Cont. no. N Y. no. N. Jersey. no. Pena no. Del. no. Virga ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Ga no.54
So the clause was disagreed to a chasm left in this part of the plan.
55 The sixth Resolution stating the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate was next taken into discussion: On the question whether each branch shd originate laws, there was an unanimous affirmative without debate. On the question for transferring all the Legislative powers of the existing Congs to this Assembly, there was also a silent affirmative nem. con.
On the proposition for giving "Legislative power in all cases to which the State Legislatures were individually incompetent."
Mr PINKNEY Mr RUTLEDGE objected to the vagueness of the term incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to vote until they should see an exact enumeration of the powers comprehended by this definition.
Mr BUTLER repeated his fears that we were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the States, and called on M: Randolp for the extent of his meaning.
Mr Randolph disclaimed any intention to give indefinite powers to the national Legislature, declaring that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State jurisdictions, and that he did not think any considerations whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion was fixed on this point.
Mr Madison said that he had brought with him into the Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might ultimately be he could not yet tell. But he should shrink from nothing which should be found essential to such a form of Govt as would provide for the safety, liberty and happiness of the community. This being the end of all our deliberations, all the necessary means for attaining it must, however reluctantly, be submitted to.
On the question for giving powers, in cases to which the States are not competent, Massts, ay. Cont divd [Sharman no Elseworth ay] N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. Carolina ay. Georga ay. 56
The other clauses 57 giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat. Leg. the articles of union, down to the last clause, (the words "or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union," being added after the words "contravening &c. the articles of the Union," on motion of Dr Franklin) were agreed to witht debate or dissent.
The last clause of Resolution 6.58 authorizing an exertion of the force of the whole agst a delinquent State came next into consideration.
Mr Madison, observed that the more he reflected on the use of force, the more he doubted the practicability, the justice and the efficacy of it when applied to people collectively and not individually.—A union of the States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction. The use of force against a State, would look more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked as a dissolution of all previous compacts by which it might be bound. He hoped that such a system would be framed as might render this recourse 59 unnecessary, and moved that the clause be postponed. This motion was agreed to nem. con.
The Committee then rose the House
Adjourned
William Houston from Georgia took his seat.
The Committee of the whole proceeded to Resolution 7.60 "that a national Executive be instituted, to be chosen by the national Legislature—for the term of years c to be ineligible thereafter, to possess the executive powers of Congress &c."
Mr PINKNEY was for a vigorous Executive but was afraid the Executive powers of the existing Congress might extend to peace war &c., which would render the Executive a monarchy, of the worst kind, to wit an elective one.
Mr Wilson moved that the Executive consist of a single person. Mr C Pinkney seconded the motion, so as to read "that a National Ex. to consist of a single person, be instituted.
A considerable pause ensuing and the Chairman asking if he should put the question, Docr Franklin observed that it was a point of great importance and wished that the gentlemen would deliver their sentiments on it before the question was put.
M: RUTLIDGE animadverted on the shyness of gentlemen on this and other subjects. He said it looked as if they supposed themselves precluded by having frankly disclosed their opinions from afterwards changing them, which he did not take to be at all the case. He said he was for vesting the Executive power in a single person, tho' he was not for giving him the power of war and peace. A single man would feel the greatest responsibihty and administer the public affairs best.
Mr. Sherman said he considered the Executive magistracy as nothing more than an institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect, that the person or persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the depositary of tfie supreme will of the Society. As they were the best judges of the business which ought to be done by the Executive department, and consequently of the number necessary from time to time for doing it, he wished the number might not be fixed but that the legislature should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience might dictate.
Mr. Wilson preferred a single magistrate, as giving most energy dispatch and responsibility to the office. He did not consider the Prerogatives of the British Monarch as a proper guide in defining the Executive powers. Some of these prerogatives were of legislative nature. Among others that of war peace &c. The only powers he conceived61 strictly Executive were those of executing the laws, and appointing officers, not appertaining to and appointed by the Legislature.
Mr. Gerry favored the policy of annexing a Council to the Executive in order to give weight & inspire confidence.
Mr. Randolph strenuously opposed a unity in the Executive magistracy. He regarded it as the foetus of monarchy. We had he said no motive to be governed by the British Governmt as our prototype. He did not mean however to throw censure on that Excellent fabric. If we were in a situation to copy it he did not know that he should be opposed to it; but the fixt genius of the people of America required a different form of Government. He could not see why the great requisites for the Executive department, vigor, despatch & responsibility could not be found in three men, as well as in one man. The Executive ought to be independent. It ought therefore in order to support its independence to consist of more than one.
Mr Wilson said that unity in the Executive instead of being the fetus of monarchy would be the best safeguard against tyranny. He repeated that he was not governed by the British Model which was inapplicable to the situation of this Country; the extent of which was so great, and the manners so republican, that nothing but a great confederated Republic would do for it.
Mr Wilson's motion for a single magistrate was postponed by common consent, the Committee seeming unprepared for any decision on it; and the first part of the clause agreed to, viz—"that a National Executive be instituted."
Mr MADISON thought it would be proper, before a choice shd be made between a unity and a plurality in the Executive, to fix the extent of the Executive authority; that as certain powers were in their nature Executive, and must be given to that departmt whether administered by one or more persons, a definition of their extent would assist the judgment in determining how far they might be safely entrusted to a single officer. He accordingly moved that so much of the clause before the Committee as related to the powers of the Executive she be struck out that after the words "that a national Executive ought to be instituted" there be inserted the words following viz. "with power to carry into effect the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for, and to execute such other powers "not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature," as may from time to time be delegated by the national Legislature." The words "not legislative nor judiciary in their nature" were added to the proposed amendment in consequence of a suggestion by Gen! Pinkney that improper powers might otherwise be delegated.
Mr Wilson seconded this motion—
Mr PINKNEY moved to amend the amendment by striking out the last member of it; viz: "and to execute such other powers not Legislative nor Judiciary in their nature as may from time to time be delegated." He said they were unnecessary, the object of them being included in the "power 62 to carry into effect the national laws."
Mr Randolph seconded the motion.
Mr. Madison did not know that the words were absolutely necessary, or even the preceding words—"to appoint to offices c. the whole being perhaps included in the first member of the proposition. He did not however see any inconveniency 63 in retaining them, and cases might happen in which they might serve to prevent doubts and misconstructions.
In consequence of the motion of Mr Pinkney, the question on Mr Madison's motion was divided; and the words objected to by Mr Pinkney struck out; by the votes of Connecticut, N. Y. N. J. Pen? Del. N. C. Geo.64 agst Mass. Virga S. Carolina 64 the preceding part of the motion being first agreed to; Connecticut divided, all the other States in the affirmative.
The next clause in Resolution 7,65 relating to the mode of appointing, the duration of, the Executive being under consideration,
Mr Wilson said he was almost unwilling to declare the mode which he wished to take place, being apprehensive that it might appear chimerical. He would say however at least that in theory he was for an election by the people. Experience, particularly in N. York Massts, shewed that an election of the first magistrate by the people at large, was both a convenient successful mode. The objects of choice in such cases must be persons whose merits have general notoriety.
Mr Sherman was for the appointment by the Legislature, and for making him absolutely dependent on that body, as it was the will of that which was to be executed. An independence of the Executive on the supreme Legislature, was in his opinion the very essence of tyranny if there was any such thing.
Mr Wilson moves that the blank for the term of duration should be filled with three years, observing at the same time that he preferred this short period, on the supposition that a reeligibility would be provided for.
Mr Pinkney moves for seven years.
Mr Sherman was for three years, and agst the doctrine of rotation as throwing out of office the men best qualifyed to execute its duties.
Mr Mason was for seven years at least, and for prohibiting a re-eligibility as the best expedient both for preventing the effect of a false complaisance on the side of the Legislature towards unfit characters; and a temptation on the side of the Executive to intrigue with the Legislature for a re-appointment.
Mr Bedford was strongly opposed to so long a term as seven years. He begged the committee to consider what the situation of the Country would be, in case the first magistrate should be saddled on it for such a period and it should be found on trial that he did not possess the qualifications ascribed to him, or should lose them after his appointment. An impeachment he said would be no cure for this evil, as an impeachment would reach misfeasance only, not incapacity. He was for a triennial election, and for an ineligibility after a period of nine years.
On the question for seven years,66
Massts dividd Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pena ay. Del. ay. Virg ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geor. no. 67 There being 5ays, 4 noes, 1 div4, a question was asked whether a majority had voted in the affirmative? The President decided that it was an affirmative vote.
The mode of appointing the Executive was the next question.
Mr WILSON renewed his declarations in favor of an appointment by the people. He wished to derive not only both branches of the Legislature from the people, without the intervention of the State Legislatures but the Executive also; in order to make them as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the States;
Col. Mason favors the idea, but thinks it impracticable. He wishes however that Mr Wilson might have time to digest it into his own form.—the clause "to be chosen by the National Legislature"—was accordingly postponed.—
Mr Rutlidge suggests an election of the Executive by the second branch only of the national Legislature.
The Committee then rose and the House
Adjourned.
It was movd & 2ded to postpone ye Resol: of Randolph respecting the Executive, in order to take up the 2d branch of the Legislature; which being negatived by Mas: Con: Del: Virg: N. C. S. C. Geo:70 agst* *N. Y. Pena Maryd The mode of appointg ye Executive was resumed.
Mr Wilson made the following motion, to be substituted for the mode proposed by Mr Randolph's resolution, "that the Executive Magistracy shall be elected in the following manner: That the States be divided into districts : that the persons qualified to vote in each district for members of the first branch of the national Legislature elect members for their respective districts to be electors of the Executive magistracy, that the said Electors'' of the Executive magistracy meet at and they or any ' of them so met shall proceed to elect by ballot, but not out of their own body person in whom the Executive authority of the national Government shall be vested. "
Mr Wilson repeated his arguments in favor of an election without the intervention of the States. He supposed too that this mode would produce more confidence among the people in the first magistrate, than an election by the national Legislature.
Mr Gerry, opposed the election by the national legislature. There would be a constant intrigue kept up for the appointment. The Legislature & the candidates wd bargain play into one another s hands, votes would be given by the former under promises or expectations from the latter, of recompensing them by services to members of the Legislature or to 71 their friends. He liked the principle of M. Wilson's motion, but fears it would alarm give a handle to the State partisans, as tending to supersede altogether the State authorities. He thought the Community not yet ripe for stripping the States of their powers, even such as might not be requisite for local purposes. He was for waiting till people should feel more the necessity of it. He seemed to prefer the taking the suffrages of the States instead of Electors, or letting the Legislatures nominate, and the electors appoint. He was not clear that the people ought to act directly even in the choice of electors, being too little informed of personal characters in large districts, and liable to deceptions.
Mr WILLIAMSON could see no advantage in the introduction of Electors chosen by the people who would stand in the same relation to them as the State Legislatures, whilst the expedient would be attended with great trouble and expence.
On the question for agreeing to Mr Wilson's substitute, it was negatived: Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no.* Pa ay. Del. no. Mard ay. Virga no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geoa no.72
On the question for electing the Executive by the national Legislature for the term of seven years, it was agreed to Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. Pena no. Del. ay. Maryd no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.73
Docr Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute—"whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services"—He said that being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion, and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of the Committee read instead of speaking them. Mr Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted—The following is a literal copy of the paper.
Sir.
It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine.—I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great advantages.
Sh, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love ol power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. Place before the eyes of such men, a post of honour that shall be at the same time a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its Councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless mischievous v/ars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace.
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and moderate; the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your Government and be your rulers.—And these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation: For their vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people.
Besides these evils. Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them. Hence as all history informs us, there has been in every State Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the governing governed : the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the Princes, or enslaving of the people. Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first all the peoples money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants for ever. It will be said, that we don't propose to establish Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States, may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our proposed System we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction tumult, by making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.
It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive department, without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In France, the office of Counsellor or Member of their Judiciary Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high price : There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as legal interest is there at five per C- they in fact pay two per C^ for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing good serving their Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.
Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made the experiment, and practised it with success more than an 74 hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences. In doing this, they are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it was75 never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites. And indeed in all cases of public service the less the profit the greater the honor.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen, the great and most important of our offices, that of General of our armies executed for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other brave men his military friends Companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the U. States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our Country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the office in question.
Sir, The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is, that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty.
The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton with the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that had a certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability.
Mr Dickenson moved " that the Executive be made removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures of individual States." It was necessary he said to place the power of removing somewhere. He did not like the plan of impeaching the Great officers of State. He did not know how provision could be made for removal of them in a better mode than that which he had proposed. He had no idea of abolishing the State Governments as some gentlemen seemed inclined to do. The happiness of this Coimtry in his opinion required considerable powers to be left in the hands of the States.
Mr Bedford seconded the motion.
Mr Sherman contended that the National legislature should have power to remove the Executive at pleasure.
Mr Mason. Some mode of displacing an unfit magistrate is rendered indispensable by the fallibility of those who choose, as well as by the corruptibility of the man chosen. He opposed decidedly the making the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a violation of the fundamental principle of good Government.
Mr Madison Mr Wilson observed that it would leave an equality of agency in the small with the great States ; that it would enable a minority of the people to prevent ye removal of an officer who had rendered himself justly criminal in the eyes of a majority; that it would open a door for intrigues agst him in States where his administration tho' just might be unpopular, and might tempt him to pay court to particular States whose leading partizans he might fear, or wish to engage as his partizans. They both thought it bad policy to introduce such a mixture of the State authorities, where their agency could be otherwise supplied.
Mr Dickenson considered the business as so important that no man ought to be silent or reserved. He went into a discourse of some length, the sum of which was, that the Legislative, Executive, Judiciary departments ought to be made as independent as possible; but that such an Executive as some seemed to have in contemplation was not consistent with a republic: that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy. In the British Govt itself the weight of the Executive arises from the attachments which the Crown draws to itself, & not merely from the force of its prerogatives. In place of these attachments we must look out for something else. One source of stability is the double branch of the Legislature. The division of the Country into distinct States formed the other principal source of stability. This division ought therefore to be maintained, and considerable powers to be left with the States. This was the ground of his consolation for the future fate of his Country. Without this, and in case of a consolidation of the States into one great Republic, we might read its fate in the history of smaller ones. A limited Monarchy he considered as one of the best Governments in the world. It was not certain that the same blessings were derivable from any other form. It was certain that equal blessings had never yet been derived from any of the republican form. A limited Monarchy however was out of the question. The spirit of the times—the state of our affairs, forbade the experiment, if it were desireable. Was it possible moreover in the nature of things to introduce it even if these obstacles were less insuperable, A House of Nobles was essential to such a Govt could these be created by a breath, or by a stroke of the pen? No. They were the growth of ages, and could only arise under a complication of circumstances none of which existed in this Country. But though a form the most perfect perhaps in itself be unattainable, we must not despair. If antient republics have been found to flourish for a moment & only then vanish for ever, it only proves that they were badly constituted ; and that we ought to seek for every remedy for their diseases. One of these remedies he conceived to be the accidental lucky division of this Country into distinct States, a division which some seemed desirous to abolish altogether. As to the point of representation in the national Legislature as it might affect States of different sizes, he said it must probably end in mutual concession. He hoped that each State would retain an equal voice at least in one branch of the National Legislature, and supposed the sums paid within each State would form a better ratio for the other branch than either the number of inhabitants or the quantum of property.
A motion being made to strike out "on request by a majority of the Legislatures of the individual States" and rejected, Connecticut, S. Carol: & Geo. being ay, the rest no: the question was taken -
On Mr Dickenson's motion for making 76 Executive removeable by 76 Natl Legislature at 76 request of 77 majority of State Legislatures78 was also rejected—all the States being in the negative Except Delaware which gave an affirmative vote.
The Question for making ye Executive ineligible after seven years,79 was next taken, and agreed to:
Massts; ay. Cont; no. N. Y. ay. Pa divd Del. ay. Maryd ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no:* 80
Mr WILLIAMSON 2ded by Mr Davie moved to add to the last Clause, the words—"and to be removeable on impeachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty"—which was agreed
Mr RUTLIDGE Mr C. PINKNEY moved that the blank for the no of persons in the Executive be filled with the words "one person." He supposed the reasons to be so obvious conclusive in favor of one that no member would oppose the motion.
Mr RANDOLPH opposed it with great earnestness, declaring that he should not do justice to the Country which sent him if he were silently to suffer the establishm! of a Unity in the Executive department. He felt an opposition to it which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived. He urged 1. that the permanent temper of the people was adverse to the very semblance of Monarchy. 2.82 that a unity was unnecessary a plurality being equally competent to all the objects of the department. 3.82 that the necessary confidence would never be reposed in a single Magistrate. 4.82 that the appointments would generally be in favor of some inhabitant near the center of the Community, and consequently the remote parts would not be on an equal footing. He was in favor of three members of the Executive to be drawn from different portions of the Country.
Mr Butler contended strongly for a single magistrate as most likely to answer the purpose of the remote parts. If one man should be appointed he would be responsible to the whole, and would be impartial to its interests. If three or more should be taken from as many districts, there would be a constant struggle for local advantages. In Military matters this would be particularly mischievous. He said his opinion on this point had been formed under the opportunity he had had of seeing the manner in which a plurality of military heads distracted Holland when threatened with invasion by the imperial troops. One man was for directing the force to the defence of this part, another to that part of the Country, just as he happened to be swayed by prejudice or interest.
The motion was then postpd the Committee rose the House Adjd
Monday June 4.84 In Committee of the whole
The Question was resumed on motion of Mr Pinkney by 85Wilson, "shall the blank for the number of the Executive be filled with a single person?"
Mr Wilson was in favor of the motion. It had been opposed by the gentleman from Virga [Mr Randolph] but the arguments used had not convinced him. He observed that the objections of R. were levelled not so much agst the measure itself, as agst its unpopularity. If he could suppose that it would occasion a rejection of the plan of which it should form a part, though the part was an important one, yet he would give it up rather than lose the whole. On examination he could see no evidence of the alledged antipathy of the people. On the contrary he was persuaded that it does not exist. All know that a single magistrate is not a King. One fact has great weight with him. All the 13 States tho agreeing in scarce any other instance, agree in placing a single magistrate at the head of the Governt The idea of three heads has taken place in none. The degree of power is indeed different , but there are no co-ordinate heads. In addition to his former reasons for preferring a unity, he would mention another. The tranquility not less than the vigor of the Govt he thought would be favored by it. Among three members, he foresaw nothing but uncontrouled, continued, violent animosities; which would not only interrupt the public administration; but diffuse their poison thro' the other branches of Govt, thro' the States, and at length thro' the people at large. If the members were to be unequal in power the principle of the 87 opposition to the unity was given up. If equal, the making them an odd number would not be a remedy. In Courts of Justice there are two sides only to a question. In the Legislative & Executive departmts questions have commonly many sides. Each member therefore might espouse a separate one & no two agree.
Mr SHERMAN. This matter is of great importance and ought to be well considered before it is determined. Mr Wilson he said had observed that in each State a single magistrate was placed at the head of the Govt It was so he admitted, and properly so, and he wished the same policy to prevail in the federal Govt But then it should be also remarked that in all the States there was a Council of advice, without which the first magistrate could not act. A council he thought necessary to make the establishment acceptable to the people. Even in G. B. the King has a Council; and though he appoints it himself, its advice has its weight with him, and attracts the Confidence of the people.
Mr Williamson asks Mr Wilson whether he means to annex a Council.
Mr Wilson means to have no Council, which oftener serves to cover, than prevent malpractices.
Mr Gerry was at a loss to discover the policy of three members for the Executive. It we be extremely inconvenient in many instances, particularly in military matters, whether relating to the militia, an army, or a navy. It would be a general with three heads.
On the question for a single Executive it was agreed to Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. Pena ay. Del. no. Maryd no. Virg. ay. [Mr R. Mr Blair no—Docr Mc Cg Mr M. Gen W. ay. Col. Mason being no, but not in house, Mr Wythe ay but gone home]. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Georga ay.88
First Clause of Proposition 8th 89 relating to a Council of Revision taken into consideration.
Mr Gerry doubts whether the Judiciary ought to form a part of it, as they will have a sufficient check agst encroachments on their own department by their exposition of the laws, which involved a power of deciding on their Constitutionality. In some States the Judges had actually set aside laws as being aget the Constitution. This was done too with general approbation. It was quite foreign from the nature of ye office to make them judges of the policy of public measures. He moves to postpone the clause in order to propose "that the National Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative act which shall not be afterwards passed by parts of each branch of the national Legislature."
Mr King seconds the motion, observing that the Judges ought to be able to expound the law as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its formation.
Mr WILSON thinks neither the original proposition nor the amendment go far enough. If the Legislative Exetv & Judiciary ought to be distinct & independent. The Executive ought to have an absolute negative. Without such a self-defense the Legislature can at any moment sink it into non-existence. He was for varying the proposition in such a manner as to give the Executive & Judiciary jointly an absolute negative.
On the question to postpone in order to take Mr Gerry's proposition into consideration it was agreed to, Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Maryd no. Virga no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Ga ay. 90
M: Gerry's proposition being now before 91 Committee, Mr WILSON & Mr HAMILTON move that the last part of it [viz. "Wch sl not be afterwd passed unless 92 by parts of each branch of the National legislature] be struck out, so as to give the Executive an absolute negative on the laws. There was no danger they thought of such a power being too much exercised. It was mentioned by Col: Hamilton that the King of G. B. had not exerted his negative since the Revolution.
Mr Gerry sees no necessity for so great a controul over the legislature as the best men in the Community would be comprised in the two branches of it.
Docr Franklin, said he was sorry to differ from his colleague for whom he had a very great respect, on any occasion, but he could not help it on this. He had had some experience of this check in the Executive on the Legislature, under the proprietary Government of Pena The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. An increase of his salary, or some donation, was always made a condition; till at last it became the regular practice, to have orders in his favor on the Treasury, presented along with the bills to be signed, so that he might actually receive the former before he should sign the latter. When the Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could not 'be got, till it was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from taxation: so that the people were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the burden. This was a mischievous sort of check. If the Executive was to have a Council, such a power would be less objectionable. It was true, the King of G. B. had not, as was said, exerted his negative since the Revolution; but that matter was easily explained. The bribes and emoluments now given to the members of parliament rendered it unnecessary, every thing being done according to the will of the Ministers. He was afraid, if a negative should be given as proposed, that more power and money would be demanded, till at last eno' would be gotten to influence & bribe the Legislature into a compleat subjection to the will of the Executive.
Mr Sherman was agst enabling any one man to stop the will of the whole. No one man could be found so far above all the rest in wisdom. He thought we ought to avail ourselves of his wisdom in revising the laws, but not permit him to overule the decided and cool opinions of the legislature.
Mr Madison supposed that if a proper proportion of each branch should be required to overrule the objections of the Executive, it would answer the same purpose as an absolute negative. It would rarely if ever happen that the Executive constituted as ours is proposed to be would, have firmness eno' to resist the legislature, unless backed by a certain part of the body itself. The King of G. B. with all his splendid attributes would not be able to withstand ye unanimous and eager wishes of both houses of Parliament. To give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious to the temper of this Country; its present temper at least.
Mr Wilson believed as others did that this power would seldom be used. The Legislature would know that such a power existed, and would refrain from such laws, as it would be sure to defeat. Its silent operation would therefore preserve harmony and prevent mischief. The case of Pena formerly was very different from its present case. The Executive was not then as now to be appointed by the people. It will not in this case as in the one cited be supported by the head of a Great Empire, actuated by a different sometimes opposite interest. The salary too is now proposed to be fixed by the Constitution, or if Dr F.'s idea should be adopted all salary whatever interdicted. The requiring a large proportion of each House to overrule the Executive check might do in peaceable times; but there might be tempestuous moments in which animosities jnay run high between the Executive and Legislative branches, and in which the former ought to be able to defend itself.
Mr Butler had been in favor of a single Executive Magistrate; but could he have entertained an idea that a compleat negative on the laws was to be given him he certainly should have acted very differently. It had been observed that in all countries the Executive power is in a constant course of increase. This was certainly the case in G. B. Gentlemen seemed to think that we had nothing to apprehend from an abuse of the Executive power. But why might not a Cataline or a Cromwell arise in this Country as well as in others.
Mr Bedford was opposed to every check on the Legislative,94 even the Council of Revision first proposed. He thought it would J be sufficient to mark out in the Constitution the boundaries to the Legislative Authority, which would give all the requisite security to the rights of the other departments. The Representatives of the people were the best Judges of what was for their interest, and ought to be under no external controul whatever. The two branches would produce a sufficient controul within the Legislature itself.
Col. Mason observed that a vote had already passed he found [he was out at the time] for vesting the executive powers in a single person. Among these powers was that of appointing to offices in certain cases. The probable abuses of a negative had been well explained by Dr F. as proved by experience, the best of all tests. Will not the same door be opened here. The Executive may refuse its assent to necessary measures till new appointments shall be referred to him; and having by degrees engrossed all these into his own hands, the American Executive, like the British, will by bribery & influence, save himself the trouble & odium of exerting his negative afterwards. We are Mr Chairman going very far in this business. We are not indeed constituting a British Government, but a more dangerous monarchy, an elective one. We are introducing a new principle into our system, and not necessary as in the British Govt where the Executive has greater rights to defend. Do gentlemen mean to pave the way to hereditary Monarchy? Do they flatter themselves that the people will ever consent to such an innovation? If they do I venture to tell them, they are mistaken. The people never will consent. And do gentlemen consider the danger of delay, and the still greater danger of a a rejection, not for a moment but forever, of the plan which shall be proposed to them. Notwithstanding the oppressions & injustice experienced among us from democracy; the genius of the people is in favor of it, and the genius of the people must be consulted. He could not but consider the federal system as in effect dissolved by the appointment of this Convention to devise a better one. And do gentlemen look forward to the dangerous interval between the extinction of an old, and the establishment of a new Governmt and to the scenes of confusion which may ensue. He hoped that nothing like a Monarchy would ever be attempted in this Country. A hatred to its oppressions had carried the people through the late Revolution. Will it not be eno' to enable the Executive to suspend offensive laws, till they shall be coolly revised, and the objections to them overruled by a greater majority than was required in the first instance. He never could agree to give up all the rights of the people to a single Magistrate. If more than one had been fixed on, greater powers might have been entrusted to the Executive. He hoped this attempt to give such powers would have its weight hereafter as an argument for increasing the number of the Executive.
Docr Franklin. a Gentleman from S. C. [Mr Butler] a day or two ago called our attention to the case of the U. Netherlands. He wished the gentleman had been a little fuller, and had gone back to the original of that Govt The people being under great obligations to the Prince of Orange whose wisdom and bravery had saved them, chose him for the Stadtholder. He did very well. Inconveniences however were felt from his powers; which growing more & more oppressive, they were at length set aside. Still however there was a party for the P. of Orange, which descended to his son who excited insurrections, spilt a great deal of blood, murdered the de Witts, and got the powers revested in the Stadtholder. Afterwards another Prince had power to excite insurrections & to 95 make the Stadtholdership hereditary. And the present Stadthder is ready to wade thro a bloody civil war to the establishment of a monarchy. Col. Mason had mentioned the circumstance of appointing officers. He knew how that point would be managed. No new appointment would be suffered as heretofore in Pensa unless it be referred to the Executive; so that all profitable offices will be at his disposal. The first man put at the helm will be a good one. No body knows what sort may come afterwards. The Executive will be always increasing here, as elsewhere, till it ends in a Monarchy
On the question for striking out so as to give 96 Executive an absolute negative—Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. Dl. no. Md no. Vª no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georgª no.97
Mr BUTLER moved that the Resoln be altered so as to read— "Resolved that the National Executive have a power to suspend any Legislative act for the term of
Doctr Franklin seconds the motion.
Mr Gerry observed that a 98 power of suspending might do all the mischief dreaded from the negative of useful laws; without answering the salutary purpose of checking unjust or unwise ones.
On 96 question for giving this suspending power" all the States, to wit Massts Cont N. Y. Ps Del. Maryd Virgs N. C. S. C. Georgia were No.
On a question for enabling two thirds of each branch of the Legislature to overrule the revisionary 99 check: it passed in the affirmative sub silentio; and was inserted in the blank of M: Gerry's motion.
On the question on Mr Gerry's motion which gave the Executive alone without the Judiciary the revisionary controul on the laws unless overruled by 2/3 of each branch; Masste ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. Pay. Del. ay. Maryano. Vay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.1
It was moved by Mr Wilson 2ded by Mr Madison—that the following amendment be made to the last resolution—after the words "National Ex." to add "& a convenient number of the National Judiciary."
An objection of order being taken by Mr HAMILTON to the introduction of the last amendment at this time, notice was given by Mr W. Mr M.—that the same wd be moved tomorrow,—whereupon Wednesday (the day after)2 was assigned to reconsider the amendment of Mr Gerry.
It was then moved & 2ded to proceed to the consideration of the 9th resolution submitted by Mr Randolph—when on motion to agree to the first clause namely "Resolved that a National Judiciary be established" 3 It passed in the affirmative nem. con.
It was then moved & 2ded to add these words to the first clause of the ninth resolution namely—"to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals," which passed in the affirmative—
The Comme then rose and the House Adjourned
Governor Livingston from 4 New Jersey, took his seat.
The words, "one or more" were struck out before "inferior tribunals" as an amendment to the last clause of Resoln 9th 5 The Clause—"that the National Judiciary be chosen by the National Legislature," being under consideration.
Mr Wilson opposed the appointmt of Judges by the National Legisl: Experience shewed the impropriety of such appointmts by numerous bodies. Intrigue, partiality, and concealment were the necessary consequences. A principal reason for unity in the Executive was that officers might be appointed by a single, responsible person.
Mr RUTLIDGE was by no means disposed to grant so great a power to any single person. The people will think we are leaning too much towards Monarchy. He was against establishing any national tribunal except a single supreme one. The State tribunals are most proper to decide in all cases in the first instance.
Docr Franklin observed that two modes of chusing the Judges had been mentioned, to wit, by the Legislature and by the Executive. He wished such other modes to be suggested as might occur to other gentlemen; it being a point of great moment. He would mention one which he had understood was practiced in Scotland. He then in a brief and entertaining manner related a Scotch mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers, who always selected the ablest of the profession in order to get rid of him, and share his practice among themselves. It was here he said the interest of the electors to make the best choice, which should always be made the case if possible.
Mr Madison disliked the election of the Judges by the Legislature or any numerous body. Besides, the danger of intrigue and partiality, many of the members were not judges of the requisite qualifications. The Legislative talents which were very different from those of a Judge, commonly recommended men to the favor of Legislative Assemblies. It was known too that the accidental circumstances of presence and absence, of being a member or not a member, had a very undue influence on the appointment. On the other hand he was not satisfied with referring the appointment to the Executive. He rather inclined to give it to the Senatorial branch, as numerous eno' to be confided in—as not so numerous as to be governed by the motives of the other branch; and as being sufficiently stable and independent to follow their deliberate judgments. He hinted this only and moved that the appointment by the Legislature might be struck out, a blank left to be hereafter filled on maturer reflection. Mr Wilson seconds it. On the question for striking out. Masste ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pena ay. Del. ay. Maay. Vaay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.6
Mr Wilson gave notice that he should at a future day move for a reconsideration of that clause which respects "inferior tribunals."
Mr Pinkney gave notice that when the clause respecting the appointment of the Judiciary should again come before the Committee he should move to restore the "appointment by the national Legislature."
The following clauses of Resol: 9.7 were agreed to viz "to hold their offices during good behaviour, and to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution."
The remaining clause of Resolution 9.8 was posponed.
Resolution 10 9 was agreed to-viz-that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the National Legislature less than the whole.
The II. propos:10 "for guarantying to States Republican Gov! territory &c., being read, Mr PATTERSON wished the point of representation could be decided before this clause should be considered, and moved to postpone it: which was not opposed, and agreed to: Connecticut S. Carolina only voting agst it.
Propos. 12 11 "for continuing Congs till a given day and for fulfilling their engagements," produced no debate.
On the question, Mass. ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J.* ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Ma ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. G. ay.
Propos: 13.12 "that provision ought to be made for hereafter amending the system now to be established, without requiring the assent of the Natl Legislature," being taken up,
Mr PINKNEY doubted the propriety or necessity of it.
Mr Gerry favored it. The novelty difficulty of the experiment requires periodical revision. The prospect of such a revision would also give intermediate stability to the Govt Nothing had yet happened in the States where this provision existed to prove its impropriety. The proposition was postponed for further consideration: the votes being, Mas: Con. N. Y. P. Del. Ma. N. C. ay Virga S. C. Geo: no
Propos. 14.13 "requiring oath from the State officers to support National Govt" was postponed after a short uninteresting conversation: the votes, Con. N. Jersey. Virg?: S. C. Geo. ay N. Y. P? Del. N. C. no Massachusetts divided.
Propos. 1514 for '^recommending Conventions under appointment of the people to ratify the new Constitution'" &c. being taken up.
Mr Sharman thought such a popular ratification unnecessary; the articles of Confederation providing for changes and alterations with the assent of Cong? and ratification of State legislatures
Mr Madison thought this provision essential. The articles of Confedn themselves were defective in this respect, resting in many of the States on the legislative sanction only. Hence in conflicts between acts of the States, and of Congs especially where the former are of posterior date, and the decision is to be made by State tribunals, an uncertainty must necessarily prevail, or rather perhaps a certain decision in favor of the State authority. He suggested also that as far as the articles of Union were to be considered as a Treaty only of a particular sort, among the Governments of Independent States, the doctrine might be set up that a breach of any one article, by any of the parties, absolved the other parties from the whole obligation. For these reasons as well as others he thought it indispensable that the new Constitution should be ratified in the most unexceptionable form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves.
Mr Gerry observed that in the Eastern States the Confed? had been sanctioned by the people themselves. He seemed afraid of referring the new system to them. The people in that quarter have at this time the wildest ideas of Government in the world. They were for abolishing the Senate in Massts and giving all the other powers of Govt to the other branch of the Legislature.
Mr King supposed that the last article of ye Confedn rendered the legislature competent to the ratification. The people of the Southern States where the federal articles had been ratified by the Legislatures only, had since impliedly given their sanction to it. He thought notwithstanding that there might be policy in varying the mode. A Convention being a single house, the adoption may more easily be carried thro' it, than thro' the Legislatures where there are several branches. The Legislatures also being to lose power, will be most likely to raise objections. The people having already parted with the necessary powers it is immaterial to them, by which Government they are possessed, provided they be well employed.
Mr. Wilson took this occasion to lead the Committee by a train of observations to the idea of not suffering a disposition in the plurality of States to confederate anew on better principles, to be defeated by the inconsiderate or selfish opposition of a few States. He hoped the provision for ratifying would be put on such a footing as to admit of such a partial union, with a door open for the acession of the rest.*
Mr PINKNEY hoped that in case the experiment should not unanimously take place, nine States might be authorized to unite under the same Governt
The propos. 15.16 was postponed nem. cont
Mr PINKNEY Mr RUTLIDGE moved that tomorrow be assigned to reconsider that clause of Propos. 4: 17 which respects the election of the first branch of the National Legislature—which passed in 18 affirmative: Con: N. Y. P. Del: 4 V. ay—6 Mas. N. J. N. C. S. C. Geo. no. 5.
Mr RUTLIDGE havg obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved that that part of the clause in propos. 9.19 should be expunged: arguing that the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights uniformity of Judgmst: that it was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system.—Mr Sherman 2ded the motion.
Mr Madison observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the Supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the seat of the Court. An effective Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A Government without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body, without arms or legs to act or move.
Mr Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds, he said the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular states, & to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen.
Mr Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing State Courts would answer the same purpose.
Mr Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be a national Judiciary, and that the former ought to have authority to institute the latter.
On the question for M: Rutlidge's motion to strike out "inferior tribunals" 20
Masst divided. Cont ay. N. Y. divd N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.21
Mr Wilson & Mr Madison then moved, in pursuance of the idea expressed above by Mr Dickinson, to add to Resol: 9.22 the words following "that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals." They observed that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated the necessity of some such provision.
Mr Butler. The people will not bear such innovations. The States will revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an establishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the best Govt he could devise; but the best they wd receive.
Mr King remarked as to the comparative expence that the establishment of inferior tribunals w^ cost infinitely less than the appeals that would be prevented by them.
On this question as moved by Mr W. Mr M.
Mass. ay. Ct no. N. Y. divd N. J.* ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.
The Committee then rose the House adjourned to ii OC toms 23
Wednesday June 6™ In Committee of the whole
Mr Pinkney according to previous notice & rule obtained, moved ' ' that the first branch of the national Legislature be elected by the State Legislatures, and not by the people." contending that the people were less fit Judges in such a case, and that the Legislatures would be less likely to promote the adoption of the new Government, if they were to be excluded from all share in it.
Mr Rutlidge 2ded the motion.
Mr Gerry. Much depends on the mode of election. In England, the people will probably lose their liberty from the smallness of the proportion having a right of suffrage. Our danger arises from the opposite extreme: hence in Massts the worst men get into the Legislature. Several members of that Body had lately been convicted of infamous crimes. Men of indigence, ignorance baseness, spare no pains, however dirty to carry their point agst men who are superior to the artifices practised. He was not disposed to run into extremes. He was as much principled as ever agst aristocracy and monarchy. It was necessary on the one hand that the people should appoint one branch of the Govt in order to inspire them with the necessary confidence. But he wished the election on the other to be so modified as to secure more effectually a just preference of merit. His idea was that the people should nominate certain persons in certain districts, out of whom the State legislatures shd make the appointment.
Mr Winson. He wished for vigor in the Govt, but he wished that vigorous authority to flow immediately from the legitimate source of all authority. The Govt ought to possess not only 1st the force, but 2dly the mind or sense of the people at large. The legislature ought to be the most exact transcript of the whole Society. Representation is made necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively. The opposition was to be expected he said from the Governments, not from the Citizens of the States. The latter had parted as was observed [by Mr King] with all the necessary powers;24 and it was immaterial to them, by whom they were exercised, if well exercised. The State officers were to be the losers of power. The people he supposed would be rather more attached to the national Govt than to the State Govts as being more important in itself, and more flattering to their pride. There is no danger of improper elections if made by large districts. Bad elections proceed from the smallness of the districts which give an opportunity to bad men to intrigue themselves into office.
Mr Sherman. If it were in view to abolish the State Govts the elections ought to be by the people. If the State Govts are to be continued, it is necessary in order to preserve harmony between the National State Govts that the elections to the former shd* *be made by the latter. The right of participating in the National Govt would be sufficiently secured to the people by their election of the State legislatures. The objects of the Union, he thought were few. 1. 25 defence agst foreign danger. 225 agst internal disputes a resort to force. 3.25 Treaties with foreign nations. 425 regulating foreign commerce, drawing revenue from it. These perhaps a few lesser objects alone rendered a Confederation of the States necessary. All other matters civil criminal would be much better in the hands of the States. The people are more happy in small than 26 large States. States may indeed be too small as Rhode Island, thereby be too subject to faction. Some others were perhaps too large, the powers of Govt not being able to pervade them. He was for giving the General Govt power to legislate and execute within a defined province.
Col. Mason. Under the existing Confederacy, Congs represent the States27 not the people of the States : their acts operate on the States, not on the individuals.28 The case will be changed in the new plan of Govt. The people will be represented; they ought therefore to choose the Representatives. The requisites in actual representation are that the Rep? should sympathize with their constituents ; shd think as they think, & feel as they feel ; and that for these purposes shd even be residents among them. Much he sd had been alledged agst democratic elections. He admitted that much might be said; but it was to be considered that no Govt was free from imperfections evils; and that improper elections in many instances, were inseparable from Republican Govts But compare these with the advantage of this Form in favor of the rights of the people, in favor of human nature. He was persuaded there was a better chance for proper elections by the people, if divided into large districts, than by the State legislatures. Paper money had been issued by the latter when the former were against it. Was it to be supposed that the State Legislatures then wd not send to the Nat? legislature patrons of such projects, if the choice depended on them.
Mr Madison considered an election of one branch at least of the Legislature by the people immediately, as a clear principle of free Govt and that this mode under proper regulations had the additional advantage of securing better representatives, as well as of avoiding too great an agency of the State Governments in the General one.—He differed from the member from Connecticut [Mr Sharman] in thinking the objects mentioned to be all the principal ones that required a National Govt Those were certainly important and necessary objects; but he combined with them the necessity of providing more effectually for the security of private rights, and the steady dispensation of Justice. Interferences with these were evils which had more perhaps than any thing else, produced this convention. Was it to be supposed that republican liberty could long exist under the abuses of it practised in some of the States. The gentleman [Mr Sharman] had admitted that in a very small State, faction oppression wd prevail. It was to be inferred then that wherever these prevailed the State was too small. Had they not prevailed in the largest as well as the smallest tho' less than in the smallest; and were we not thence admonished to enlarge the sphere as far as the nature of the Govt would admit. This was the only defence agst the inconveniencies of democracy consistent with the democratic form of Govt All civilized Societies would be divided into different Sects, Factions, interests, as they happened to consist of rich & poor, debtors & creditors, the landed, the manufacturing, the commercial interests, the inhabitants of this district or that district, the followers of this political leader or that political leader, the disciples of this religious Sect or that religious Sect. In all cases where a majority are united by a common interest or passion, the rights of the minority are in danger. What motives are to restrain theMr A prudent regard to the maxim that honesty is the best policy is found by experience to be as little regarded by bodies of men as by individuals. Respect for character is always diminished in proportion to the number among whom the blame or praise is to be divided. Conscience, the only remaining tie, is known to be inadequate in individuals: In large numbers, little is to be expected from it. Besides, Religion itself may become a motive to persecution & oppression.—These observations are verified by the Histories of every Country antient & modem. In Greece Rome the rich & poor, the creditors & debtors, as well as the patricians & plebians alternately oppressed each other with equal unmercifulness. What a source of oppression was the relation between the parent cities of Rome, Athens & Carthage, & their respective provinces: the former possessing the power, the latter being sufficiently distinguished to be separate objects of it? Why was America so justly apprehensive of Parliamentary injustice? Because G. Britain had a separate interest real or supposed, & if her authority had been admitted, could have pursued that interest at our expence. We have seen the mere distinction of colour made in the most enlightened period of time, a ground of the most oppressive dominion ever exercised by man over man. What has been the source of those unjust laws complained of among ourselves ? Has it not been the real or supposed interest of the major number? Debtors have defrauded their creditors. The landed interest has borne hard on the mercantile interest. The Holders of one species of property have thrown a disproportion of taxes on the holders of another species. The lesson we are to draw from the whole is that where a majority are united by a common sentiment, and have an opportunity, the rights of the minor party become insecure. In a Republican Govt the Majority if united have always an opportunity. The only remedy is to enlarge the sphere, thereby divide the community into so great a number of interests & parties, that in the 1st place a majority will not be likely at the same moment to have a common interest separate from that of the whole or of the minority and in the 2d place, that in case they shd have such an interest, they may not be apt to unite in the pursuit of it. It was incumbent on us then to try this remedy, and with that view to frame a republican system on such a scale & in such a form as will controul all the evils wch have been experienced.
Mr Dickenson considered it as 30 essential that one branch of the Legislature shd be drawn immediately from the people; and as expedient that the other shd be chosen by the Legislatures of the States. This combination of the State Govts with the national Govt was as politic as it was unavoidable. In the formation of the Senate we ought to carry it through such a refining process as will assimilate it as near as may be to the House of Lords in England. He repeated his warm eulogiums on the British Constitution. He was for a strong National Govt but for leaving. the States a considerable agency in the System. The objection agst making the former dependent on the latter might be obviated by giving to the Senate an authority permanent & irrevocable for three, five or seven years. Being thus independent they will speak31 & decide with becoming freedom.
Mr Read. Too much attachment is betrayed to the State Governts We must look beyond their continuance. A national Govt must soon of necessity swallow all of them up. They will soon be reduced to the mere office of electing the National Senate. He was agst patching up the old federal System: he hoped the idea w^ be dismissed. It would be like putting new cloth on an old garment. The confederation was founded on temporary principles. It cannot last: it cannot be amended. If we do not establish a good Govt on new principles, we must either go to ruin, or have the work to do over again. The people at large are wrongly suspected of being averse to a Genl Govt The aversion lies among interested men who possess their confidence.
Mr Pierce was for an election by the people as to the 1st branch & by the States as to the 2d branch; by which means the Citizens of the States wd be represented both individually & collectively.
General Pinkney wished to have a good National Govt & at the same time to leave a considerable share of power in the States. An election of either branch by the people scattered as they are in many States, particularly in S. Carolina was totally impracticable. He differed from gentlemen who thought that a choice by the people wd be a better guard agst bad measures, than by the Legislatures. A majority of the people in S. Carolina were notoriously for paper money as a legal tender ; the Legislature had refused to make it a legal tender. The reason was that the latter had some sense of character and were restrained by that consideration. The State Legislatures also he said would be more jealous, more ready to thwart the National Govt, if excluded from a participation in it. The Idea of abolishing these Legislatures wd never go down.
Mr Wilson, would not have spoken again, but for what had fallen from Mr Read; namely, that the idea of preserving the State Govts ought to be abandoned. He saw no incompatibility between the National State Govts provided the latter were restrained to certain local purposes ; nor any probability of their being devoured by the former. In all confederated Systems antient & modern the reverse had happened; the Generality being destroyed gradually by the usurpations of the parts composing it.
On the question for electing the 1st branch by the State Legislatures as moved by Mr Pinkney: it was negatived:
Mass. no. Ct ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.33
Mr Wilson moved to reconsider the vote excluding the Judiciary from a share in the revision of the laws, and to add after " National Executive" the words "with a convenient number of the national Judiciary " ; remarking the expediency of reinforcing the Executive with the influence of that Department.
Mr Madison 2ded the motion. He observed that the great difficulty in rendering the Executive competent to its own defence arose from the nature of Republican Govt which could not give to an individual citizen that settled pre-eminence in the eyes of the rest, that weight of property, that personal interest agst betraying the national interest, which appertain to an hereditary magistrate. In a Republic personal merit alone could be the ground of political exaltation, but it would rarely happen that this merit would be so pre-eminent as to produce universal acquiescence. The Executive Magistrate would be envied & assailed by disappointed competitors: His firmness therefore wd need support. He would not possess those great emoluments from his station, nor that permanent stake in the public interest which wd place him out of the reach of foreign corruption: He would stand in need therefore of being controuled as well as supported. An association of the Judges in his revisionary function w^ both double the advantage and diminish the danger. It wd also enable the Judiciary Department the better to defend itself agst Legislative encroachments. Two objections had been made that the Judges ought not to be subject to the bias which a participation in the making of laws might give in the exposition of them. 2dly that the Judiciary Departmt ought to be separate & distinct from the other great Departments. The 1st objection had some weight; but it was much diminished by reflecting that a small proportion of the laws coming in question before a Judge wd be such wherein he had been consulted; that a small part of this proportion wd be so ambiguous as to leave room for his prepossessions; and that but a few cases wd probably arise in the life of a Judge under such ambiguous passages. How much good on the other hand wd proceed from the perspicuity, the conciseness, and the systematic character wch the Code of laws wd receive from the Judiciary talents. As to the 2d objection, it either had no weight, or it applied with equal weight to the Executive & to the Judiciary revision of the laws. The maxim on which the objection was founded required a separation of the Executive as well as of 34 the Judiciary from the Legislature & from each other. There wd in truth however be no improper mixture of these distinct powers in the present case. In England, whence the maxim itself had been drawn, the Executive had an absolute negative on the laws; and the supreme tribunal of Justice [the House of Lords] formed one of the other branches of the Legislature. In short whether the object of the revisionary power was to restrain the Legislature from encroaching on the other co-ordinate Departments, or on the rights of the people at large; or from passing laws unwise in their principle, or incorrect in their form, the utility of annexing the wisdom and weight of the Judiciary to the Executive seemed incontestable.
Mr Gerry thought the Executive, whilst standing alone wd be more impartial than when he cd be covered by the sanction seduced by the sophistry of the Judges.
Mr King. If the Unity of the Executive was preferred for the sake of responsibility, the policy of it is as applicable to the revisionary as to the Executive power.
Mr Pinkney had been at first in favor of joining the heads of the principal departmts the Secretary of War, of foreign affairs & in the council of revision. He had however relinquished the idea from a consideration that these could be called in 35 by the Executive Magistrate whenever he pleased to consult them. He was opposed to an introduction of the Judges into the business.
Col. Mason was for giving all possible weight to the revisionary institution. The Executive power ought to be well secured agst Legislative usurpations on it. The purse & the sword ought never to get into the same hands whether Legislative or Executive.
Mr Dickenson. Secrecy, vigor & despatch are not the principal properties reqd in the Executive. Important as these are, that of responsibility is more so, which can only be preserved; by leaving it singly to dicharge its functions. He thought too a junction of the Judiciary to it, involved an improper mixture of powers.
Mr Wilson remarked, that the responsibility required belonged to his Executive duties. The revisionary duty was an extraneous one, calculated for collateral purposes.
Mr Williamson, was for substituting a clause requiring 2/3 for every effective act of the Legislature, in place of the revisionary provision.
On the question for joining the Judges to the Executive in the revisionary business. Mass. no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md no. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. No. Geo. no.37
Mr Pinkney gave notice that tomorrow he should move for the reconsideration of that clause in the sixth Resolution adopted by the ComMr which vests a negative in the National Legislature on the laws of the several States.
The Come rose the House adjd to 11 OC.38
Mr Pinkney according to notice moved to reconsider the clause respecting the negative on State laws, which was agreed to and tomorrow for fixed 40 the purpose.
The Clause providing for ye appointment of the 2d branch of the national legislature, having lain blank since the last vote on the mode of electing it, to wit, by the 1st branch, Mr Dickenson now moved "that the members of the 2d branch ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures. "
Mr Sharman seconded the motion; observing that the particular States would thus become interested in supporting the national Govenmt and that a due harmony between the two Governments would be maintained. He admitted that the two ought to have separate and distinct jurisdictions, but that they ought to have a mutual interest in supporting each other.
Mr Pinkney. If the small States should be allowed one Senator only, the number will be too great, there will be 80 at least.
Mr Dickenson had two reasons for his motion, 1.41 because the sense of the States would be better collected through their Governments; than immediately from the people at large ; 2.41 because he wished the Senate to consist of the most distinguished characters, distinguished for their rank in life and their weight of property, and bearing as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible ; and he thought such characters more likely to be selected by the State Legislatures, than in any other mode. The greatness of the number was no objection with him. He hoped there would be 80 and twice 80. of them. If their number should be small, the popular branch could not be balanced by them. The legislature of a numerous people ought to be a numerous body.
Mr Williamson, preferred a small number of Senators, but wished that each State should have at least one. He suggested 25 as a convenient number. The different modes of representation in the different branches, will serve as a mutual check.
Mr Butler was anxious to know the ratio of representation before he gave any opinion.
Mr Wilson. If we are to establish a national Government, that Government ought to flow from the people at large. If one branch of it should be chosen by the Legislatures, and the other by the people, the two branches will rest on different foundations, and dissensions will naturally arise between them. He wished the Senate to be elected by the people as well as the other branch, and the people might be divided into proper districts for the purpose & 42 moved to postpone the motion of Mr Dickenson, in order to take up one of that import.
Mr Morris 2ded him.
Mr Read proposed " that the Senate should be appointed by the Executive Magistrate out of a proper number of persons to be nominated by the individual legislatures." He said he thought it his duty, to speak his mind frankly. Gentlemen he hoped would not be alarmed at the idea. Nothing short of this approach towards a proper model of Government would answer the purpose, and he thought it best to come directly to the point at once. His proposition was not seconded nor supported.
Mr Madison, if the motion [of Mr. Dickenson] should be agreed to, we must either depart from the doctrine of proportional representation ; or admit into the Senate a very large number of members. The first is inadmissible, being evidently unjust. The second is inexpedient. The use of the Senate is to consist in its proceeding with more coolness, with more system, & with more wisdom, than the popular branch. Enlarge their number and you communicate to them the vices which they are meant to correct. He differed from Mr D. who thought that the additional number would give additional weight to the body. On the contrary it appeared to him that their weight would be in an inverse ratio to their number.43 The example of the Roman Tribunes was applicable. They lost their influence and power, in proportion as their number was augmented. The reason seemed to be obvious: They were appointed to take care of the popular interests & pretensions at Rome, because the people by reason of their numbers could not act in concert; 44 were liable to fall into factions among themselves, and to become a prey to their aristocratic adversaries. The more the representatives of the people therefore were multiplied, the more they partook of the infirmities of their constituents, the more liable they became to be divided among themselves either from their own indiscretions or the artifices of the opposite faction, and of course the less capable of fulfilling their trust. When the weight of a set of men depends merely on their personal characters; the greater the number the greater the weight. When it depends on the degree of political authority lodged in them the smaller the number the greater the weight. These considerations might perhaps be combined in the intended Senate; but the latter was the material one.
Mr Gerry. 4 modes of appointing the Senate have been mentioned. 1. 45 by the branch of the National Legislature. This would create a dependence contrary to the end proposed. 2 45 by the National Executive. This is a stride towards monarchy that few will think of. 3.45 by the people. The people have two great interests, the landed interest, and the commercial including the stockholders. To draw both branches from the people will leave no security to the latter interest; the people being chiefly composed of the landed interest, and erroneously supposing, that the other interests are adverse to it. 445 by the Individual Legislatures. The elections being carried thro' this refinement, will be most likely to provide some check in favor of the commercial interest agst the landed; without which oppression will take place, and no free Govt can last long where that is the case. He was therefore in favor of this last.
Mr Dickenson.* The preservation of the States in a certain degree of agency is indispensable. It will produce that collision between the different authorities which should be wished for in order to check each other. To attempt to abolish the States altogether, would degrade the Councils of our Country, would be impracticable, would be ruinous. He compared the proposed National System to the Solar System, in which the States were the planets, and ought to be left to move freely in their proper orbits. The Gentleman from Pa [Mr Wilson] wished he said to extinguish these planets. If the State Governments were excluded from all agency in the national one, and all power drawn from the people at large, the consequence would be that the national Govt would move in the same direction as the State Govts now do, and would run into all the same mischiefs. The reform would only unite the 13 small streams into one great current pursuing the same course without any opposition whatever. He adhered to the opinion that the Senate ought to be composed of a large number, and that their influence from family weight & other causes would be increased thereby. He did not admit that the Tribunes lost their weight in proportion as their no was augmented and gave a historical sketch of this institution. If the reasoning of [Mr Madison] was good it would prove that the number of the Senate ought to be reduced below ten, the highest no of the Tribunitial corps.
Mr Wilson. The subject it must be owned is surrounded with doubts and difficulties. But we must surmount them. The British Govemmt cannot be our model. We have no materials for a similar one. Our manners, our laws, the abolition of entails and of primogeniture, the whole genius of the people, are opposed to it. He did not see the danger of the States being devoured by the Nationl Govt. On the contrary, he wished to keep them from devouring the national Govt. He was not however for extinguishing these planets as was supposed by Mr D.—neither did he on the other hand, believe that they would warm or enlighten the Sun. Within their proper orbits they must still be suffered to act for subordinate purposes for which their existence is made essential by the great extent of our Country. He could not comprehend in what manner the landed interest wd be rendered less predominant in the Senate, by an election through the medium of the legislatures then by the people themselves. If the Legislatures, as was now complained, sacrificed the commercial to the landed interest, what reason was there to expect such a choice from them as would defeat their own views. He was for an election by the people in large districts which wd be most likely to obtain men of intelligence & uprightness; subdividing the districts only for the accomodation of voters.
Mr Madison could as little comprehend in what manner family weight, as desired by Mr D. would be more certainly conveyed into the Senate through elections by the State Legislatures, than in some other modes. The true question was in what mode the best choice wd be made? If an election by the people, or thro' any other channel than the State Legislatures promised as uncorrupt & impartial a preference of merit, there could surely be no necessity for an appointment by those legislatures. Nor was it apparent that a more useful check would be derived thro' that channel than from the people thro' some other. The great evils complained of were that the State Legislatures run into schemes of paper money &c. whenever solicited by the people, & sometimes without even the sanction of the people. Their / influence then, instead of checking a like propensity in the National Legislature, may be expected to promote it. Nothing can be more contradictory than to say that the Natl Legislature witht a proper check, will follow the example of the State Tegislatures, & in the same breath, that the State Legislatures are the only proper check.
Mr Sharman opposed elections by the people in districts, as not likely to produce such fit men as elections by the State Legislatures.
Mr Gerry insisted that the commercial monied interest wd be more secure in the hands of the State Legislatures, than of the people at large. The former have more sense of character, and will be restrained by that from injustice. The people are for paper money when the legislatures are agst it. In Massts the County Conventions had declared a wish for a depreciating paper that w^ sink itself. Besides, in some States there are two Branches in the Legislature, one of which is somewhat aristocratic. There wd therefore be so far a better chance of refinement in the choice. There seemed, he thought to be three powerful objections agst elections by districts, 1.46 it is impracticable; the people cannot be brought to one place for the purpose; and whether brought to the same place or not, numberless frauds wd be unavoidable. 2.46 small States forming part of the same district with a large one, or 47 large part of a large one, wd have no chance of gaining an appointment for its citizens of merit. 3 46 a new source of discord wd be opened between different parts of the same district.
Mr PINKNEY thought the 2d branch ought to be permanent & independent, that the members of it wd be rendered more so by receiving their appointment 48 from the State Legislatures. This mode w! avoid the rivalships discontents incident to the election by districts. He was for dividing the States into three classes according to their respective sizes, & for allowing to the 1st class three members—to the 2d two, & to the 3d one.
On the question for postponing Mr Dickinson's motion referring the appointment of the Senate to the State Legislatures, in order to consider Mr Wilson's for referring it to the people
Mass. no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay Del. no. Ma no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 49
Col. Mason. whatever power may be necessary for the Natl Govt a certain portion must necessarily be left in 50 the States. It is impossible for one power to pervade the extreme parts of the U. S. so as to carry equal justice to them. The State Legislatures also ought to have some means of defending themselves agst encroachments of the Natl Govt In every other department we have studiously endeavored to provide for its self-defence. Shall we leave the States alone unprovided with the means for this purpose? And what better means can we provide than the giving them some share in, or rather to make them a constituent part of, the Natl Establishment. There is danger on both sides no doubt; but we have only seen the evils arising on the side of the State Govt Those on the other side remain to be displayed. The example of Congs does not apply. Congs had no power to carry their acts into execution as the Natl Govt will have.
On Mr Dickinson's motion for an appointment of the Senate by the State-Legislatures.
Mass. ay. Ct ay. N. Y. ay. Pa ay Del. ay. Ma ay. Va ay N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.51
Mr Gerry gave notice that he wd tomorrow move for a reconsideration of the mode of appointing the Natl Executive in order to substitute an appointmt by the State Executives
The Committee rose & The House adjd
On a reconsideration of the clause giving the Natl Legislature a negative on such laws of the States as might be contrary to the articles of Union, or Treaties with foreign nations,
Mr Pinkney moved "that the National Legislature shd have authority to negative all laws which they shd judge to be improper." He urged that such a universality of the power was indispensably necessary to render it effectual; that the States must be kept in due subordination to the nation; that if the States were left to act of themselves in any case, it wd be impossible to defend the national prerogatives, however extensive they might be on paper; that the acts of Congress had been defeated by this means; nor had foreign treaties escaped repeated violations; that this universal negative was in fact the comer stone of an efficient national Govt; that under the British Govt the negative of the Crown had been found beneficial, and the States are more one nation now, than the Colonies were then.
Mr Madison seconded the motion. He could not but regard an indefinite power to negative legislative acts of the States as absolutely necessary to a perfect system. Experience had evinced a constant tendency in the States to encroach on the federal authority; to violate national Treaties; to infringe the rights & interests of each other; to oppress the weaker party within their respective jurisdictions. A negative was the mildest expedient that could be devised for preventing these mischiefs. The existence of such a check would prevent attempts to commit them. Should no such precaution be engrafted, the only remedy wd lie 52 in an appeal to coercion. Was such a remedy eligible? was it practicable? Could the national resources, if exerted to the utmost enforce a national decree agst Massts abetted perhaps by several of her neighbours? It wd not be possible. A small proportion of the Community, in a compact situation, acting on the defensive, and at one of its extremities might at an}" time bid defiance to the National authority. Any Govt for the U. States formed on the supposed practicability of using force agst the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, prove as visionary fallacious as the Govt of Congs The negative render the use of force unnecessary. The States cd of themselves then 53 pass no operative act, any more than one branch of a Legislature where there are two branches, can proceed without the other. But in order to give the negative this efficacy, it must extend to all cases. A discrimination wd only be a fresh source of contention between the two authorities. In a word, to recur to the illustrations borrowed from the planetary system. This prerogative of the General Govt is the great pervading principle that must controul the centrifugal tendency of the States; which, without it, will continually fly out of their proper orbits and destroy the order harmony of the political System.
Mr Williamson was agst giving a power that might restrain the States from regulating their internal police.
Mr Gerry cd not see the extent of such a power, and was agst every power that was not necessary. He thought a remonstrance agst unreasonable acts of the States wd reclaim 54 them If it shd not force might be resorted to. He had no objection to authorize a negative to paper money and similar measures. When the confederation was depending before Congress, Massachussetts was then for inserting the power of emitting paper money amg the exclusive powers of Congress. He observed that the proposed negative wd extend to the regulations of the Militia, a matter on which the existence of a 55 State might depend. The Natl Legislature with such a power may enslave the States. Such an idea as this will never be acceded to. It has never been suggested or conceived among the people. No speculative projector, and there are eno' of that character among us, in politics as well as in other things, has in any pamphlet or newspaper thrown out the idea. The States too have different interests and are ignorant of each other's interests. The negative therefore will be abused. New States too having separate views from the old States will never come into the Union. They may even be under some foreign influence; are they in such case to participate in the negative on the will of the other States?
Mr Sherman thought the cases in which the negative ought to be exercised, might be defined. He wished the point might not be decided till a trial at least shd be made for that purpose.
Mr Wilson would not say what modifications of the proposed power might be practicable or expedient. But however novel it might appear the principle of it when viewed with a close & steady eye, is right. There is no instance in which the laws say that the individual shd be bound in one case, & at liberty to judge whether he will obey or disobey in another. The cases are parallel. Abuses of the power over the individual person may happen as well as over the individual States. Federal liberty is to 56 States, what civil liberty, is to private individuals. And States are not more unwilling to purchase it, by the necessary concession of their political sovereignty, that 57 the savage is to purchase civil liberty by the surrender of his 58 personal sovereignty, which he enjoys in a State of nature. A definition of the cases in which the Negative should be exercised, is impracticable. A discretion must be left on one side or the other? will it not be most safely lodged on the side of the Natl Govt? Among the first sentiments expressed in the first Congs one was that Virga is no more, that Masts is no 59 , that Pa is no more &c. We are now one nation of brethren. We must bury all local interests distinctions. This language continued for some time. The tables at length began to turn. No sooner were the State Govts formed than their jealousy & ambition began to display themselves. Each endeavoured to cut a slice from the common loaf, to add to its own morsel, till at length the confederation became frittered down to the impotent condition in. which it now stands. Review the progress of the articles of Confederation thro ' Congress & compare the first last draught of it. To correct its vices- is the business of this convention. One of its vices is the want of an effectual controul in the whole over its parts. What danger is there that the whole will unnecessarily sacrifice a part? But reverse the case, and leave the whole at the mercy of each part, and will not the general interest be continually sacrificed to local interests?
Mr Dickenson deemed it impossible to draw a line between the cases proper & improper for the exercise of the negative. We must take our choice of two things. We must either subject the States to the danger of being injured by the power of the Natl Govt or the latter to the danger of being injured by that of the States. He thought the danger greater from the States. To leave the power doubtful, would be opening another spring of discord, and he was for shutting as many of them as possible.
Mr Bedford. In answer to his colleague's question where wd be the danger to the States from this power, would refer him to the smallness of his own State which may be injured at pleasure without redress. It was meant he found to strip the small States of their equal right of suffrage. In this case Delaware would have about 1/90 for its share in the General Councils, whilst Pa & Va would possess ⅓ of the whole. Is there no difference of interests, no rivalship of commerce, of manufactures? Will not these large States crush the small ones whenever they stand in the way of their ambitious or interested views. This shews the impossibility of adopting such a system as that on the table, or any other founded on a change in the principle of representation. And after all, if a State does not obey the law of the new System, must not force be resorted to as the only ultimate remedy, in this as in any other system. It seems as if Pa & Va by the conduct of their deputies wished to provide a system in which they would have an enormous & monstrous influence. Besides, How can it be thought that the proposed negative can be exercised? are the laws of the States to be suspended in the most urgent cases until they can be sent seven or eight hundred miles, and undergo the deliberations 60 of a body who may be incapable of Judging of theMr Is the National Legislature too to sit continually in order to revise the laws of the States?
Mr MADISON observed that the difficulties which had been started were worthy of attention and ought to be answered before the question was put. The case of laws of urgent necessity must be provided for by some emanation of the power from the Natl Govt into each State so far as to give a temporary assent at least. This was the practice in Royal Colonies before the Revolution and would not have been inconvenient, if the supreme power of negativing had been faithful to the American interest, and had possessed the necessary information. He supposed that the negative might be very properly lodged in the senate alone, and that the more numerous & expensive branch therefore might not be obliged to sit constantly.—He asked Mr B. what would be the consequence to the small States of a dissolution of the Union wch seemed likely to happen if no effectual substitute was made for the defective System existing, and he did not conceive any effectual system could be substituted on any other basis than that of a proportional suffrage? If the large States possessed the avarice & ambition with which they were charged, would the small ones in their neighbourhood, be more secure when all controul of a Genl Govt was withdrawn.
Mr Butler was vehement agst the Negative in the proposed extent, as cutting off all hope of equal justice to the distant States. The people there would not he was sure give it a hearing.
On the question for extending the negative power to all cases as proposd by [Mr P. Mr M—] Mass. ay. Cont. no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. divd Mr Read & Mr Dickenson ay. Mr Bedford & Mr Basset no. Maryd. no. Va. ay. Mr R. Mr Mason no. Mr Blair, Docr Mc Mr M. ay. Genl W. not consulted. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 61
On motion of Mr Gerry and Mr King tomorrow was assigned for reconsidering the mode of appointing the National Executive: the reconsideration being voted for by all the States except Connecticut N. Carolina.
Mr Pinkney and Mr Rutlidge moved to add to Resoln 4.62 agreed to by the Come the following, viz. "that the States be divided into three classes, the 1st class to have 3 members, the 2d two. the 3d one member each; that an estimate be taken of the comparative importance of each State at fixed periods, so as to ascertain the number of members they may from time to time be entitled to " The Committee then rose and the House adjourned.
Mr Gerry, according to previous notice given by him, moved "that the National Executive should be elected by the Executives of the States whose proportion of votes should be the same with that allowed to the States in the election of the Senate." If the appointmt should be made by the Natl Legislature, it would lessen that independence of the Executive which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue and corruption between the Executive & Legislature previous to the election, and to partiality in the Executive afterwards to the friends who promoted him. Some other mode therefore appeared to him necessary. He proposed that of appointing by the State Executives as most analogous to the principle observed in electing the other branches of the Natl Govt; the first branch being chosen by the people of the States, the 2d by the Legislatures of the States; he did not see any objection agst letting the Executive be appointed by the Executives of the States. He supposed the Executives would be most likely to select the fittest men, and that it would be their interest to support the man of their own choice.
Mr Randolph, urged strongly the inexpediency of Mr Gerry's mode of appointing the Natl Executive. The confidence of the people would not be secured by it to the Natl magistrate. The small States would lose all chance of an appointmt from within themselves. Bad appointments would be made; the Executives of the States being little conversant with characters not within their own small spheres. The State Executives too notwithstanding their constitutional independence, being in fact dependent on the State legislatures will generally be guided by the yiews of the latter, and prefer either favorites within the States, or such as it may be expected will be most partial to the interests of the State. A Natl Executive thus chosen will not be likely to defend with becoming vigilance firmness the National rights agst State encroachments. Vacancies also must happen. How can these be filled? He could not suppose either that the Executives would feel the interest in supporting the Natl Executive which had been imagined. They will not cherish the great Oak which is to reduce them to paltry shrubs.
On the question for referring the appointment of the Natl Exexecutive to the State Executives as propd by Mr Gerry Massst no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. divd Md no. Va no. S. C. no. Geo. no.63
Mr Patterson moves that the Committee resume the clause relating to the rule of suffrage in the Natl Legislature.
Mr Brearly seconds him. He was sorry he said that any question on this point was brought into view. It had been much agitated in Congs at the time of forming the Confederation, and was then rightly settled by allowing to each sovereign State an equal vote. Otherwise the smaller States must have been destroyed instead of being saved. The substitution of a ratio, he admitted carried fairness on the face of it; but on a deeper examination was unfair and unjust. Judging of the disparity of the States by the quota of Congs Virga would have 16 votes, and Georgia but one. A like proportion to the others will make the whole number ninity. There will be 3. large states, and 10 small ones. The large States by which he meant Massts Pena Virga will carry every thing before them. It had been admitted, and was known to him from facts within N. Jersey that where large & small counties were united into a district for electing representatives for the district, the large counties always carried their point, and Consequently that 64 the large States would do so. Virga with her sixteen votes will be a solid column indeed, a formidable phalanx. While Georgie with her Solitary vote, and the other little States will be obliged to throw themselves constantly into the scale of some large one, in order to have any weight at all. He had come to the convention with a view of being as useful as he could in giving energy and stability to the federal Government. When the proposition for destroying the equality of votes came forward, he was astonished, he was alarmed. Is it fair then it will be asked that Georgia should have an equal vote with Virga? He would not say it was. What remedy then? One only, that a map of the U. S. be spread out, that all the existing boundaries be erased, and that a new partition of the whole be made into 13 equal parts.
Mr Patterson considered the proposition for a proportional representation as striking at the existence of the lesser States. He wd premise however to an investigation of this question some remarks on the nature structure and powers of the Convention. The Convention he said was formed in pursuance of an Act of Congs that this act was recited in several of the Commissions, particularly that of Massts which he required to be read: that the amendment of the confederacy was the object of all the laws and commissions on the subject; that the articles of the Confederation were therefore the proper basis of all the proceedings of the Convention.65 We ought to keep within its limits, or we should be charged by our Constituents with usurpation, that the people of America were sharpsighted and not to be deceived. But the Commissions under which we acted were not only the measure of our power, they denoted also the sentiments of the States on the subject of our deliberation. The idea of a national Govt as contradistinguished from a federal one, never entered into the mind of any of them, and to the public mind we must accomodate ourselves. We have no power to go beyond the federal scheme, and if we had the people are not ripe for any other. We must follow the people; the people will not follow us. —The proposition could not be maintained whether considered in reference to us as a nation, or as a confederacy. A confederacy supposes sovereignty in the members composing it & sovereignty supposes equality. If we are to be considered as a nation, all State distinctions must be abolished, the whole must be thrown into hotchpot, and when an equal division is made, then there may be fairly an equality of representation. He held up Virga Massts & Pa as the three large States, and the other ten as small ones; repeating the calculations of Mr Brearly as to the disparity of votes which wd take place, and affirming that the small States would never agree to it. He said there was no more reason that a great individual State contributing much, should have more votes than a small one contributing little, than that a rich individual citizen should have more votes than an indigent one. If the rateable property of A was to that of B as 40 to I , ought A for that reason to have 40 times as many votes as B. Such a principle would never be admitted, and if it were admitted would put B entirely at the mercy of A. As A. has more to be protected than B so he ought to contribute more for the common protection. The same may be said of a large State wch has more to be protected than a small one. Give the large States an influence in proportion to their magnitude, and wha,t will be the consequence? Their ambition will be proportionally increased, and the small States will have every thing to fear. It was once proposed by Galloway some others that America should be represented in the British Parlt and then be bound by its laws. America could not have been entitled to more than ⅓ of the no of 66 Representatives which would fall to the share of G. B. Would American rights interests have been safe under an authority thus constituted? It has been said that if a Natl Govt is to be formed so as to operate on the people and not on the States, the representatives ought to be drawn from the people. But why so? May not a Legislature filled by the State Legislatures operate on the people who chuse the State Legislatures? or may not a practicable coercion be found. He admitted that there was none such in the existing System.—He was attached strongly to the plan of the existing confederacy, in which the people chuse their Legislative representatives; and the Legislatures their federal representatives. No other amendments were wanting than to mark the orbits of the States with due precision, and provide for the use of coercion, which was the great point. He alluded to the hint thrown out heretofore by Mr Wilson of the necessity to which the large States might be reduced of confederating among themselves, by a refusal of the others to concur. Let them imite if they please, but let them remember that they have no authority to compel the others to unite. N. Jersey will never confederate on the plan before the Committee. She would be swallowed up. He had rather submit to a monarch, to a despot, than to such a fate. He would not only oppose the plan here but on his return home do every thing in his power to defeat it there.
Mr Wilson hoped if the Confederacy should be dissolved, that a majority, that a minority of the States would unite for their safety. He entered elaborately into the defence of a proportional representation, stating for his first position that as all authority was derived from the people, equal numbers of people ought to have an equal n? of representatives, and different numbers of people different numbers of representatives. This principle had been improperly violated in the Confederation, owing to the urgent circumstances of the time. As to the case of A. & B, stated by Mr Patterson, he observed that in districts as large as the States, the number of people was the best measure of their comparative wealth. Whether therefore wealth or numbers were 67 to form the ratio it would be the same. Mr P. admitted persons, not property to be the measure of suffrage. Are not the Citizens of Pena equal to those of N. Jersey? does it require 150 of the former to balance 50 of the latter? Representatives of different districts ought clearly to hold the same proportion to each other, as their respective Constituents hold to each other. If the small States will not confederate on this plan, Pena he presumed some other States, would not confederate on any other. We have been told that each State being sovereign, all are equal. So each man is naturally a sovereign over himself, and all men are therefore naturally equal. Can he retain this equality when he becomes a member of Civil Government? He can not. As little can a Sovereign State, when it becomes a member of a federal Governt. If N. J. will not part with her Sovereignty it is in vain to talk of Govt. A new partition of the States is desireable, but evidently & totally impracticable.
Mr Williamson, illustrated the cases by a comparison of the different States, to Counties of different sizes within the same State; observing that proportional representation was admitted to be just in the latter case, and could not therefore be fairly contested in the former.
The Question being about to be put Mr Patterson hoped that as so much depended on it, it might be thought best to postpone the decision till tomorrow, which was done nem. con.
The Come rose & the House adjourned.
The clause concerning the rule of suffrage in the natl Legislature postponed on Saturday was resumed.
Mr Sharman proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1st branch should be according to the respective numbers of free inhabitants; and that in the second branch or Senate, each State should have one vote and no more. He said as the States would remain possessed of certain individual rights, each State ought to be able to protect itself : otherwise a few large States will rule the rest. The House of Lords in England he observed had certain particular rights under the Constitution, and hence they have an equal vote with the House of Commons that they may be able to defend their rights.
Mr Rutlidge proposed that the proportion of suffrage in the 1st branch should be according to the quotas of contribution. The justice of this rule he said could not be contested. Mr Butler urged the same idea : adding that money was power ; and that the States ought to have weight in the Govt in proportion to their wealth.
Mr King & Mr Wilson,* in order to bring the question to a point moved " that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national Legislature ought not to be according 68 the rule established in the articles of Confederation, but according to some equitable ratio of representation." The clause so far as it related to suffrage in the first branch was postponed in order to consider this motion.
Mr Dickenson contended for the actual contributions of the States as the rule of their representation & suffrage in the first branch. By thus connecting the interest 69 of the States with their duty, the latter would be sure to be performed.
Mr King remarked that it was uncertain what mode might be used in levying a national revenue; but that it was probable, imposts would be one source of it. If the actual contributions were to be the rule the non-importing States, as Cont & N. Jersey, wd be in a bad situation indeed. It might so happen that they wd have no representation. This situation of particular States had been always one powerful argument in favor of the 5 Per Ct impost.
The question being abt to be put Docr Franklin sd he had thrown his ideas of the matter on a paper wch Mr Wilson read to the Committee in the words following-
Mr Chairman
It has given me great pleasure to observe that till this point, the proportion of representation, came before us, our debates were carried on with great coolness & temper. If any thing of a contrary kind, has on this occasion appeared, I hope it will not be repeated; for we are sent here to consult, not to contend, with each other ; and declarations of a fixed opinion, and of determined resolution, never to change it, neither enlighten nor convince us. Positiveness and warmth on one side, naturally beget their like on the other; and tend to create and augment discord & division in a great concern, wherein harmony & Union are extremely necessary to give weight to our Councils, and render them effectual in promoting & securing the common good.
I must own that I was originally of opinion it would be better if every member of Congress, or our national Council, were to consider himself rather as a representative of the whole, than as an Agent for the interests of a particular State; in which case the proportion of members for each State would be of less consequence, & it would not be very material whether they voted by States or individually. But as I find this is not to be expected, I now think the number of Representatives should bear some proportion to the number of the Represented; and that the decisions shd be by the majority of members, not by the majority of 70 States. This is objected to from an apprehension that the greater States would then swallow up the smaller. I do not at present clearly see what advantage the greater States could propose to themselves by swallowing 71 the smaller, and therefore do not apprehend they would attempt it. I recollect that in the beginning of this Century, when the Union was proposed of the two Kingdoms, England & Scotland, the Scotch Patriots were full of fears, that unless they had an equal number of Representatives in Parliament, they should be ruined by the superiority of the English. They finally agreed however that the different proportions of importance in the Union, of the two Nations should be attended to, whereby they were to have only forty members in the House of Commons, and only sixteen in the House of Lords; A very great inferiority of numbers! And yet to this day I do not recollect that any thing has been done in the Parliament of Great Britain to the prejudice of Scotland; and whoever looks over the lists of public officers. Civil & military of that nation will find I believe that the North Britons enjoy at least their full proportion of emolument.
But, Sir, in the present mode of voting by States, it is equally in the power of the lesser States to swallow up the greater ; and this is mathematically demonstrable. Suppose for example, that 7 smaller States had each 3 members in the House, and the 6 larger to have one Avith another 6 members; and that upon a question, two members of each smaller State should be in the affirmative and one in the Negative; they will 72 make
Affirmatives……14……. Negatives 7
And that all the larger States should be unanimously in the Negative, they would make …… Negatives 36
Inall ………………………………………..43
It is then apparent that the 14 carry the question against the 43, and the minority overpowers the majority, contrary to the common practice of Assemblies in all Countries and Ages.
The greater States Sir are naturally as unwilling to have their property left in the disposition of the smaller, as the smaller are to have theirs in the disposition of the greater. An honorable gentleman has, to avoid this difficulty, hinted a proposition of equalizing the States. It appears to me an equitable one, and I should, for my own part, not be against such a measure, if it might be found practicable. Formerly, indeed, when almost every province had a different Constitution, some with greater others with fewer privileges, it was of importance to the borderers when their boundaries were contested, whether by running the division lines, they were placed on one side or the other. At present when such differences are done away, it is less material. The Interest of a State is made up of the interests of its individual members. If they are not injured, the State is not injured. Small States are more easily well & happily governed than large ones. If therefore in such an equal division, it should be found necessary to diminish Pennsylvania, I should not be averse to the giving a part of it to N. Jersey, and another to Delaware. But as there would probably be considerable difficulties in adjusting such a division; and however equally made at first, it would be continually varying by the augmentation of inhabitants in some States, and their 73 fixed proportion in others and thence frequent occasion for new divisions, I beg leave to propose for the consideration of the Committee another mode, which appears to me, to be as equitable, more easily carried into practice, and more permanent in its nature.
Let the weakest State say what proportion of money or force it is able and willing to furnish for the general purposes of the Union.
Let all the others oblige themselves to furnish each an equal proportion.
The whole of these joint supplies to be absolutely in the disposition of Congress.
The Congress in this case to be composed of an equal number of Delegates from each State.
And their decisions to be by the Majority of individual members voting.
If these joint and equal supplies should on particular occasions not be sufficient, Let Congress make requisitions on the richer and more powerful States for farther aids, to be voluntarily afforded, leaving to each State the right of considering the necessity and utility of the aid desired, and of giving more or less as it should be foimd proper.
This mode is not new, it was formerly practised with success by the British Government with respect to Ireland and the Colonies. We sometimes gave even more than they expected, or thought just to accept; and in the last war carried on while we were united, they gave us back in 5 years a million Sterling. We should probably have continued such voluntary contributions, whenever the occasions appeared to require them for the commongood of the Empire. It was not till they chose to force us, and to deprive us of the merit and pleasure of voluntary contributions that we refused & resisted. Those 74 contributions however were to be disposed of at the pleasure of a Government in which we had no representative. I am therefore persuaded, that they will not be refused to one in which the Representation shall be equal
My learned Colleague [Mr Wilson] has already mentioned that the present method of voting by States, was submitted to originally by Congress, under a conviction of its impropriety, inequality, and injustice. This appears in the words of their Resolution. It is of Sept 6. 1774. The words are
"Resolved that in determining questions in this Congs each Colony or province shall have one vote: The Congs not being possessed of or at present able to procure materials for ascertaining the importance of each Colony."
On the question for agreeing to Mr Kings and Mr Wilsons motion it passed in the affirmative
Massts. ay. Ct ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md divd. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.75
It was then moved by Mr. Rutlidge 2ded by Mr. Butler to add to the words "equitable ratio of representation" at the end of the motion just agreed to, the words "according to the quotas of contribution." On motion of Mr Wilson seconded by Mr C. Pinckney, this was postponed; in order to add, after, after the words "equitable ratio of representation" the words following "in proportion to the whole number of white other free Citizens inhabitants of every age sex & condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes, in each State," this being the rule in the Act of Congress agreed to by eleven States, for apportioning quotas of revenue on the States, and requiring a Census only every 5–7, or 10 years.
Mr Gerry thought property not the rule of representation. Why then shd the blacks, who were property in the South, be in the rule of representation more than the Cattle horses of the North.
On the question,—Mass: Con: N. Y. Pen: Maryd Virga N. C. S. C. & Geo: were in the affirmative: 76 N. J. & Del: in the negative. 76
Mr Sharman moved that a question be taken whether each State shall have one vote in the 2d branch. Every thing he said depended on this. The smaller States would never agree to the plan on any other principle than an equality of suffrage in this branch. Mr Elsworth seconded the motion. On the question for allowing each State one vote in the 2d branch.
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.77
Mr Wilson & Mr Hamilton moved that the right of suffrage in the 2d branch ought to be according to the same rule as in the 1st branch. On this question for making the ratio of representation the same in the 2d as in the 1st branch it passed in the affirmative:
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.78
Resol: 11,79 for guarantying Republican Govt territory to each State being considered: the words "or partition" were, on motion of Mr Madison, added, after the words "voluntary junction : ' '
Mas. N. Y. P. Va N. C. S. C. G. ay80 Con: N. J. Del. Md no.80
Mr Read disliked the idea of guarantying territory. It abetted the idea of distinct States wch would be a perpetual source of discord. There can be no cure for this evil but in doing away States altogether and uniting them all into one great Society.
Alterations having been made in the Resolution, making it read "that a republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States" the whole was agreed to nem. con.
Resolution 13,81 for amending the national Constitution hereafter without consent of 82 Natl Legislature being considered, several members did not see the necessity of the Resolution at all, nor the propriety of making the consent of the Natl Legisl. unnecessary.
Col. Mason urged the necessity of such a provision. The plan now to be formed will certainly be defective, as the Confederation has been found on trial to be. Amendments therefore will be necessary, and it will be better to provide for them, in an easy, regular and Constitutional way than to trust to chance and violence. It would be improper to require the consent of the Natl Legislature, because they may abuse their power, and refuse their consent 83 on that very account. The opportunity for such an abuse, may be the fault of the Constitution calling for amendmt
Mr Randolph enforced these arguments.
The words, "without requiring the consent of the Natl Legislature" were postponed. The other provision in the clause passed nem. con.
Resolution 14,84 requiring oaths from the members of the State Govt® to observe the Natl Constitution laws, being considered.
Mr Sharman opposed it as unnecessarily intruding into the State jurisdictions.
Mr Randolph considered it as 85 necessary to prevent that competition between the National Constitution & laws those of the particular States, which had already been felt. The officers of the States are already under oath to the States. To preserve a due impartiality they ought to be equally bound to the Natl Govt The Natl authority needs every support we can give it. The Executive & Judiciary of the States, notwithstanding their nominal independence on the State Legislatures are in fact, so dependent on them, that unless they be brought under some tie to the Natl System, they will always lean too much to the State systems, whenever a contest arises between the two.
Mr Gerry did not like the clause. He thought there was as much reason for requiring an oath of fidelity to the States, from Natl officers, as vice, versa.
Mr Luther Martin moved to strike out the words requiring such an oath from the State officers, viz "within the several States" observing that if the new oath should be contrary to that already taken by them it would be improper; if coincident the oaths already taken will be sufficient.
On the question for striking out as proposed by Mr L. Martin Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. ay. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.86
Question on 87 whole Resolution as proposed by Mr Randolph;
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 88
89 Come rose 89 House adjd.
The Question 90 taken on Resolution 15,91 to wit, referring the new system to the people of the 92 States for ratification it passed in the affirmative: Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa* ay. Del. divd Md divd Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 93
Mr Sharman & Mr Elseworth moved to fill the blank left in the 4th Resolution for the periods of electing the members of the first branch with the words, "every year." Mr Sharman observing that he did it in order to bring on some question.
Mr Rutlidge proposed "every two years."
Mr Jennifer propd "every three years," observing that the too great frequency of elections rendered the people indifferent to them, and made the best men unwilling to engage in so precarious a service.
Mr Madison seconded the motion for three years. Instability is one of the great vices of our republics, to be remedied. Three years will be necessary, in a Government so extensive, for members to form any knowledge of the various interests of the States to which they do not belong, and of which they can know but little from the situation and affairs of their own. One year will be almost consumed in preparing for and travelling to & from the seat of national business.
Mr Gerry. The people of New England will never give up the point of annual elections, they know of the transition made in England from triennial to septennial elections, and will consider such an innovation here as the prelude to a like usurpation. He considered annual elections as the only defence of the people agst tyranny. He was as much agst a triennial House as agst a hereditary Executive.
Mr Madison, observed that if the opinions of the people were to be our guide, it wd be difficult to say what course we ought to take. No member of the Convention could say what the opinions of his Constituents were at this time; much less could he say what they would think if possessed of the information & lights possessed by the members here; & still less what would be their way of thinking 6 or 12 months hence. We ought to consider what was right & necessary in itself for the attainment of a proper Governmt. A plan adjusted to this idea will recommend itself—The respectability of this convention will give weight to their recommendation of it. Experience will be constantly urging the adoption of it, and all the most enlightened & respectable citizens will be its advocates. Should we fall short of the necessary & proper point, this influential class of Citizens will be turned against the plan, and little support in opposition to them can be gained to it from the unreflecting multitude.
Mr Gerry repeated his opinion that it was necessary to consider what the people would approve. This had been the policy of all Legislators. If the reasoning of Mr Madison were just, and we supposed a limited Monarchy the best form in itself, we ought to recommend it, tho' the genius of the people was decidedly adverse to it, and having no hereditary distinctions among us, we were destitute of the essential materials for such an innovation.
On the question for 94 triennial election of the 1st branch
Mass. no. [Mr King ay.] Mr Ghorum wavering. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay. 95
The words requiring members of yo 1st branch to be of the age of years were struck out Maryland alone, no. The words "liberal compensation for members" being considd Mr Madison moves to insert the words, "& fixt." He observed that it would be improper to leave the members of the Nat1 legislature to be provided for by the State Legisls because it would create an improper dependence; and to leave them to regulate their own wages, was an indecent thing, and might in time prove a dangerous He thought wheat or some other article of which the average price throughout a reasonable period preceding might be settled in some convenient mode, would form a proper standard.
Col. Mason seconded the motion; adding that it would be improper for other reasons to leave the wages to be regulated by the States. 1.96 the different States would make different provision for their representatives, and an inequality would be felt among them, whereas he thought they ought to be in all respects equal. 2.96 the parsimony of the States might reduce the provision so low that as had already happened in choosing delegates to Congress, the question would be not who were most fit to be chosen, but who were most willing to serve.
On the question for inserting the words "and fixt."
Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. 97
Doctr Franklyn said he approved of the amendment just made for rendering the salaries as fixed as possible; but disliked the word "liberal." he would prefer the word moderate if it was necessary to substitute any other. He remarked the tendency of abuses in every case, to grow of themselves when once begun, and related very pleasantly the progression in ecclesiastical benefices, from the first departure from the gratuitous provision for the Apostles, to the establishment of the papal system. The word "liberal" was struck out nem. con.
On the motion of Mr PIERCE, that the wages should be paid out of the National Treasury, Massts ay. Ct no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. G. ay. 98
Question on the clause relating to term of service compensation of 99 1 st branch
Massts ay. Ct no. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.1
On a question for striking out the "ineligibility of members of 99 Nat1 Legis: to State offices."
Massts divd Cont ay. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md divd Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no 2
On the question for agreeing to the clause as amended
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.3
On a question for making Members of 4 Nat1 legislature ineligible to any office under the Nat1 Govt for the term of 3 years after ceasing to be members.
Massts no. Cont no. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa no. Del. no. Md ay. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.5
On the question for such ineligibility for one year
Massts ay. Ct ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md divd Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.6
On 4 question moved by Mr PINCKNEY for striking out "incapable of re-election into 4 1st branch of 4 Nat1 Legisl. for years, and subject to recall" agd to nem. con.
On 4 question for striking out from Resol: 5 7 the words requiring members of the senatorial branch to be of the age of years at least
Massts no. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. no. Md no. Va no. N. C. divd. S. C. no. Geo. divd. 8
On the question for filling the blank with 30 years as the qualification; it was agreed to.
Massts ay. Cont no. N. Y. ay N. J. no. Pa ay Del. no Md ay Va ay N. C. ay S. C ay Geo. no 9
Mr Spaight moved to fill the blank for the duration of the appointmts to the 2d branch of the National Legislature with the words "7 years.
Mr Sherman, thought 7 years too long. He grounded his opposition he said on the principle that if they did their duty well, they would be reelected. And if they acted amiss, an earlier opportunity should be allowed for getting rid of them. He preferred 5 years which we be between the terms of 10 1st branch & of the executive
Mr Pierce proposed 3 years. 7 years would raise an alarm. Great mischiefs had 11 arisen in England from their septennial act which was reprobated by most of their patriotic Statesmen.
Mr Randolph was for the term of 7 years. The democratic licentiousness of the State Legislatures proved the necessity of a firm Senate. The object of this 2d branch is to controul the democratic branch of the Nat1 Legislature. If it be not a firm body, the other branch being more numerous, and coming immediately from the people, will overwhelm it. The Senate of Maryland constituted on like principles had been scarcely able to stem the popular torrent. No mischief can be apprehended, as the concurrence of the other branch, and in some measure, of the Executive, will in all cases be necessary. A firmness independence may be the more necessary also in this branch, as it ought to guard the Constitution agst encroachments of the Executive who will be apt to form combinations with the demagogues of the popular branch.
Mr Madison, considered 7 years as a term by no means too long. What we wished was to give to the Govt that stability which was every where called for, and which the Enemies of the Republican form alledged to be inconsistent with its nature. He was not afraid of giving too much stability by the term of Seven years. His fear was that the popular branch would still be too great an overmatch for it. It was to be much lamented that we had so little direct experience to guide us. The Constitution of Maryland was the only one that bore any analogy to this part of the plan. In no instance had the Senate of Maryd created just suspicions of danger from it. In some instances perhaps it may have erred by yielding to the H. of Delegates. In every instance of their opposition to the measures of the H. of D. they had had with them the suffrages of the most enlightened and impartial people of the other States as well as of their own. In the States where the Senates were chosen in the same manner as the other branches, of the Legislature, and held their seats for 4 years, the institution was found to be no check whatever agst the instabilities of the other branches. He conceived it to be of great importance that a stable & firm Govt organized in the republican form should be held out to the people. If this be not done, and the people be left to judge of this species of Govt by yo operations of the defective systems under which they now live, it is much to be feared the time is not distant when, in universal disgust, they will renounce the blessing which they have purchased at so dear a rate, and be ready for any change that may be proposed to them.
On the question for "seven years" as the term for the 2d branch Massts divided (Mr. King, Mr. Ghorum ay—Mr. Gerry, Mr. Strong, no) Cont no. N. Y. divd N. J. ay. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Vt ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 12
Mr BUTLER & Mr RUTLIDGE proposed that the members of the 2d branch should be entitled to no salary or compensation for their services On the question,*
Massts divd Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. P. no. Del. ay. Md no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.14
It was then moved & agreed that the clauses respecting the stipends & ineligibility of the 2d branch be the same as, of the 1st branch: Con: disagreeing to the ineligibility.
It was moved & 2ded to alter Resol: 9.15 so as to read "that the jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall be to hear determine in the dernier resort, all piracies, felonies &c."
It was moved & 2ded to strike out " all piracies felonies on the high seas," which was agreed to.
It was moved & agreed to strike out "all captures from an enemy."
It was moved & agreed to strike out "other States" and insert "two distinct States of the Union"
It was moved & agreed to postpone the consideration of Resolution 9,15 relating to the Judiciary:
The Coms then rose the House adjourned
Resol : 9 15 being resumed
The latter parts of the clause relating to the jurisdiction of the Nati1 tribunals, was struck out nem. con in order to leave full room for their organization.
Mr Randolph & Mr Madison, then moved the following resolution respecting a National Judiciary, viz "that the jurisdiction of the National Judiciary shall extend to cases, which respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and questions which involve the national peace and harmony" which was agreed to.
Mr Pinkney & Mr Sherman moved to insert after the words "one supreme tribunal" the words "the Judges of which to be appointed by the national Uegislature."
Mr Madison, objected to an appt by the whole Uegislature. Many of them were 16 incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications. They were too much influenced by their partialities. The candidate who was present, who had displayed a talent for business in the legislative field, who had perhaps assisted ignorant members in business of their own, or of their Constituents, or used other winning means, would without any of the essential qualifications for an expositor of the laws prevail over a competitor not having these recommendations, but possessed of every necessary accomplishment. He proposed that the appointment should be made by the Senate, which as a less numerous & more select body, would be more competent judges, and which was sufficiently numerous to justify such a confidence in them.
Mr Sharman & Mr Pinkney withdrew their motion, and the appt by the Senate was agd to nem. con.
Mr Gerry, moved to restrain the Senatorial branch from originating money bills. The other branch was more immediately the representatives of the people, and it was a maxim that the people ought to hold the purse-strings. If the Senate should be allowed to originate such bills, they wd repeat the experiment, till chance should furnish a sett of representatives in the other branch who will fall into their snares.
Mr Butler saw no reason for such a discrimination. We were always following the British Constitution when the reason of it did not apply. There was no analogy between the H. of Tords and the body proposed to be established. If the Senate should be degraded by any such discriminations, the best men would be apt to decline serving in it in favor of the other branch. And it will lead the latter into the practice of tacking other clauses to money bills.
Mr Madison observed that the Commentators on the Brit: Const: had not yet agreed on the reason of the restriction on the H. of T. in money bills. Certain it was there could be no similar reason in the case before us. The Senate would be the representatives of the people as well as the 1st branch. If they sd have any dangerous influence over it, they would easily prevail on some member of the latter to originate the bill they wished to be passed. As the Senate would be generally a more capable sett of men, it wd be wrong to disable them from any preparation of the business, especially of that which was most important, and in our republics, worse prepared than any other. The Gentleman in pursuance of his principle ought to carry the restraint to the amendment, as well as the originating of money bills, since, an addition of a given sum wd be equivalent to a distinct proposition of it.
Mr King differed from Mr Gerry, and concurred in the objections to the proposition.
Mr Read favored the proposition, but would not extend the restraint to the case of amendments.
Mr Pinkney thinks the question premature. If the Senate sh^ be formed on the same proportional representation as it stands at present, they sd have equal power, otherwise if a different principle sd be introduced.
Mr Sherman. As both branches must concur, there can be no danger whichever way the Senate 17 be formed. We establish two branches in order to get more wisdom, which is particularly needed in the finance business—The Senate bear their share of the taxes, and are also the representatives of the people. What a man does by another, he does by himself is a maxim. In Cont both branches can originate in all cases, and it has been found safe & convenient. Whatever might have been the reason of the rule as to The H. of Lords, it is clear that no good arises from it now even there.
Gen1 Pinkney. This distinction prevails in S. C. has been a source of pernicious disputes between yo 2 branches. The Constitution is now evaded, by informal schedules of amendments handed from yo Senate to the other House.
Mr Williamson wishes for a question chiefly to prevent re-discussion. The restriction will have one advantage, it will oblige some member in 18 lower branch to move, & people can then mark him.
On the question for excepting money bills as propd by Mr Gerry, Mass. no. Cont no. N. Y. ay. N. J. no. Del. ay. Md no. Va ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.19
20 Committee rose & Mr Ghorum made report, which was postponed till tomorrow, to give an opportunity for other plans to be proposed. The report was in the words following:
Resd that it is the opinion of this Committee that a National Governmt ought to be established, consisting of a supreme Legislative, Executive Judiciary.
Resold that the National Legislature ought to consist of two branches.
Resd that the members of the first branch of the National Legislature ought to be elected by the people of the several States for the term of three years, to receive fixed Stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to20 public service, to be paid out of the National Treasury: to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch), during the term of service, and under the national Government for the space of one year after its expiration.
Resd that the members of the second branch of the Nat1 Legislature ought to be chosen by the individual Legislatures, to be of the age of 30 years at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency,22 namely, seven years, to receive fixed stipends by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to20 public service to be paid out of the National Treasury; to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the U. States, (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term of service, and under the Nat1 Govt for the space of one year after its expiration.
Resd that each branch ought to possess the right of originating Acts
Resd that the Nat1 Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the Legislative rights vested in Congs by the Confederation, and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent; or in which the harmony of the U. S. may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation ; to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the Union.
Resd that the rights of suffrage in the 1st branch of the National Legislature, ought not to be according to the rule established in the articles of confederation but according to some equitable ratio of representation, namely, in proportion to the whole number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants, of every age sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, & three fifths of all other persons, not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes in each State:
Resolved that the right of suffrage in the 2d branch of the National Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for the first.
Resolved that a National Executive be instituted to consist of a single person, to be chosen by the Nati1 Legislature for the term of seven years, with power to carry into execution the national laws, to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for-to be ineligible a second time, & to be removeable on impeachment and conviction of malpractices or neglect of duty-to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to 23 public service to be paid out of the national Treasury.
Resold that the Nat1 Executive shall have a right to negative any Legislative Act, which shall not be afterwards passed unless 24 by two thirds of each branch of the National Legislature.
Resold that a Nat1 Judiciary be established, to consist of one supreme tribunal, the Judges of which to 25 be appointed by the 2d branch of the Nat1 Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour, & to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution.
Resold that the Nat1 Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals.
Resd that the jurisdiction of the Nat1 Judiciary shall extend to all cases which respect the collection of the Nat1 revenue, impeachments of any Nat1 Officers, and questions which involve the national peace & harmony.
Resd that provision ought to be made for the admission of States lawfully arising within the limits of the U. States, whether from a voluntary junction of Government & territory or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the Nat1 Legislature less than the whole.
Resd that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities and privileges untill a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted and for the completion of all their engagements.
Resd that a Republican Constitution & its existing laws ought to be guaranteed to each State by the U. States.
Resd that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the Articles of Union whensoever it shall seem necessary.
Resd that the Legislative, Executive & Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.
Resd that the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by the Convention ought at a proper time or times after the approbation of Congs to be submitted to an Assembly or Assemblies recommended by the several Legislatures to be expressly chosen by the people to consider and decide thereon.
Mr Patterson, observed to the Convention that it was the wish of several deputations, particularly that of N. Jersey, that further time might be allowed them to contemplate the plan reported from the Committee of the Whole, and to digest one purely federal, and contradistinguished from the reported plan. He said they hoped to have such an one ready by tomorrow to be laid before the Convention: And the Convention adjourned that leisure might be given for the purpose.
26 The words "In Convention" are crossed out in the transcript.
28 Mr. PATTERSON, laid before the Convention the plan which he said several of the deputations wished to be substituted in place of that proposed by Mr Randolph. After some little discussion of the most proper mode of giving it a fair deliberation it was agreed that it should be referred to a Committee of the whole, and that in order to place the two plans in due comparison, the other should be recommitted. At the earnest desire 29 of Mr Lansing & some other gentlemen, it was also agreed that the Convention should not go into Committee of the whole on the subject till tomorrow, by which delay the friends of the plan proposed by Mr Patterson wd be better prepared to explain & support it, and all would have an opportuy of taking copies.*
The propositions from N. Jersey moved by Mr Patterson were in the words following.
Resd that the articles of Confederation ought to be so revised, corrected & enlarged, as to render the federal Constitution adequate to the exigencies of Government, & the preservation of the Union.
Resd that in addition to the powers vested in the U. States in Congress, by the present existing articles of Confederation, they be authorized to pass acts for raising a revenue, by levying a duty or duties on all goods or merchandizes of foreign growth or manufacture, imported into any part of the U. States, by Stamps on paper, vellum or parchment, and by a postage on all letters or packages passing through the general post-office, to be applied to such federal purposes as they shall deem proper & expedient; to make rules & regulations for the collection thereof; and the same from time to time, to alter & amend in such manner as they shall think proper: to pass Acts for the regulation of trade & commerce as well with foreign nations as with each other: provided that all punishments, fines, forfeitures & penalties to be incurred for contravening such acts rules and regulations shall be adjudged by the Common law Judiciaries of the State in which any offence contrary to the true intent & meaning of such Acts rules regulations shall have been committed or perpetrated, with liberty of commencing in the first instance all suits & prosecutions for that purpose in the superior common law Judiciary in such State, subject nevertheless, for the correction of all errors, both in law & fact in rendering Judgment, to an appeal to the Judiciary of the U. States.
Resd that whenever requisitions shall be necessary, instead of the rule for making requisitions mentioned in the articles of Confederation, the United States in Congs be authorized to make such requisitions in proportion to the whole number of white & other free citizens & inhabitants of every age sex and condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years & three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians not paying taxes; that if such requisitions be not complied with, in the time specified therein, to direct the collection thereof in the non complying States & for that purpose to devise and pass acts directing & authorizing the same; provided that none of the powers hereby vested in the U. States in Congs shall be exercised without the consent of at least States, and in that proportion if the number of Confederated States should hereafter be increased or diminished.
Resd that the U. States in Congs be authorized to elect a federal Executive to consist of persons, to continue in office for the term of years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the Executive at the time of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the federal treasury; to be incapable of holding any other office or appointment during their time of service and for years thereafter; to be ineligible a second time, & removeable by Congs on application by a majority of the Executives of the several States; that the Executives a besides their general authority to execute the federal acts ought to appoint all federal officers not otherwise provided for, & to direct all military operations; provided that none of the persons composing the federal Executive shall on any occasion take command of any troops, so as personally to conduct any b enterprise as General or in other capacity
Resd that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution; that the Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear & determine in the first instance on all impeachments of federal officers, & by way of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors, in all cases of captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies & felonies on the high Seas, in all cases in which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for c regulation of trade, or the collection of the federal Revenue: that none of the Judiciary shall during the time they remain in office be capable of receiving or holding any other office or appointment during their time d of service, or for thereafter.
Resd that all Acts of the U. States in Congs made by virtue & in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of Confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding; and that if any State, or any body of men in any State shall oppose or prevent yd carrying into execution such acts or treaties, the federal Executive shall be authorized to call forth ye power of the Confederated States, or so much thereof as may be necessary to enforce and compel an obedience to such Acts, or an observance of such Treaties.
Resd that provision be made for the admission of new States into the Union.
Resd the rule for naturalization ought to be the same in every State.
Resd 5 that a Citizen of one State committing an offense in another State of the Union, shall be deemed guilty of the same offense as if it had been committed by a Citizen of the State in which the offense was committed.*
Adjourned.
Mr. Lansing called for the reading of the 1st resolution of each plan, which he considered as involving principles directly in contrast; that of Mr. Patterson says he sustains the sovereignty of the respective States, that of Mr. Randolph distroys it: the latter requires a negative on all the laws of the particular States; the former, only certain general powers for the general good. The plan of Mr. R. in short absorbs all power except what may be exercised in the little local matters of the States which are not objects worthy of the supreme cognizance. He grounded his preference of Mr. P.'s plan, chiefly on two objections agst 34 that of Mr. R.1.35 want of power in the Convention to discuss & propose it. 2 35 the improbability of its being adopted. 1. He was decidedly of opinion that the power of the Convention was restrained to amendments of a federal nature, and having for their basis the Confederacy in being. The Act of Congress The tenor of the Acts of the States, the Commissions produced by the several deputations all proved this. And this limitation of the power to an amendment of the Confederacy, marked the opinion of the States, that it was unnecessary & improper to go farther. He was sure that this was the case with his State. N. York would never have concurred in sending deputies to the convention, if she had supposed the deliberations were to turn on a consolidation of the States, and a National Government.
Mr PATTERSON, said as he had on a former occasion given his sentiments on the plan proposed by Mr R. he would now avoiding repetition as much as possible give his reasons in favor of that proposed by himself. He preferred it because it accorded 1.36 with the powers of the Convention, 2 36 with the sentiments of If the confederacy was radically wrong, let us return to our States, and obtain larger powers, not assume them of ourselves. I came here not to speak my own sentiments, but the sentiments of those who sent me. Oiu: object is not such a Governmt as may be best in itself, but such a one as our Constituents have authorized us to prepare, and as they will approve. If we argue the matter on the supposition that no Confederacy at present exists, it can not be denied that all the States stand on the footing of equal sovereignty. All therefore must concur before any can be bound. If a proportional representation be right, why do we not vote so here? If we argue on the fact that a federal compact actually exists, and consult the articles of it we still find an equal Sovereignty to be the basis of it. He reads the 5th art: of 37 Confederation giving each State a vote & the 13th* *declaring that no alteration shall be made without unanimous consent. This is the nature of all treaties. What is unanimously done, must be unanimously undone. It was observed [by Mr Wilson] that the larger States gave up the point, not because it was right, but because the circumstances of the moment urged the concession. Be it so. Are they for that reason at liberty to take it back. Can the donor resume his gift without the consent of the donee. This doctrine may be convenient, but it is a doctrine that will sacrifice the lesser States. The large States acceded readily to the confederacy. It was the small ones that came in reluctantly and slowly. N. Jersey & Maryland were the two last, the former objecting to the want of power in Congress over trade: both of them to the want of power to appropriate the vacant territory to the benefit of the whole.—If the sovereignty of the States is to be maintained, the Representatives must be drawn immediately from the States, not from the people: and we have no power to vary the idea of equal sovereignty. The only expedient that will cmre the difficulty, is that of throwing the States into Hotchpot. To say that this is impracticable, will not make it so. Let it be tried, and we shall see whether the Citizens of Massts Pena & Va accede to it. It will be objected that Coercion will be impracticable. But will it be more so in one plan than the other? Its efficacy will depend on the quantum of power collected, not on its being drawn from the States, or from the individuals; and according to his plan it may be exerted on individuals as well as according 38 that of Mr R. A distinct executive & Judiciary also were equally provided by his plan. It is urged that two branches in the Legislature are necessary. Why? for the purpose of a check. But the reason of 39 the precaution is not applicable to this case. Within a particular State, where party heats prevail, such a check may be necessary. In such a body as Congress it is less necessary, and besides, the delegations of the different States are checks on each other. Do the people at large complain of Congs? No, what they wish is that Congs may have more power. If the power now proposed be not eno', the people hereafter will make additions to it. With proper powers Congs will act with more energy & wisdom than the proposed Nat1 Legislature; being fewer in number, and more secreted & refined by the mode of election. The plan of Mr R. will also be enormously expensive. Allowing Georgia & Del. two representatives each in the popular branch the aggregate number of that branch will be 180. Add to it half as many for the other branch and you have 270. members coming once at least a year from the most distant as well as the most central parts of the republic. In the present deranged state of our finances can so expensive a system be seriously thought of? By enlarging the powers of Congs the greatest part of this expence will be saved, and all purposes will be answered. At least a trial ought to be made.
Mr Wilson entered into a contrast of the principal points of the two plans so far he said as there had been time to examine the one last proposed. These points were 1. in the Virga plan there are 2 & in some degree 3 branches in the Legislature: in the plan from N. J. there is to be a single legislature only—2. Representation of the people at large is the basis of the 40 one:—the State Legislatures, the pillars of the other—3. proportional representation prevails in one:—equality of suffrage in the other—4. A single Executive Magistrate is at the head of the one:—a plurality is held out in the other.—5. in the one the 41 majority of the people of the U.S. must prevail:—in the other a minority may prevail. 6. the Nat1 Legislature is to make laws in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent &-:--in place of this Congs are to have additional power in a few cases only-7. A negative on the laws of the States:—in place of this coertion to be substituted -8. The Executive to be removeable on impeachment conviction;—in one plan: in the other to be removeable at the instance of 42 majority of the Executives of the States—9. Revision of the laws provided for in one:—no such check in the other—10. inferior national tribunals in one:—none such in the other. 11. In ye one jurisdiction of Nat1 tribunals to extend &c—; an appellate jurisdiction only allowed in the other. 12. Here the jurisdiction is to extend to all cases affecting the Nation1 peace & harmony: there, a few cases only are marked out. 13. finally ye ratification is in this to be by the people themselves:—in that by the legislative authorities according to the 13 art: of 43 Confederation.
With regard to the power of the Convention, he conceived himself authorized to conclude nothing, but to be at liberty to propose any thing. In this particular he felt himself perfectly indifferent to the two plans.
With regard to the sentiments of the people, he conceived it difficult to know precisely what they are. Those of the particular circle in which one moved, were commonly mistaken for the general voice. He could not persuade himself that the State Govts & Sovereignties were so much the idols of the people, nor a Nat1 Govt so obnoxious to them, as some supposed. Why sd a Nat1 Govt be unpopular? Has it less dignity? will each Citizen enjoy under it less liberty or protection? Will a Citizen of Delaware be degraded by becoming a Citizen of the United States?44 Where do the people look at present for relief from the evils of which they complain? Is it from an internal reform of their Govts? no, Sir. It is from the Nat1 Councils that relief is expected. For these reasons he did not fear, that the people would not follow us into a national Govt and it will be a further recommendation of Mr R.'s plan that it is to be submitted to them, and not to the Legislatures, for ratification.
proceeding now to the 1st point on which he had contrasted the two plans, he observed that anxious as he was for some augmentation of the federal powers, it would be with extreme reluctance indeed that he could ever consent to give powers to Congs he had two reasons either of wch was sufficient. 1.45 Congs as a Legislative body does not stand on the people. 2.45 it is a single body. 1 . He would not repeat the remarks he had formerly made on the principles of Representation. he would only say that an inequality in it, has ever been a poison contaminating every branch of Govt. In G. Britain where this poison has had a full operation, the security of private rights is owing entirely to the purity of Her tribunals of Justice, the Judges of which are neither appointed nor paid, by a venal Parliament. The political liberty of that Nation, owing to the inequality of representation is at the mercy of its rulers. He means not to insinuate that there is any parallel between the situation of that Country & ours at present. But it is a lesson we ought not to disregard, that the smallest bodies in G. B. are notoriously the most corrupt. Every other source of influence must also be stronger in small than 46 large bodies of men. When Lord Chesterfield had told us that one of the Dutch provinces had been seduced into the views of France, he need not have added, that it was not Holland, but one of the smallest of them. There are facts among ourselves which are known to all. Passing over others, he 47 will only remark that the Impost, so anxiously wished for by the public was defeated not by any of the larger States in the Union. 2. Congress is a single Legislature. Despotism comes on Mankind in different Shapes, sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in a Military, one. Is there no danger of a Legislative despotism? Theory & practice both proclaim it. If the Legislative authority be not restrained, there can be neither liberty nor stability; and it can only be restrained by dividing it within itself, into distinct and independent branches. In a single House there is no check, but the inadequate one, of the virtue & good sense of those who compose it.
On another great point, the contrast was equally favorable to the plan reported by the Committee of the whole. It vested the Executive powers in a single Magistrate. The plan of N. Jersey, vested them in a plurality. In order to controul the Legislative authority, you must divide it. In order to controul the Executive you must unite it. One man will be more responsible than three. Three will contend among themselves till one becomes the master of his colleagues. In the triumvirates of Rome first Caesar, then Augustus, are witnesses of this truth. The Kings of Sparta, & the Consuls of Rome prove also the factious consequences of dividing the Executive Magistracy. Having already taken up so much time he wd not he sd proceed to any of the other points. Those on which he had dwelt, are sufficient of themselves: and on a decision of them, the fate of the others will depend.
Mr Pinkney, the whole comes to this, as he conceived. Give N. Jersey an equal vote, and she will dismiss her scruples, and concur in the Nati1 system. He thought the Convention authorized to go any length in recommending, which they found necessary to remedy the evils which produced this Convention.
Mr Elseworth proposed as a more distinctive form of collecting the mind of the Committee on the subject, "that the Legislative power of the U. S. should remain in Congs" This was not seconded though it seemed better calculated for the purpose than the 1st proposition of Mr Patterson in place of which Mr E. wished to substitute it.
Mr Randolph, was not scrupulous on the point of power. When the salvation of the Republic was at stake, it would be treason to our trust, not to propose what we found necessary. He painted in strong colours, the imbecility of the existing Confederacy, & the danger of delaying a substantial reform. In answer to the objection drawn from the sense of our Constituents as denoted by their acts relating to the Convention and the objects of their deliberation, he observed that as each State acted separately in the case, it would have been indecent for it to have charged the existing Constitution with all the vices which it might have perceived in it. The first State that set on foot this experiment would not have been justified in going so far, ignorant as it was of the opinion of others, and sensible as it must have been of the uncertainty of a successful issue to the experiment. There are certainly seasons 48 of a peculiar nature where the ordinary cautions must be dispensed with; and this is certainly one of them. He wd not as far as depended on him leave any thing that seemed necessary, undone. The present moment is favorable, and is probably the last that will offer.
The true question is whether we shall adhere to the federal plan, or introduce the national plan. The insufficiency of the former has been fully displayed by the trial already made. There are but two modes, by which the end of a Gen1 Govt can be attained: the 1st is 49 by coercion as proposed by Mr P.s plan 2.50 by real legislation as propd by the other plan. Coercion he pronounced to be impracticable, expensive, cruel to individuals. It tended also to habituate the instruments of it to shed the blood & riot in the spoils of their fellow Citizens, and consequently trained them up for the service of ambition. We must resort therefor to a National 51 Legislation over individuals, for which Congs are unfit. To vest such power in them, would be blending the Legislative with the Executive, contrary to the recd maxim on this subject: If the Union of these powers heretofore in Congs has been safe, it has been owing to the general impotency of that body. Congs are moreover not elected by the people, but by the Legislatures who retain even a power of recall. They have therefore no will of their own, they are a mere diplomatic body, and are always obsequious to the views of the States, who are always encroaching on the authority of the U. States. A provision for harmony among the States, as in trade, naturalization &c.—for crushing rebellion whenever it may rear its crest—and for certain other general benefits, must be made. The powers for these purposes, can never be given to a body, inadequate as Congress are in point of representation, elected in the mode in which they are, and possessing no more confidence than they do: for notwithstanding what has been said to the contrary, his own experience satisfied him that a rooted distrust of Congress pretty generally prevailed. A Nat1 Govt alone, properly constituted, will answer the purpose; and he begged it to be considered that the present is the last moment for establishing one. After this select experiment, the people will yield to despair.
The Committee rose & the House adjourned.
On motion of Mr DICKINSON to postpone the 1st Resolution in Mr Patterson's plan, in order to take up the following viz—"that the Articles of Confederation ought to be revised and amended, so as to render the Government of the U. S. adequate to the exigences, the preservation and the prosperity of the Union" the postponement was agreed to by 10 States, Pen: divided.
M: HAMILTON, had been hitherto silent on the business before the Convention, partly from respect to others whose superior abilities age & experience rendered him unwilling to bring forward ideas dissimilar to theirs, and partly from his delicate situation with respect to his own State, to whose sentiments as expressed by his Colleagues, he could by no means accede. The crisis however which now marked our affairs, was too serious to permit any scruples whatever to prevail over the duty imposed on every man to contribute his efforts for the public safety & happiness. He was obliged therefore to declare himself unfriendly to both plans. He was particularly opposed to that from N. Jersey, being fully convinced, that no amendment of the Confederation, leaving the States in possession of their Sovereignty could possibly answer the purpose. On the other hand he confessed he was much discouraged by the amazing extent of Country in expecting the desired blessings from any general sovereignty that could be substituted.—As to the powers of the Convention, he thought the doubts started on that subject had arisen from distinctions reasonings too subtle. A federal Govt he conceived to mean an association of independent Communities into one. Different Confederacies have different powers, and exercise them in different ways. In some instances the powers are exercised over collective bodies; in others over individuals, as in the German Diet- & among ourselves in cases of piracy. Great latitude therefore must be given to the signification of the term. The plan last proposed departs itself from the federal idea, as understood by some, since it is to operate eventually on individuals. He agreed moreover with the Honble gentleman from Va [Mr R.] that we owed it to our Country, to do on this emergency whatever we should deem essential to its happiness. The States sent us here to provide for the exigences of the Union. To rely on & propose any plan not adequate to these exigences, merely because it was not 52 clearly within our powers, would be to sacrifice the means to the end. It may be said that the States can not ratify a plan not within the purview of the article of 53 Confederation providing for alterations & amendments. But may not the States themselves in which no constitutional authority equal to this purpose exists in the Legislatures, have had in view a reference to the people at large. In the Senate of N. York, a proviso was moved, that no act of the Convention should be binding untill it should be referred to the people & ratified; and the motion was lost by a single voice only, the reason assigned agst it being, that it might possibly be found an inconvenient shackle.
The great question is what provision shall we make for the happiness of our Country? He would first make a comparative examination of the two plans—prove that there were essential defects in both—and point out such changes as might render a national one, efficacious.—The great & essential principles necessary for the support of Government are 1. an active & constant interest in supporting it. This principle does not exist in the States in favor of the federal Govt. They have evidently in a high degree, the esprit de corps. They constantly pursue internal interests adverse to those of the whole. They have their particular debts—their particular plans of finance &c. All these when opposed to, invariably prevail over the requisitions & plans of Congress. 2. The love of power. Men love power. The same remarks are applicable to this principle. The States have constantly shewn a disposition rather to regain the powers delegated by them than to part with more, or to give effect to what they had parted with. The ambition of their demagogues is known to hate the controul of the Gen1 Government. It may be remarked too that the Citizens have not that anxiety to prevent a dissolution of the Gen1 Govt as of the particular Govts. A dissolution of the latter would be fatal; of the former would still leave the purposes of Govt attainable to a considerable degree. Consider what such a State as Virga will be in a few years, a few compared with the life of nations. How strongly will it feel its importance & selfsufficiency? 3. An habitual attachment of the people. The whole force of this tie is on the side of the State Govt. Its sovereignty is immediately before the eyes of the people: its protection is immediately enjoyed by them. From its hand distributive justice, and all those acts which familiarize & endear54 Govt to a people, are dispensed to them. 4. Force by which may be understood a coertion of laws or coertion of arms. Congs have not the former except in few cases. In particular States, this coercion is nearly sufficient; tho' he held it in most cases, not entirely so. A certain portion of military force is absolutely necessary in large communities. Masss is now feeling this necessity & making provision for it. But how can this force be exerted on the States collectively. It is impossible. It amounts to a war between the parties. Foreign powers also will not be idle spectators. They will interpose, the confusion will increase, and a dissolution of the Union ensue. 5. influence. he did not mean corruption, but a dispensation of those regular honors & emoluments, which produce an attachment to the Govt. Almost all the weight of these is on the side of the States; and must continue so as long as the States continue to exist. All the passions then we see, of avarice, ambition, interest, which govern most individuals, and all public bodies, fall into the current of the States, and do not flow in the stream of the Gen1 Govt. The former therefore will generally be an overmatch for the Gen1 Govt and render any confederacy, in its very nature precarious. Theory is in this case fully confirmed by experience. The Amphyctionic Council had it would seem ample powers for general purposes. It had in particular the power of fining and using force agst* *delinquent members. What was the consequence. Their decrees were mere signals of war. The Phocian war is a striking example of it. Philip at length taking advantage of their disunion, and insinuating himself into their Councils, made himself master of their fortunes. The German Confederacy affords another lesson. The authority of Charlemagne seemed to be as great as could be necessary. The great feudal chiefs however, exercising their local sovereignties, soon felt the spirit & found the means of, encroachments, which reduced the imperial authority to a nominal sovereignty. The Diet has succeeded, which tho' aided by a Prince at its head, of great authority independently of his imperial attributes, is a striking illustration of the weakness of Confederated Governments. Other examples instruct us in the same truth. The Swiss cantons have scarce any Union at all, and have been more than once at war with one another—How then are all these evils to be avoided? only by such a compleat sovereignty in the general Governmt as will turn all the strong principles & passions above mentioned on its side. Does the scheme of N. Jersey produce this effect? does it afford any substantial remedy whatever? On the contrary it labors under great defects, and the defect of some of its provisions will destroy the efficacy of others. It gives a direct revenue to Congs but this will not be sufficient. The balance can only be supplied by requisitions: which experience proves can not be relied on. If States are to deliberate on the mode, they will also deliberate on the object of the suppHes, and will grant or not grant as they approve or disapprove of it. The definquency of one will invite and countenance it in others. Quotas too must in the nature of things be so unequal as to produce the same evil. To what standard will you resort? band is a fallacious one. Compare Holland with Russia; France or Eng? with other countries of Europe. Pena with N. Carola will the relative pecuniary abilities in those instances, correspond with the relative value of land. Take numbers of inhabitants for the rule and make like comparison of different countries, and you will find it to be equally unjust. The different degrees of industry and improvement in different Countries render the first object a precarious measure of wealth. Much depends too on situation. Cont N. Jersey & N. Carolina, not being commercial States & contributing to the wealth of the commercial ones, can never bear quotas assessed by the ordinary rules of proportion. They will & must fail in their duty, their example will be followed, and the Union itself be dissolved. Whence then is the national revenue to be drawn? from Commerce? even from exports which notwithstanding the common opinion are fit objects of moderate taxation, from excise, &c &c. These tho' not equal, are less unequal than quotas. Another destructive ingredient in the plan, is that equality of suffrage which is so much desired by the small States. It is not in human nature that Va & the large States should consent to it, or if they did that they shd long abide by it. It shocks too much the 55 ideas of Justice, and every human feeling. Bad principles in a Govt tho slow are sure in their operation and will gradually destroy it. A doubt has been raised whether Congs at present have a right to keep Ships or troops in time of peace. He leans to the negative. Mr Pa plan provides no remedy.—If the powers proposed were adequate, the organization of Congs is such that they could never be properly & effectually exercised. The members of Congs being chosen by the States & subject to recall, represent all the local prejudices. Should the powers be found effectual, they will from time to time be heaped on them, till a tyrannic sway shall be established. The general power whatever be its form if it preserves itself, must swallow up the State powers. Otherwise it will be swallowed up by them. It is agst all the principles of a good Government to vest the requisite powers in such a body as Congs Two Sovereignties can not co-exist within the same limits. Giving powers to Congs must eventuate in a bad Govt or in no Govt. The plan of N. Jersey therefore will not do. What then is to be done? Here he was embarrassed. The extent of the Country to be governed, discouraged him. The expence of a general Govt was also formidable; unless there were such a diminution of expence on the side of the State Govts as the case would admit. If they were extinguished, he was persuaded that great oeconomy might be obtained by substituting a general Govt. He did not mean however to shock the public opinion by proposing such a measure. On the other hand he saw no other necessity for declining it. They are not necessary for any of the great purposes of commerce, revenue, or agriculture. Subordinate authorities he was aware would be necessary. There must be district tribunals: corporations for local purposes. But cui bono, the vast & expensive apparatus now appertaining to the States. The only difficulty of a serious nature which occurred to him, was that of drawing representatives from the extremes to the center of the Community. What inducements can be offered that will suffice? The moderate wages for the 1st branch would 56 only be a bait to little demagogues. Three dollars or thereabouts he supposed would be the utmost. The Senate he feared from a similar cause, would be filled by certain undertakers who wish for particular offices under the Govt This view of the subject almost led to him despair that a Republican Govt could be established over so great an extent. He was sensible at the same time that it would be unwise to propose one of any other form. In his private opinion he had no scruple in declaring, supported as he was by the opinions of so many of the wise & good, that the British Govt was the best in the world: and that he doubted much whether any thing short of it would do in America. He hoped Gentlemen of different opinions would bear with him in this, and begged them to recollect the change of opinion on this subject which had taken place and was still going on. It was once thought that the power of Congs was amply sufficient to secure the end of their institution. The error was now seen by every one. The members most tenacious of republicanism, he observed, were as loud as any in declaiming agst the vices of democracy. This progress of the public mind led him to anticipate the time, when others as well as himself
would join in the praise bestowed by Mr Neckar on the British Constitution, namely, that it is the only Govt in the world " which unites public strength with individual security."—In every community where industry is encouraged, there will be a division of it into the few & the many. Hence separate interests will arise. There will be debtors & creditors &c. Give all power to the many, they will oppress the few. Give all power to the few, they will oppress the many. Both therefore ought to have 57 power, that each may defend itself agst the other. To the want of this check we owe our paper money, instalment laws &c. To the proper adjustment of it the British owe the excellence of their Constitution. Their house of Lords is a most noble institution. Having nothing to hope for by a change, and a sufficient interest by means of their property, in being faithful to the national interest, they form a permanent barrier agst every pernicious innovation, whether attempted on the part of the Crown or of the Commons. No temporary Senate will have firmness eno' to answer the purpose. The Senate [of Maryland] which seems to be so much appealed to, has not yet been sufficiently tried. Had the people been unanimous & eager, in the late appeal to them on the subject of a paper emission they would would have yielded to the torrent. Their acquiescing in such an appeal is a proof of it. —Gentlemen differ in their opinions concerning the necessary checks, from the different estimates they form of the human passions. They suppose seven years a sufficient period to give the senate an adequate firmness, from not duly considering the amazing violence & turbulence of the democratic spirit. When a great object of Govt is pursued, which seizes the popular passions, they spread like wild fire, and become irresistable. He appealed to the gentlemen from the N. England States whether experience had not there verified the remark.—As to the Executive, it seemed to be admitted that no good one could be established on Republican principles. Was not this giving up the merits of the question: for can there be a good Govt without a good Executive. The English model was the only good one on this subject. The Hereditary interest of the King was so interwoven with that of the Nation, and his personal emoluments so great, that he was placed above the danger of being corrupted from abroad—and at the same time was both sufficiently independent and sufficiently controuled, to answer the purpose of the institution at home, one of the weak sides of Republics was their being liable to foreign influence & corruption. Men of little character, acquiring great power become easily the tools of intermedling Neibours. Sweeden was a striking instance. The French & English had each their parties during the late Revolution which was effected by the predominant influence of the former.—What is the inference from all these observations? That we ought to go as far in order to attain stability and permanency, as republican principles will admit. Let one branch of the Legislature hold their places for life or at least during good behaviour. Let the Executive also be for life. He appealed to the feelings of the members present whether a term of seven years, would induce the sacrifices of private affairs which an acceptance of public trust would require, so so as to ensure the services of the best Citizens. On this plan we should have in the Senate a permanent will, a weighty interest, which would answer essential purposes. But is this a Republican Govt it will be asked? Yes if all the Magistrates are appointed, and vacancies are filled, by the people, or a process of election originating with the people. He was sensible that an Executive constituted as he proposed would have in fact but little of the power and independence that might be necessary. On the other plan of appointing him for 7 years, he thought the Executive ought to have but little power. He would be ambitious, with the means of making creatures; and as the object of his ambition wd be to prolong his power, it is probable that in case of a 58 war, he would avail himself of the emergence,59 to evade or refuse a degradation from his place. An Executive for life has not this motive for forgetting his fidelity, and will therefore be a safer depository of power. It will be objected probably, that such an Executive will be an elective Monarch, and will give birth to the tumults which characterize that form of Govt He wd reply that Monarch is an indefinite term. It marks not either the degree or duration of power. If this Executive Magistrate wd be a monarch for life—the other propd by the Report from the Comtte of the whole, wd be a monarch for seven years. The circumstance of being elective was also applicable to both. It had been observed by judicious writers that elective monarchies wd be the best if they could be guarded agst the tumults excited by the ambition and intrigues of competitors. He was not sure that tumults were an inseparable evil. He rather thought this character of Elective Monarchies had been taken rather from particular cases than from general principles. The election of Roman Emperors was made by the Army. In Poland the election is made by great rival princes with independent power, and ample means, of raising commotions. In the German Empire, the appointment is made by the Electors & Princes, who have equal motives & means, for exciting cabals & parties. Might not such a mode of election be devised among ourselves as will defend the community agst these effects in any dangerous degree? Having made these observations he would read to the Committee a sketch of a plan which he shd prefer to either of those under consideration. was aware that it went beyond the ideas of most members. But will such a plan be adopted out of doors? In return he would ask will the people adopt the other plan? At present they will adopt neither. But he sees the Union dissolving or already dissolved—he sees evils operating in the States which must soon cure the people of their fondness for democracies—he sees that a great progress has been already made & is still going on in the public mind. He thinks therefore that the people will in time be unshackled from their prejudices; and whenever that happens, they will themselves not be satisfied at stopping where the plan of Mr R. wd place them, but be ready to go as far at least as he proposes. He did not mean to offer the paper he had sketched as a proposition to the Committee. It was meant only to give a more correct view of his ideas, and to suggest the amendments which he should probably propose to the plan of Mr R. in the proper stages of its future discussion. He read 60 his sketch in the words following: towit
I. "The Supreme Legislative power of the United States of America to be vested in two different bodies of men; the one to be called the Assembly, the other the Senate who together shall form the Legislature of the United States with power to pass all laws whatsoever subject to the Negative hereafter mentioned.
II. The Assembly to consist of persons elected by the people to serve for three years.
III. The Senate to consist of persons elected to serve during good behaviour; their election to be made by electors chosen for that purpose by the people: in order to this the States to be divided into election districts. On the death, removal or resignation of any Senator his place to be filled out of the district from which he came.
IV. The supreme Executive authority of the United States to be vested in a Governour to be elected to serve during good behaviour—the election to be made by Electors chosen by the people in the Election Districts aforesaid—The authorities & functions of the Executive to be as follows: to have a negative on all laws about to be passed, and the execution of all laws passed, to have the direction of war when authorized or begun; to have with the advice and approbation of the Senate the power of making all treaties; to have the sole appointment of the heads or chief officers of the departments of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs; to have the nomination of all other officers (Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the Senate; to have the power of pardoning all offences except Treason; which he shall not pardon without the approbation of the Senate.
V. On the death, resignation or removal of the Governour his authorities to be exercised by the President of the Senate till a Successor be appointed.
VI. The Senate to have the sole power of declaring war, the power of advising and approving all Treaties, the power of approving or rejecting all appointments of officers except the heads or chiefs of the departments of Finance War and foreign affairs.
VII. The supreme Judicial authority to be vested in Judges to hold their offices during good behaviour with adequate and permanent salaries. This Court to have original jurisdiction in all causes of capture, and an appellative jurisdiction in all causes in which the revenues of the general Government or the Citizens of foreign Nations are concerned.
VIII. The Legislature of the United States to have power to institute Courts in each State for the determination of all matters of general concern.
IX. The Governour Senators and all officers of the United States to be liable to impeachment for mal- and corrupt conduct; and upon conviction to be removed from office, & disqualified for holding any place of trust or profit—All impeachments to be tried by a Court to consist of the Chief or Judge of the superior Court of Law of each State, provided such Judge shall hold his place during good behavior, and have a permanent salary.
X. All laws of the particular States contrary to the Constitution or laws of the United States to be utterly void; and the better to prevent such laws being passed, the Governour or president of each State shall be appointed by the General Government and shall have a negative upon the laws about to be passed in the State of which he is a Governour or President.
XI. No State to have any forces land or Naval; and the Militia of all the States to be under the sole and exclusive direction of the United States, the officers of which to be appointed and commissioned by them.
On these several articles he entered into explanatory observations 61 corresponding with the principles of his introductory reasoning.
63 Committee rose the House Adjourned.
The substitute offered yesterday by Mr Dickenson being rejected by a vote now taken on it; Con. N. Y. N. J. Del. ay.64 Mas. Pa V. N. C. S. C. Geo. no.65 Mayd divided. Mr Patterson's plan was again at large before the Committee.
Mr Madison. Much stress had 66 been laid by some gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention to propose any other than a federal plan. To what had been answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the characteristics attached to a federal plan would support this objection. One characteristic, was that in a federal Government, the power was exercised not on the people individually; 67 but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in some instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy, and in many instances, the amendments to it proposed by Mr Patterson, must operate immediately on individuals. The other characteristic was that a federal Govt derived its appointments not immediately from the people, but from the States which they respectively composed. Here too were facts on the other side. In two of the States, Connect and Rh. Island, the delegates to Congs were chosen, not by the legislatures, but by the people at large; and the plan of Mr P. intended no change in this particular.
It had been alledged [by Mr Patterson], that the Confederation having been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts? does it arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of Confederation? If we consider the federal union as analogous to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component members, it can not be said that no dissolution of the compact can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society would certainly absolve the other part from their obligations to it. If the breach of any article by any of the parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is because, the contrary is implied in the compact itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives an indifinite authority to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This latter circumstance shews that we are not to consider the federal Union as analogous to the social compact of individuals; for if it were so, a Majority would have a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the whole, which the Gentn from N. Jersey would be among the last to admit. If we consider the federal Union as analogous not to the social compacts among individual men: but to the conventions among individual States. What is the doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly, according to the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a breach of any one article, by any one party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach. In some treaties indeed it is expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles shall not have this consequence, and even that particular articles shall remain in force during war, which in general is 68 understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles of confederation? So far from it that there is not even an express stipulation that force shall be used to compell an offending member of the Union to discharge its duty. He observed that the violations of the federal articles had been numerous & notorious. Among the most notorious was an act of N. Jersey herself; by which she expressly refused to comply mth a constitutional requisition of Congs and yielded no farther to the expostulations of their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal without passing any positive act of compliance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences from these observations. He thought it proper however that the true nature of the existing confederacy should be investigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it now stands.
Proceeding to the consideration of Mr Patterson's plan, he stated the object of a proper plan to be twofold. 1.69 to preserve the Union. 2.69 to provide a Governmt that will remedy the evils felt by the States both in their united and individual capacities. Examine Mr P.s plan, & say whether it promises satisfaction in these respects.
Will it prevent those violations of the law of nations & of Treaties which if not prevented must involve us in the calamities of foreign wars? The tendency of the States to these violations has been manifested in sundry instances. The files of Congs contain complaints already, from almost every nation with which treaties have been formed. Hitherto indulgence has been shewn to us. This can not be the permanent disposition of foreign nations. A rupture with other powers is among the greatest of national calamities. It ought therefore to be effectually provided that no part of a nation shall have it in its power to bring them on the whole. The existing Confederacy does not sufficiently provide against this evil. The proposed amendment to it does not supply the omission. It leaves the will of the States as uncontrouled as ever.
Will it prevent encroachments on the federal authority? A tendency to such encroachments has been sufficiently exemplified, among ourselves, as well 70 in every other confederated republic antient and Modern. By the federal articles, transactions with the Indians appertain to Congs Yet in several instances, the States have entered into treaties & wars with them. In like manner no two or more States can form among themselves any treaties &c. without the consent of Congs. Yet Virga & Maryd in one instance—Pena & N. Jersey in another, have entered into compacts, without previous application or subsequent apology. No State again can of right raise troops in time of peace without the like consent. Of all cases of the league, this seems to require the most scrupulous observance. Has not Massts, notwithstanding, the most powerful member of the Union, already raised a body of troops? Is she not now augmenting them, without having even deigned to apprise Congs of Her intention? In fine-Have we not seen the public land dealt out to Cont to bribe her acquiescence in the decree constitionally awarded agst her claim on the territory of Pena? for no other possible motive can account for the policy of Congs in that measure?—If we recur to the examples of other confederacies, we shall find in all of them the same tendency of the parts to encroach on the authority of the whole. He then reviewed the Amphyctionic & Achæan confederacies among the antients, and the Helvetic, Germanic & Belgic among the moderns, tracing their analogy to the U. States—in the constitution and extent of their federal authorities—in the tendency of the particular members to usurp on these authorities; and to bring confusion & ruin on the whole.—He observed that the plan of Mr. Pat-son besides omitting a controul over the States as a general defence of the federal prerogatives was particularly defective in two of its provisions. 1.71 Its ratification was not to be by the people at large, but by the legislatures. It could not therefore render the Acts of Cong! in pursuance of their powers, even legally paramount to the Acts of the States. 2.72 It gave to the federal Tribunal an appellate jurisdiction only—even in the criminal cases enumerated, The necessity of any such provision supposed a danger of undue acquittals 73 in the State tribunals. Of what avail cd 74 an appellate tribunal be, after an acquittal? Besides in most if not all of the States, the Executives have by their respective Constitutions the right of pardg How could this be taken from them by a legislative 75 ratification only?
Will it prevent trespasses of the States on each other? Of these enough has been already seen. He instanced Acts of Virga & Maryland which give 76 a preference to their own Citizens in cases where the Citizens of other States are entitled to equality of privileges by the Articles of Confederation. He considered the emissions of paper money & other kindred measures as also aggressions. The States relatively to one an other being each of them either Debtor or Creditor; The creditor States must suffer unjustly from every emission by the debtor States. We have seen retaliating acts on this subject which threatened danger not to the harmony only, but the tranquility of the Union. The plan of Mr Paterson, not giving even a negative on the acts of the States, left them as much at liberty as ever to execute their unrighteous projects agst each other.
Will it secure the internal tranquility of the States themselves? The insurrections in Massts admonished all the States of the danger to which they were exposed. Yet the plan of Mr P. contained no provisions for supplying the defect of the Confederation on this point. According to the Republican theory indeed, Right & power being both vested in the majority, are held to be synonimous. According to fact & experience, a minority may in an appeal to force be an overmatch for the majority. 1.77 If the minority happen to include all such as possess the skill & habits of military life, with such as possess the great pecuniary resources, one third may conquer the remaining two thirds. 2.78 one third of those who participate in the choice of rulers may be rendered a majority by the accession of those whose poverty disqualifies them from a suffrage, & who for obvious reasons may 79 be more ready to join the standard of sedition than that of the 80 established Government. 3.81 where slavery exists, the Republican Theory becomes still more fallacious.
Will it secure a good internal legislation & administration to the particular States? In developing the evils which vitiate the political system of the U. S. it is proper to take into view those which prevail within the States individually as well as those which affect them collectively: Since the former indirectly affect the whole; and there is great reason to believe that the pressure of them had a full share in the motives which produced the present Convention. Under this head he enumerated and animadverted on 1.82 the multiplicity of the laws passed by the several States. 2.82 the mutability of their laws. 3.82 the injustice of them. 4.83 the impotence of them: observing that Mr Patterson's plan contained no remedy for this dreadful class of evils, and could not therefore be received as an adequate provision for the exigences of the Community.
Will it secure the Union agst the influence of foreign powers over its members. He pretended not to say that any such influence had yet been tried: but it was naturally to be expected that occasions would produce it. As lessons which claimed particular attention, he cited the intrigues practised among the Amphyctionic Confederates first by the Kings of Persia, and afterwards fatally by Philip of Macedon: among the Achseans, first by Macedon & afterwards no less fatally by Rome: among the Swiss by Austria, France & the lesser neighbouring powers: among the members of the Germanic Body by France, England, Spain & Russia—: and in the Belgic Republic, by all the great neighbouring powers. The plan of Mr Patterson, not giving to the general Councils any negative on the will of the particular States, left the door open for the like pernicious machinations among ourselves.
He begged the smaller States which were most attached to Mr Pattersons plan to consider the situation in which it would leave them. In the first place they would continue to bear the whole expence of maintaining their Delegates in Congress. It ought not to be said that if they were willing to bear this burden, no others had a right to complain. As far as it led the small States to forbear keeping up a representation, by which the public business was delayed, it was evidently a matter of common concern. An examination of the minutes of Congress would satisfy every one that the public business had been frequently delayed by this cause; and that the States most frequently unrepresented in Cong? were not the larger States. He reminded the convention of another consequence of leaving on a small State the burden of maintaining a Representation in Congs During a considerable period of the War, one of the Representatives of Delaware, in whom alone before the signing of the Confederation the entire vote of that State and after that event one half of its vote, frequently resided, was a Citizen & Resident of Pena and held an office in his own State incompatible with an appointment from it to Congs. During another period, the same State was represented by three delegates two of whom were citizens of Penna and the third a Citizen of New Jersey. These expedients must have been intended to avoid the burden of supporting delegates from their own State. But whatever might have been ya cause, was not in effect the vote of one State doubled, and the influence of another increased by it? In the 2d place The coercion, on which the efficacy of the plan depends, can never be exerted but on themselves. The larger States will be impregnable, the smaller only can feel the vengeance of it. He illustrated the position by the history of the Amphyctionic Confederates: and the ban of the German Empire. It was the cobweb weh could entangle, the weak, but would be the sport of the strong.
He begged them to consider the situation in which they would remain in case their pertinacious adherence to an inadmissible plan, should prevent the adoption of any plan. The contemplation of such an event was painful ; but it woud be prudent to submit to the task of examining it at a distance, that the means of escaping it might be the more readily embraced. Let the Union of the States be dissolved, and one of two consequences must happen. Either the States must remain individually independent & sovereign; or two or more Confederacies must be formed among them. In the first event would the small States be more secure agst the ambition & power of their larger neighbours, than they would be under a general Government pervading with equal energy every part of the Empire, and having an equal interest in protecting every part agst every other part? In the second, can the smaller expect that their larger neighbours would confederate with them on the principle of the present confederacy, which gives to each member, an equal suffrage; or that they would exact less severe concessions from the smaller States, than are proposed in the scheme of Mr Randolph?
The great difficulty lies in the affair of Representation; and if this could be adjusted, all others would be surmountable. It was admitted by both the gentlemen from N. Jersey [Mr Brearly and Mr Patterson] that it would not be just to allow Virga which was 16 times as large as Delaware an equal vote only. Their language was that it would not be safe for Delaware to allow Virga 16 times as many votes. The expedient proposed by them was that all the States should be thrown into one mass and a new partition be made into 13 equal parts. Would such a scheme be practicable? The dissimilarities existing in the rules of property, as well as in the manners, habits and prejudices of the 84 different States, amounted to a prohibition of the attempt. It had been found impossible for the power of one of the most absolute princes in Europe [K. of France] directed by the wisdom of one of the most enlightened and patriotic Ministers [Mr Neckar] that any age has produced to equalize in some points only the different usages & regulations of the different provinces. But admitting a general amalgamation and repartition of the States to be practicable, and the danger apprehended by the smaller States from a proportional representation to be real; would not a particular and voluntary coalition of these with their neighbours, be less inconvenient to the whole community, and equally effectual for their own safety. If N, Jersey or Delaware conceived that an advantage would accrue to them from an equalization of the States, in which case they would necessaryly form a junction with their neighbours, why might not this end be attained by leaving them at liberty by the Constitution to form such a junction whenever they pleased? And why should they wish to obtrude a like arrangement on all the States, when it was, to say the least, extremely difficult, would be obnoxious to many of the States, and when neither the inconveniency,85 nor the benefit of the expedient to themselves, would be lessened, by confining it to themselves.—The prospect of many new States to the Westward was another consideration of importance. If they should come into the Union at all, they would come when they contained but few inhabitants. If they should be entitled to vote according to their proportions of inhabitants, all would be right & safe. Let them have an equal vote, and a more objectionable minority than ever might give law to the whole.
On a question for postponing generally the 1st proposition of Mr Patterson's plan, it was agreed to: N. Y. & N J. only being no—
On the question moved by Mr King whether the Committee should rise & Mr Randolphs propositions be re-reported without alteration, which was in fact a question whether Mr R's should be adhered to as preferable to those of Mr Patterson:
Massts ay. Cont ay. N. Y. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md divd Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 86
Insert here from Printed Journal p. 13 87 copy of the Resolns of M. R. as altered in the Come and reported to the House 88
[State of the resolutions submitted to the consideration of the House by the honorable Mr. Randolph, as altered, amended, and agreed to, in a Committee of the whole House.
Resolved that it is the opinion of this Committee that a national government ought to be established consisting of a Supreme Legislative, Judiciary, and Executive.
Resolved. that the national Legislature ought to consist of Two Branches.
Resolved that the members of the first branch of the national Legislature ought to be elected by the People of the several States for the term of Three years. to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service to be paid out of the National-Treasury. to be ineligible to any Office established by a particular State or under the authority of the United-States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the first branch) during the term of service, and under the national government for the space of one year after it's expiration.
Resolved. that the members of the second Branch of the national legislature ought to be chosen by the individual legislatures, to be of the age of thirty years at least, to hold their offices for a term sufficient to ensure their independency, namely seven years, to receive fixed stipends, by which they may be compensated for the devotion of their time to public service—to be paid out of the National Treasury to be ineligible to any office established by a particular State, or under the authority of the United States (except those peculiarly belonging to the functions of the second branch) during the term of service, and under the national government, for the space of one year after it's expiration.
Resolved that each branch ought to possess the right of originating acts.
Resolved. that the national Legislature ought to be empowered to enjoy the legislative rights vested in Congress by the confederation—and moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent: or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual legislation. to negative all laws passed by the several States contravening, in the opinion of the national Legislature, the articles of union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the union.
Resolved. that the right of suffrage in the first branch of the national Legislature ought not to be according to the rule established in the articles of confederation : but according to some equitable ratio of representation—namely, in proportion to the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex, and condition including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, except Indians, not paying taxes in each State.
Resolved. that the right of suffrage in the second branch of the national Legislature ought to be according to the rule established for the first.
Resolved. that a national Executive be instituted to consist of a single person. to be chosen by the National Legislature. for the term of seven years. with power to carry into execution the national Laws, to appoint to Offices in cases not otherwise provided for to be ineligible a second time, and to be removable on impeachment and conviction of mal practice or neglect of duty. to receive a fixed stipend, by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service to be paid out of the national Treasury.
Resolved. that the national executive shall have a right to negative any legislative act: which shall not be afterwards passed unless by two third parts of each branch of the national Legislature.
Resolved. that a national Judiciary be established to consist of One Supreme Tribunal. The Judges of which to be appointed by the second Branch of the National Legislature. to hold their offices during good behaviour to receive, punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services: in which no encrease or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such encrease or diminution
Resolved. That the national Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals.
Resolved. that the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases which respect the collection of the national revenue: impeachments of any national officers: and questions which involve the national peace and harmony.
Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the admission of States, lawfully arising within the limits of the United States, whether from a voluntary junction of government and territory, or otherwise, with the consent of a number of voices in the national Legislature less than the whole.
Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the continuance of Congress and their authorities until a given day after the reform of the articles of Union shall be adopted; and for the completion of all their engagements.
Resolved that a republican constitution, and its existing laws, ought to be guaranteed to each State by the United States.
Resolved. that provision ought to be made for the amendment of the articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.
Resolved. that the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary powers within the several States ought to be bound by oath to support the articles of Union.
Resolved. that the amendments which shall be offered to the confederation by the Convention, ought at a proper time or times, after the approbation of Congress to be submitted to an assembly or assemblies of representatives, recommended by the several Legislatures, to be expressly chosen by the People to consider and decide thereon.
(Of 89 Mr Randolph's plan as reported from the Committee) 90. the 1. propos: "that a Natl Govt ought to be established consisting &c." being taken up in the House. 91
Mr Wilson observed that by a Natl Govt he did not mean one that would swallow up the State Govts as seemed to be wished by some gentlemen. He was tenacious of the idea of preserving the latter. He thought, contrary to the opinion of [Col. Hamilton] that they might not only subsist but subsist on friendly terms with the former. They were absolutely necessary for certain purposes which the former could not reach. All large Governments must be subdivided into lesser jurisdictions. As Examples he mentioned Persia, Rome, and particularly the divisions & subdivisions of England by Alfred.
Col. Hamilton coincided with the proposition as it stood in the Report. He had not been understood yesterday. By an abolition of the States, he meant that no boundary could be drawn between the National & State Legislatures; that the former must therefore have indefinite authority. If it were limited at all, the rivalship of the States would gradually subvert it. Even as Corporations the extent of some of them as Va Massts &c. would be formidable. As States, he thought they ought to be abolished. But he admitted the necessity of leaving in them, subordinate jurisdictions. The examples of Persia & the Roman Empire, cited by [Mr Wilson] were he thought in favor of his doctrine: the great powers delegated to the Satraps & proconsuls, having frequently produced revolts, and schemes of independence.
Mr King, wished as every thing depended on this proposition, that no objections might be improperly indulged agst* *the phraseology of it. He conceived that the import of the terms "States'' "Sovereignty" "national" "federal,'' had been often used & applied in the discussions inaccurately & delusively. The States were not "Sovereigns" in the sense contended for by some. They did not possess the peculiar featmes of sovereignty, they could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances nor treaties. Considering them as political Beings, they were dumb, for they could not speak to any foreign Sovereign whatever. They were deaf, for they could not hear any propositions from such Sovereign. They had not even the organs or faculties of defence or offence, for they could not of themselves raise troops, or equip vessels, for war. On the other side, if the Union of the States comprizes the idea of a confederation, it comprizes that also of consolidation. A Union of the States is a Union of the men composing them, from whence a national character results to the whole. Congs can act alone without the States—they can act & their acts will be binding agst the Instructions of the States. If they declare war: war is de jure declared—captures made in pursuance of it are lawful—No acts of the States can vary the situation, or prevent the judicial consequences. If the States therefore retained some portion of their sovereignty, they had certainly divested themselves of essential portions of it. If they formed a confederacy in some respects they formed a Nation in others—The Convention could clearly deliberate on & propose any alterations that Congs could have done under ye federal articles, and could not Congs propose by virtue of the last article, a change in any article whatever: and as well that relating to the equality of suffrage, as any other. He made these remarks to obviate some scruples which had been expressed. He doubted much the practicability of annihilating the States; but thought that much of their power ought to be taken from them.
Mr Martin, said he considered that the separation from G. B. placed the 13 States in a state of Nature towards each other; that they would have remained in that state till this time, but for the confederation; that they entered into the confederation on the footing of equality ; that they met now to to amend it on the same footing; and that he could never accede to a plan that would introduce an inequality and lay 10 States at the mercy of Va Massts and Penna.
Mr Wilson, could not admit the doctrine that when the Colonies became independent of G. Britain, they became independent also of each other. He read the declaration of Independence, observing thereon that the United Colonies were declared to be free & independent States; and inferring that they were independent, not individually but Unitedly and that they were confederated as they were independent, States.
Col. Hamilton, assented to the doctrine of Mr Wilson. He denied the doctrine that the States were thrown into a State of Nature He was not yet prepared to admit the doctrine that the Confederacy, could be dissolved by partial infractions of it. He admitted that the States met now on an equal footing but could see no inference from that against concerting a change of the system in this particular. He took this occasion of observing for the purpose of appeasing the fears of the small States, that two circumstances would render them secure under a National Govt in which they might lose the equality of rank they now held: one was the local situation of the 3 largest States Virga Masts* *& Pa. They were separated from each other by distance of place, and equally so, by all the pecularities which distinguish the interests of one State from those of another. No combination therefore could be dreaded. In the second place, as there was a gradation in the States from Va the largest down to Delaware the smallest, it would always happen that ambitious combinations among a few States might & wd be counteracted by defensive combinations of greater extent among the rest. No combination has been seen among 92 large Counties merely as such, agst lesser Counties. The more close the Union of the States, and the more compleat the authority of the whole: the less opportunity will be allowed 93 the stronger States to injure the weaker.
Adjd
Mr. John Francis Mercer from Maryland took his seat.
Mr. RUTLIDGE delivered in the Report of the Committee of detail as follows: a printed copy being at the same time furnished to each member:14
"We the people of the States of New Hampshire, Massachussetts, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, Connecticut, New-York, New-Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North-Carolina, South-Carolina, and Georgia, do ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution for the Government of Ourselves and our Posterity.
The stile of the Government shall be, "The United States of America"
The Government shall consist of supreme legislative, executive; and judicial powers.
The legislative power shall be vested in a Congress, to consist of two separate and distinct bodies of men, a House of Representatives and a Senate ; each of which shall in all cases have a negative on the other. The Legislature shall meet on the first Monday in December 16 every year.
Sect. I . The members of the House of Representatives shall be chosen every second year, by the people of the several States comprehended within this Union. The qualifications of the electors shall be the same, from time to time, as those of the electors in the several States, of the most numerous branch of their own legislatures.
Sect. 2. Every member of the House of Representatives shall be of the age of twenty five years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least three years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State in which he shall be chosen.
Sect. 3. The House of Representatives shall, at its first formation, and until the number of citizens and inhabitants shall be taken in the manner herein after described, consist of sixty five Members, of whom three shall be chosen in New-Hampshire, eight in Massachusetts, one in Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations, five in Connecticut, six in New-York, four in New-Jersey, eight in Pennsylvania, one in Delaware, six in Maryland, ten in Virginia, five in North-Carolina, five in South-Carolina, and three in Georgia.
Sect. 4. As the proportions of numbers in different States will alter from time to time; as some of the States may hereafter be divided; as others may be enlarged by addition of territory; as two or more States may be united ; as new States will be erected within the limits of the United States, the Legislature shall, in each of these cases, regulate the number of representatives by the number of inhabitants, according to the provisions herein after made, at the rate of one for every forty thousand.
Sect. 5. All bills for raising or appropriating money, and for fixing the salaries of the officers of Government, shall originate in the House of Representatives, and shall not be altered or amended by the Senate. No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of appropriations that shall originate in the House of Representatives.
Sect. 6. The House of Representatives shall have the sole power of impeachment. It shall choose its Speaker and other officers.
Sect. 7. Vacancies in the House of Representatives shall be supplied by writs of election from the executive authority of the State, in the representation from which it 17 shall happen.
Sect. I The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the Legislatures of the several States. Each Legislature shall chuse two members. Vacancies may be supplied by the Executive until the next meeting of the Legislature. Each member shall have one vote.
Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six years; but immediately after the first election they shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, as nearly as may be, numbered one, two and three. The seats of the members of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that a third part of the members may be chosen every second year.
Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least four years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State for which he shall be chosen.
Sect. 4. The Senate shall chuse its own President and other officers.
Sect. I . The times and places and manner of holding the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the Legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States.
Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House, with regard to property, as to the said Legislature shall seem expedient.
Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day.
Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns and qualifications of its own members.
Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the Legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in any Court or place out of the Legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases, except treason felony and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at Congress, and in going to and returning from it.
Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings; may punish its members for disorderly behaviour; and may expel a member.
Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate, when it shall be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal of their proceedings, and shall, from time to time, publish them: and the yeas and nays of the members of each House, on any question, shall at the desire of one-fifth part of the members present, be entered on the journal.
Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that at which the two Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate, when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the article.
Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any office under the authority of the United States, during the time for which they shall respectively be elected and the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding any such office for one year afterwards.
Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State, in which they shall be chosen.
18 Sect. 11 . The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be. "Be it enacted by the Senate and Representatives in Congress assembled. "
Sect. 12. Each House shall possess the right of originating bills, except in the cases beforementioned.
Sect. 13. Every bill, which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become 19 a law, be presented to the President of the United States for his revision: if, upon such revision, he approve of it, he shall signify his approbation by signing it: But if, upon such revision, it shall appear to him improper for being passed into a law, he shall return it, together with his objections against it, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider the bill. But if after such reconsideration, two thirds of that House shall, notwithstanding the objections of the President, agree to pass it, it shall together with his objections, be sent to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of the other House also, it shall become a law. But in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays; and the names of the persons voting for or against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within seven days after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law, unless the legislature, by their adjournment, prevent its return; in which case it shall not be a law.
Sect. I. The Legislature of the United States shall have the power to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;
To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States;
To establish an uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United States;
To coin money;
To regulate the value of foreign coin;
To fix the standard of weights and measures;
To establish Post-offices;
To borrow money, and emit bills on the credit of the United States
To appoint a Treasurer by ballot;
To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court;
To make rules concerning captures on land and water;
To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offenses against the law of nations;
To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its legislature;
To make war;
To raise armies;
To build and equip fleets;
To call forth the aid of the militia, in order to execute the laws of the Union, enforce treaties, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions;
And to make all laws that shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested, by this Constitution, in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer 20 thereof;
Sect. 2. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against the United States, or any of them; and in adhering to the enemies of the United States, or any of them. The Legislature of the United States shall have power to declare the punishment of treason. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses. No attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, nor forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.
Sect. 3. The proportions of direct taxation shall be regulated by the whole number of white and other free citizens and inhabitants of every age, sex and condition, including those bound to servitude for a term of years, and three fifths of all other persons not comprehended in the foregoing description, (except Indians not paying taxes) which number shall, within six years after the first meeting of the Legislature, and within the term of every ten years afterwards, be taken in such 21 manner as the said Legislature shall direct.
Sect. 4. No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature on articles exported from any State; nor on the migration or importation of such persons as the several States shall think proper to admit; nor shall such migration or importation be prohibited.
Sect. 5. No capitation tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the Census hereinbefore directed to be taken.
Sect. 6. No navigation act shall be passed without the assent of two thirds of the members present in the each House.
Sect. 7. The United States shall not grant any title of Nobility.
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in pursuance of this Constitution, and all treaties made under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the several States, and of their citizens and inhabitants; and the judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions; any thing in the Constitutions or laws of the several States to the contrary notwithstanding.
Sect 1. The Senate of the United States shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassadors, and Judges of the Supreme Court.
Sect. 2. In all disputes and controversies now subsisting, or that may hereafter subsist between two or more States, respecting jurisdiction or territory, the Senate shall possess the following powers. Whenever the Legislature, or the Executive authority, or lawful agent of any State, in controversy with another, shall by memorial to the Senate, state the matter in question, and apply for a hearing; notice of such memorial and application shall be given by order of the Senate, to the Legislature or the Executive authority of the other State in Controversy. The Senate shall also assign a day for the appearance of the parties, by their agents, before the 22 House. The Agents shall be directed to appoint, by joint consent, commissioners or judges to constitute a Court for hearing and determining the matter in question. But if the Agents cannot agree, the Senate shall name three persons out of each of the several States; and from the list of such persons each party shall alternately strike out one, until the number shall be reduced to thirteen; and from that number not less than seven nor more than nine names, as the Senate shall direct, shall in their presence, be drawn out by lot; and the persons whose names shall be so drawn, or any five of them shall be commissioners or Judges to hear and finally determine the controversy; provided a majority of the Judges, who shall hear the cause, agree in the determination. If either party shall neglect to attend at the day assigned, without shewing sufficient reasons for not attending, or being present shall refuse to strike, the Senate shall proceed to nominate three persons out of each State, and the Clerk of the Senate shall strike in behalf of the party absent or refusing. If any of the parties shall refuse to submit to the authority of such Court; or shall not appear to prosecute or defend their claim or cause, the Court shall nevertheless proceed to pronounce judgment. The judgment shall be final and conclusive. The proceedings shall be transmitted to the President of the Senate, and shall be lodged among the public records, for the security of the parties concerned. Every Commissioner shall, before he sit in judgment, take an oath, to be administred by one of the Judges of the Supreme or Superior Court of the State where the cause shall be tried, "well and truly to hear and determine the matter in question according to the best of his judgment, without favor, affection, or hope of reward."
Sect. 3. All controversies concerning lands claimed under different grants of two or more States, whose jurisdictions, as they respect such lands shall have been decided or adjusted subsequent 23 to such grants, or any of them, shall, on application to the Senate, be finally determined, as near as may be, in the same manner as is before prescribed for deciding controversies between different States.
Sect. 1. The Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single person. His stile shall be, "The President of the United States of America;" and his title shall be, "His Excellency." He shall be elected by ballot by the Legislature. He shall hold his office during the term of seven years; but shall not be elected a second time.
Sect. 2. He shall, from time to time, give information to the Legislature, of the state of the Union: he may recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary, and expedient: he may convene them on extraordinary occasions. In case of disagreement between the two Houses, with regard to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he thinks proper: he shall take care that the laws of the United States be duly and faithfully executed: he shall commission all the officers of the United States; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for by this Constitution. He shall receive Ambassadors, and may correspond with the supreme Executives of the several States. He shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment. He shall be commander in chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States. shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during his continuance in office. Before he shall enter on the duties of his department, he shall take the following oath or affirmation, "I —---- solemnly swear, (or affirm) that that 24 I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States of America." shall be removed from his office on impeachment by the House of Representatives, and conviction in the supreme Court, of treason, bribery, or corruption. In case of his removal as aforesaid, death, resignation, or disability to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the President of the Senate shall exercise those powers and duties, until another President of the United States be chosen, or until the disability of the President be removed.
Sect. I . The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
Sect. 3. The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States; to all cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers of the United States; to all cases of Admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States, (except such as shall regard Territory or Jurisdiction) between a State and Citizens of another State, between Citizens of different States, and between a State or the Citizens thereof and foreign States, citizens or subjects. In cases of impeachment, cases affecting Ambassadors, other Public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be party, this jurisdiction shall be original. In all the other cases beforementioned, it shall be appellate, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Legislature shall make. The Legislature may assign any part of the jurisdiction abovementioned (except the trial of the President of the United States) in the manner, and under the limitations which it shall think proper, to such Inferior Courts, as it shall constitute from time to time.
Sect. 4. The trial of all criminal offences (except in cases of impeachments) shall be in the State where they shall be committed; and shall be by Jury.
Sect. 5. Judgment, in cases of Impeachment, shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honour, trust or profit, under the United States. But the party convicted shall, nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment and punishment according to law.
No State shall coin money; nor grant letters of marque and reprisal; nor enter into any Treaty, alliance, or confederation; nor grant any title of Nobility.
No State, without the consent of the Legislature of the United States, shall emit bills of credit, or make any thing but specie a tender in payment of debts; nor lay imposts or duties on imports; nor keep troops or ships of war in time of peace; nor enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with any foreign power; nor engage in any war, unless it shall be actually invaded by enemies, or the danger of invasion be so imminent, as not to admit of delay, until the Legislature of the United States can be consulted.
The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.
Any person charged with treason, felony or high misdemeanor in any State, who shall flee from justice, and shall be found in any other State, shall, on demand of the Executive power of the State from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the State having jurisdiction of the offence.
Full faith shall be given in each State to the acts of the Legislatures, and to the records and judicial proceedings of the Courts and magistrates of every other State.
New States lawfully constituted or established within the limits of the United States may be admitted, by the Legislature, into this Government; but to such admission the consent of two thirds of the members present in each House shall be necessary. If a new State shall arise within the limits of any of the present States, the consent of the Legislatures of such States shall be also necessary to its admission. If the admission be consented to, the new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original States. But the Legislature may make conditions with the new States, concerning the public debt which shall be then subsisting.
The United States shall guaranty to each State a Republican form of Government; and shall protect each State against foreign invasions, and, on the application of its Legislature, against domestic violence.
On the application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the States in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the legislature of the United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.
The members of the Legislatures, and the Executive and Judicial officers of the United States, and of the several States, shall be bound by oath to support this Constitution.
The ratifications of the Conventions of States shall be sufficient for organizing this Constitution.
This Constitution shall be laid before the United States in Congress assembled, for their approbation; and it is the opinion of this Convention, that it should be afterwards submitted to a Convention chosen,25 under the recommendation of its legislature, in order to receive the ratification of such Convention.
To introduce this government, it is the opinion of this Convention, that each assenting Convention should notify its assent and ratification to the United States in Congress assembled; that Congress, after receiving the assent and ratification of the Conventions of States, should appoint and publish a day, as early as may be, and appoint a place for commencing proceedings under this Constitution; that after such publication, the Legislatures of the several States should elect members of the Senate, and direct the election of members of the House of Representatives; and that the members of the Legislature should meet at the time and place assigned by Congress, and should, as soon as may be, after their meeting, choose the President of the United States, and proceed to execute this Constitution."
A motion was made to adjourn till Wednesday, in order to give leisure to examine the Report; which passed in the negative—N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. Pa ay. Md ay. Virg. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no.26
The House then adjourned till to morrow 27 II OC.
The Report of the Committee of detail being taken up,
Mr. Pinkney moved that it be referred to a Committee of the whole. This was strongly opposed by Mr. Ghorum several others, as likely to produce unnecessary delay; and was negatived. Delaware Maryd Virga only being in the affirmative.
The preamble of the Report was agreed to nem. con. So were Art: I II.28
Art: III.29, 30 considered. Col. Mason doubted the propriety of giving each branch a negative on the other "in all cases." There were some cases in which it was he supposed not intended to be given as in the case of balloting for appointments.
Mr, Govr, Morris moved to insert "legislative acts" instead of "all cases"
Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ds him.
Mr. Sherman. This will restrain the operation of the clause too much. It will particularly exclude a mutual negative in the case of ballots, which he hoped would take place.
Mr. Ghorum contended that elections ought to be made by joint ballot. If separate ballots should be made for the President, and the two branches should be each attached to a favorite, great delay contention & confusion may ensue. These inconveniences have been felt in Masts. in the election of officers of little importance compared with the Executive of the U. States. The only objection agst. a joint ballot is that it may deprive the Senate of their due weight; but this ought not to prevail over the respect due to the public tranquility welfare.
Mr. Wilson was for a joint ballot in several cases at least; particularly in the choice of the President, and was therefore for the amendment. Disputes between the two Houses during & concerning the vacancy of the Executive might have dangerous consequences.
Col. Mason thought the amendment of Mr Govr. Morris extended too far. Treaties are in a subsequent part declared to be laws, they will be therefore 31 subjected to a negative; altho' they are to be made as proposed by the Senate alone. He proposed that the mutual negative should be restrained to "cases requiring the distinct assent" of the two Houses.
Mr. Govr. Morris thought this but a repetition of the same thing; the mutual negative and distinct assent, being equavalent expressions. Treaties he thought were not laws.
Mr. Madison moved to strike out the words "each of which shall in all cases, have a negative on the other; the idea being sufficiently expressed in the preceding member of the article; vesting the "legislative power" in "distinct bodies," especially as the respective powers and mode of exercising them were fully delineated in a subsequent article.
Genl. PINKNEY 2ded the motion
On 32 question for inserting legislative Acts as moved by Mr. Govr. Morris. 33
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no.34
On 32 question for agreeing to Mr. M.'s motion to strike out &c.—
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. M. no. V. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 35
Mr. Madison wished to know the reasons of the Come. for fixing by ye. Constitution the time of Meeting for the Legislature; and suggested, that it be required only that one meeting at least should be held every year leaving the time to be fixed or varied by law.
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the sentence. It was improper to tie down the Legislature to a particular time, or even to require a meeting every year. The public business might not require it.
Mr. Pinkney concurred with Mr. Madison.
Mr. Ghorum. If the time be not fixed by the Constitution, disputes will arise in the Legislature; and the States will be at a loss to adjust thereto, the times of their elections. In the N. England States the annual time of meeting had been long fixed by their Charters Constitutions, and no inconveniency had resulted. He thought it necessary that there should be one meeting at least every year as a check on the Executive department.
Mr. Elseworth was agst. striking out the words. The Legislature will not know till they are met whether the public interest required their meeting or not. He could see no impropriety in fixing the day, as the Convention could judge of it as well as the Legislature.
Mr. Wilson thought on the whole it would be best to fix the day.
Mr. King could not think there would be a necessity for a meeting every year. A great vice in our system was that of legislating too much. The most numerous objects of legislation belong to the States. Those of the Natl. Legislature were but few. The chief of them were commerce & revenue. When these should be once settled, alterations would be rarely necessary & easily made.
Mr. Madison thought if the time of meeting should be fixed by a law it wd. be sufficiently fixed there would be no difficulty then as had been suggested, on the part of the States in adjusting their elections to it. One consideration appeared to him to militate strongly agst. fixing a time by the Constitution. It might happen that the Legislature might be called together by the public exigencies & finish their Session but a short time before the annual period. In this case it would be extremely inconvenient to reassemble so quickly without the least necessity. He thought one annual meeting ought to be required: but did not wish to make two unavoidable.
Col. Mason thought the objections against fixing the time insuperable: but that an annual meeting ought to be required as essential to the preservation of the Constitution. The extent of the Country will supply business. And if it should not, the Legislature, besides legislative, is to have inquisitorial powers, which can not safely be long kept in a state of suspension.
Mr. Sherman was decided for fixing the time, as well as for frequent meetings of the Legislative body. Disputes and difficulties will arise between the two Houses, between both the States, if the time be changeable—frequent meetings of Parliament were required at the Revolution in England as an essential safeguard of liberty. So also are annual meetings in most of the American charters & constitutions. There will be business eno' to require it. The Western Country, and the great extent and varying state of our affairs in general will supply objects.
Mr. Randolph was agst. fixing any day irrevocably; but as there was no provision made any where in the Constitution for regulating the periods of meeting, and some precise time must be fixed, untill the Legislature shall make provision, he could not agree to strike out the words altogether. Instead of which he moved to add the words following—"unless a different day shall be appointed by law."
Mr. Madison 2ded the motion, on the question
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.37
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out Decr. & insert May. It might frequently happen that our measures ought to be influenced by those in Europe, which were generally planned during the Winter and of which intelligence would arrive in the Spring.
Mr. Madison 2ded the motion, he preferred May to Decr. because the latter would require the travelling to from the seat of Govt. in the most inconvenient seasons of the year.
Mr. Wilson. The Winter is the most convenient season for business.
Mr. Elseworth. The summer will interfere too much with private business, that of almost all the probable members of the Legislature being more or less connected with agriculture.
Mr. Randolph. The time is of no great moment now, as the Legislature can vary it. On looking into the Constitutions of the States, he found that the times of their elections with which the election 38 of the Natl. Representatives would no doubt be made to co-incide, would suit better with Decr. than May. And it was adviseable to render our innovations as little incommodious as possible.
On 39 question for "May" instead of "Decr."
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 40
Mr. Read moved to insert after the word "Senate" the words, "subject to the Negative to be hereafter provided." His object was to give an absolute negative to the Executive—He considered this as so essential to the Constitution, to the preservation of liberty, to the public welfare, that his duty compelled him to make the motion.
Mr. Gov.r Morris 2ded him. And on the question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.41
Mr. Rutlidge. Altho' it is agreed on all hands that an annual meeting of the Legislature should be made necessary, yet that point seems not to be freed from doubt as the clause stands. On this suggestion, "Once at least in every year," were inserted, nem. con.
Art. III with the foregoing alterations was agd. to nem. con. and is as follows "The Legislative power shall be vested in a Congress to consist of 2 separate distinct bodies of men; a House of Reps. & a Senate. The Legislature shall meet at least once in every year, and such meeting shall be on the 1st. monday in Decr. unless a different day shall be appointed by law."
"Art IV. Sect I. 42, 43 taken up."
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out the last member of the section beginning with the words "qualifications" of Electors," in order that some other provision might be substituted which wd. restrain the right of suffrage to freeholders.
Mr. Fitzimmons 2ded the motion
Mr. Williamson was opposed to it.
Mr Wilson. This part of the Report was well considered by the Committee, and he did not think it could be changed for the better. It was difficult to form any uniform rule of qualifications for all the States. Unnecessary innovations he thought too should be avoided. It would be very hard & disagreeable for the same persons at the same time, to vote for representatives in the State Legislature and to be excluded from a vote for those in the Natl. Legislature.
Mr. Govr. Morris. Such a hardship would be neither great nor novel. The people are accustomed to it and not dissatisfied with it, in several of the States. In some the qualifications are different for the choice of the Govr. & 44 Representatives; In others for different Houses of the Legislature. Another objection agst. the clause as it stands is that it makes the qualifications of the Natl. Legislature depend on the will of the States, which he thought not proper.
Mr. Elseworth, thought the qualifications of the electors stood on the most proper footing. The right of suffrage was a tender point, and strongly guarded by most of the State Constitutions. The people will not readily subscribe to the Natl. Constitution if it should subject them to be disfranchised. The States are the best Judges of the circumstances & temper of their own people.
Col. Mason. The force of habit is certainly not attended to by those gentlemen who wish for innovations on this point. Eight or nine States have extended the right of suffrage beyond the freeholders, what will the people there say, if they should be disfranchised. A power to alter the qualifications would be a dangerous power in the hands of the Legislature.
Mr. Butler. There is no right of which the people are more jealous than that of suffrage. Abridgments of it tend to the same revolution as in Holland where they have at length thrown all power into the hands of the Senates, who fill up vacancies themselves, and form a rank aristocracy.
Mr. Dickinson, had a very different idea of the tendency of vesting the right of suffrage in the freeholders of the Country. He considered them as the best guardians of liberty; And the restriction of the right to them as a necessary defence agst. the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property without principle with which our Country like all others, will in time abound. As to the unpopularity of the innovation it was in his opinion chemirical. The great mass of our Citizens is composed at this time of freeholders, and will be pleased with it.
Mr. Elseworth. How shall the freehold be defined? Ought not every man who pays a tax, to vote for the representative who is to levy dispose of his money? Shall the wealthy merchants & manufacturers, who will bear a full share of the public burdens be not allowed a voice in the imposition of them—taxation representation ought to go together.
Mr. Govr. Morris. He had long learned not to be the dupe of words. The sound of Aristocracy therefore had no effect on 45 him. It was the thing, not the name, to which he was opposed, and one of his principal objections to the Constitution as it is now before us, is that it threatens this 46 Country with an Aristocracy. The aristocracy will grow out of the House of Representatives. Give the votes to people who have no property, and they will sell them to the rich who will be able to buy them. We should not confine our attention to the present moment. The time is not distant when this Country will abound with mechanics manufacturers who will receive their bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure & faithful Guardians of liberty? Will they be the impregnable barrier agst. aristocracy?—He was as little duped by the association of the words "taxation & Representation." The man who does not give his vote freely is not represented. It is the man who dictates the vote. Children do not vote. Why? because they want prudence, because they have no will of their own. The ignorant & the dependent can be as little trusted with the public interest. He did not conceive the difficulty of defining "freeholders" to be insuperable. Still less that the restriction could be unpopular. 9/10 of the people are at present freeholders and these will certainly be pleased with it. As to Mercts. &c. if they have wealth value the right they can acquire it. If not they don't deserve it.
Col. Mason. We all feel too strongly the remains of antient prejudices, and view things too much through a British medium. A Freehold is the qualification in England, hence it is imagined to be the only proper one. The true idea in his opinion was that every man having evidence of attachment to & permanent common interest with the Society ought to share in all its rights & privileges. Was this qualification restrained to freeholders? Does no other kind of property but land evidence a common interest in the proprietor ? does nothing besides property mark a permanent attachment. Ought the merchant, the monied man, the parent of a number of children whose fortunes are to be pursued in his own Country, to be viewed as suspicious characters, and unworthy to be trusted with the common rights of their fellow Citizens
Mr. Madison, the right of suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of republican Government, and ought not to be left to be regulated by the Legislature. A gradual abridgment of this right has been the mode in which Aristocracies have been built on the ruins of popular forms. Whether the Constitutional qualification ought to be a freehold, would with him depend much on the probable reception such a change would meet with in 48 States where the right was now exercised by every description of people. In several of the States a freehold was now the qualification. Viewing the subject in its merits alone, the freeholders of the Country would be the safest depositories of Republican liberty. In future times a great majority of the people will not only be without landed, but any other sort of, property. These will either combine under the influence of their common situation; in which case, the rights of property & the public liberty, will not be secure in their hands: or which 49 is more probable, they will become the tools of opulence ambition, in which case there will be equal danger on another side. The example of England had been misconceived [by Col Mason]. A very small proportion of the Representatives are there chosen by freeholders. greatest part are chosen by the Cities & boroughs, in many of which the qualification of suffrage is as low as it is in any one of the U.S. and it was in the boroughs & Cities rather than the Counties, that bribery most prevailed, the influence of the Crown on elections was most dangerously exerted. 50
Docr. Franklin. It is of great consequence that we shd. not depress the virtue & public spirit of our common people; of which they displayed a great deal during the war, and which contributed principally to the favorable issue of it. He related the honorable refusal of the American seamen who were carried in great numbers into the British Prisons during the war, to redeem themselves from misery or to seek their fortunes, by entering on board the Ships of the Enemies to their Country; contrasting their patriotism with a contemporary instance in which the British seamen made prisoners by the Americans, readily entered on the ships of the latter on being promised a share of the prizes that might be made out of their own Country. This proceeded he said from the different manner in which the common people were treated in America & G. Britain. He did not think that the elected had any right in any case to narrow the privileges of the electors. He quoted as arbitrary the British Statute setting forth the danger of tumultuous meetings, and under that pretext narrowing the right of suffrage to persons having freeholds of a certain value; observing that this Statute was soon followed by another under the succeeding Parliamt. subjecting the people who had no votes to peculiar labors hardships. He was persuaded also that such a restriction as was proposed would give great uneasiness in the populous States. The sons of a substantial farmer, not being themselves freeholders, would not be pleased at being disfranchised, and there are a great many persons of that description.
Mr. Mercer. The Constitution is objectionable in many points, but in none more than the present. He objected to the footing on which the qualification was put, but particularly to the mode of election by the people. The people can not know & judge of the characters of Candidates. The worse possible choice will be made. He quoted the case of the Senate in Virga. as an example in point. The people in Towns can unite their votes in favor of one favorite; & by that means always prevail over the people of the Country, who being dispersed will scatter their votes among a variety of candidates.
Mr. Rutlidge thought the idea of restraining the right of suffrage to the freeholders a very unadvised one. It would create division among the people & make enemies of all those who should be excluded.
On the question for striking out as moved by Mr. Govr. Morris, from the word "qualifications" to the end of the III article.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. no. Del. ay. Md. divided. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. not prest. 51
Art: IV. Sect, I. 52, 53 – Mr. Mercer expressed his dislike of the whole plan, and his opinion that it never could succeed.
Mr. Ghorum. he had never seen any inconveniency 54 from allowing such as were not freeholders to vote, though it had long been tried. The elections in Phila. N. York & Boston where the Merchants, & Mechanics vote are at least as good as those made by freeholders only. The case in England was not accurately stated yesterday [by Mr. Madison] The Cities & large towns are not the seat of Crown influence corruption. These prevail in the Boroughs, and not on account of the right which those who are not freeholders have to vote, but of the smallness of the number who vote. The people have been long accustomed to this right in various parts of America, and will never allow it to be abridged. We must consult their rooted prejudices if we expect their concurrence in our propositions.
Mr. Mercer did not object so much to an election by the people at large including such as were not freeholders, as to their being left to make their choice without any guidance. He hinted that Candidates ought to be nominated by the State Legislatures.
On 55 question for agreeing to Art: IV- Sect, I it passd. nem. Con.
Art IV. Sect. 2 52, 56 taken up.
Col. Mason was for opening a wide door for emigrants; but did not chuse to let foreigners and adventurers make laws for us & govern us. Citizenship for three years was not enough for ensuring that local knowledge which ought to be possessed by the Representative. This was the principal ground of his objection to so short a term. It might also happen that a rich foreign Nation, for example Great Britain, might send over her tools who might bribe their way into the Legislature for insidious purposes. He moved that "seven" years instead of "three," be inserted.
Mr Govr. Morris 2ded the Motion, & on the question, all the States agreed to it except Connecticut.
Mr. Sherman moved to strike out the word "resident " and insert " inhabitant," as less liable to miscontruction.
Mr. Madison 2ded the motion, both were vague, but the latter least so in common acceptation, and would not exclude persons absent occasionally for a considerable time on public or private business. Great disputes had been raised in Virga. concerning the meaning of residence as a qualification of Representatives which were determined more according to the affection or dislike to the man in question, than to any fixt interpretation of the word.
Mr Wilson preferred "inhabitant."
Mr. Govt. Morris, was opposed to both and for requiring nothing more than a freehold. He quoted great disputes in N. York occasioned by these terms, which were decided by the arbitrary will of the majority. Such a regulation is not necessary. People rarely chuse a nonresident—It is improper as in the branch, the people at large, not the States, are represented.
Mr. Rutlidge urged & moved that a residence of 7 years shd. be required in the State Wherein the Member shd. be elected. An emigrant from N. England to S. C. or Georgia would know little of its affairs and could not be supposed to acquire a thorough knowledge in less time.
Mr. Read reminded him that we were now forming a Natl. Got.^ and such a regulation would correspond little with the idea that we were one people.
Mr. Wilson. enforced the same consideration.
Mr. Madison suggested the case of new States in the West, which could have perhaps no representation on that plan.
Mr. Mercer. Such a regulation would present a greater alienship among the States 57 than existed under the old federal system. It would interweave local prejudices & State distinctions in the very Constitution which is meant to cure them. He mentioned instances of violent disputes raised in Maryland concerning the term "residence"
Mr. Elseworth thought seven years of residence was by far too long a term: but that some fixt term of previous residence would be proper. He thought one year would be sufficient, but seemed to have no objection to three years.
Mr. Dickenson proposed that it should read "inhabitant actually resident for year. 58 This would render the meaning less indeterminate.
Mr. Wilson. If a short term should be inserted in the blank, so strict an expression might be construed to exclude the members of the Legislature, who could not be said to be actual residents in their States whilst at the Seat of the Genl. Government.
Mr. Mercer. It would certainly exclude men, who had once been inhabitants, and returning from residence elsewhere to resettle in their original State; although a want of the necessary knowledge could not in such case 59 be presumed.
Mr. Mason thought 7 years too long, but would never agree to part with the principle. It is a valuable principle. He thought it a defect in the plan that the Representatives would be too few to bring with them all the local knowledge necessary. If residence be not required, Rich men of neighbouring States, may employ with success the means of corruption in some particular district and thereby get into the public Councils after having failed in their own State.60 This is the practice in the boroughs of England.
On the question for postponing in order to consider Mr. Dickensons motion.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 61
On the question for inserting "inhabitant" in place of "resident"—agd to nem. Con.
Mr. Elseworth & Col. Mason move to insert "one year" for previous inhabitancy
Mr. Williamson liked the Report as it stood. He thought "resident" a good eno' term. He was agst. requiring any period of previous residence. New residents if elected will be most zealous to Conform to the will of their constituents, as their conduct will be watched with a more jealous eye.
Mr. Butler & Mr. Rutlidge moved "three years" instead of "one year" for previous inhabitancy
On the question for 3 years—
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 62
On the question for "1 year"
N. H. no—Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa no. Del. no. Md divd. Va no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 63
Art. IV. Sect. 2. As amended in manner preceding, was agreed to nem. Con.
Art: IV. Sect. 3." 64, 65 taken up.
Genl. Pinkney & Mr. Pinkney moved that the number of representatives allotted to S. Carola. be "six" on the question,
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Delaware ay, Md, no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 66
The 3. Sect. of Art: IV was then agreed to.
Art: IV. Sect. 4 64.65 taken up.
Mr. Williamson moved to strike out "according to the provisions hereinafter after made" and to insert the words "according "to the rule hereafter to be provided for direct taxation"— See Art. VII. sect. 3.67
On the question for agreeing to Mr. Williamson's amendment
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 68
Mr. King wished to know what influence the vote just passed was meant 69 have on the succeeding part of the Report, concerning the admission of slaves into the rule of Representation. He could not reconcile his mind to the article if it was to prevent objections to the latter part. The admission of slaves was a most grating circumstance to his mind, he believed would be so to a great part of the people of America. He had not made a strenuous opposition to it heretofore because he had hoped that this concession would have produced a readiness which had not been manifested, to strengthen the Genl. Govt. and to mark a full confidence in it. The Report under consideration had by the tenor of it, put an end to all those hopes. In two great points the hands of the Legislature were absolutely tied. The importation of slaves could not be prohibited—exports could not be taxed. Is this reasonable? What are the great objects of the Genl. System? 1.70 defence agst . foreign invasion. 2.70 agst. internal sedition. Shall all the States then be bound to defend each; shall each be at liberty to introduce a weakness which will render defence more difficult? Shall one part of the U.S. be bound to defend another part, and that other part be at liberty not only to increase its own danger, but to withhold the compensation for the burden? If slaves are to be imported shall not the exports produced by their labor, supply a revenue the better to enable the Genl. Govt. to defend their masters?—There was so much inequality & unreasonableness in all this, that the people of the Northern States could never be reconciled to it. No candid man could undertake to justify it to them. He had hoped that some accomodation wd. have taken place on this subject; that at least a time wd. have been limited for the importation of slaves. He never could agree to let them be imported without limitation & then be represented in the Natl. Legislature. Indeed he could so little persuade himself of the rectitude of such a practice, that he was not sure he could assent to it under any circumstances. At all events, either slaves should not be represented, or exports should be taxable.
Mr. Sherman regarded the slave trade as iniquitous; but the point of representation having been settled after much difficulty deliberation, he did not think himself bound to make opposition; especially as the present article as amended did not preclude any arrangement whatever on that point in another place of the Report.
Mr. Madison objected to 1 for every 40,000, inhabitants as a perpetual rule. The future increase of population if the Union shd. be permanent, will render the number of Representatives excessive.
Mr. Ghorum. It is not to be supposed that the Govt. will last so long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one nation?
Mr Elseworth. If the Govt. should continue so long, alterations may be made in the Constitution in the manner proposed in a subsequent article.
Mr. Sherman & Mr. Madison moved to insert the words "not exceeding" before the words "1 for every 40,000, which was agreed to nem. Con.
Mr. Govt. Morris moved to insert "free" before the word inhabitants. Much he said would depend on this point. He never would concur in upholding domestic slavery. It was a nefarious institution. It was the curse of heaven on the States where it prevailed. Compare the free regions of the Middle States, where a rich & noble cultivation marks the prosperity & happiness of the people, with the misery & poverty which overspread the barren wastes of Va. Maryd. & the other States having slaves. Travel thro' ye. whole Continent & you behold the prospect continually varying with the appearance & disappearance of slavery. The moment you leave ye. E. Sts. enter N. York, the effects of the institution become visible, passing thro' the Jerseys entering Pa. every criterion of superior improvement witnesses the change. Proceed south wdly & every step you take thro' ye. great region of slaves presents a desert increasing, with ye. increasing proportion of these wretched beings. Upon what principle is it that the slaves shall be computed in the representation? Are they men? Then make them Citizens and let them vote. Are they property? Why then is no other property included? The Houses in this city [Philada.] are worth more than all the wretched slaves which cover the rice swamps of South Carolina. The admission of slaves into the Representation when fairly explained comes to this: that the inhabitant of Georgia and S. C. who goes to the Coast of Africa, and in defiance of the most sacred laws of humanity tears away his fellow creatines from their dearest connections & damns them to the most cruel bondages,71 shall have more votes in a Govt. instituted for protection of the rights of mankind, than the Citizen of Pa. or N. Jersey who views with a laudable horror, so nefarious a practice. He would add that Domestic slavery is the most prominent feature in the aristocratic countenance of the proposed Constitution. The vassalage of the poor has ever been the favorite offspring of Aristocracy. And What is the proposed compensation to the Northern States for a sacrifice of every principle of right, of every impulse of humanity. They are to bind themselves to march their militia for the defence of the S. States; for their defence agst. those very slaves of whom they complain. They must supply vessels & seamen in case of foreign Attack. The Legislature will have indefinite power to tax them by excises, and duties on imports: both of which will fall heavier on them than on the Southern inhabitants; for the bohea tea used by a Northern freeman, will pay more tax than the whole consumption of the miserable slave, which consists of nothing more than his physical subsistence and the rag that covers his nakedness. On the other side the Southern States are not to be restrained from importing fresh supplies of wretched Africans, at once to increase the danger of attack, and the difficulty of defence; nay they are to be encouraged to it by an assurance of having their votes in the Natl. Govt. increased in proportion, and are at the same time to have their exports & their slaves exempt from all contributions for the public service. Let it not be said that direct taxation is to be proportioned to representation. It is idle to suppose that the Genl. Govt. can stretch its hand directly into the pockets of the people scattered over so vast a Country. They can only do it through the medium of exports imports & excises. For what then are all these sacrifices to be made? He would sooner submit himself to a tax for paying for all the negroes in the U. States, than saddle posterity with such a Constitution.
Mr. Dayton 2ded the motion. He did it he said that his sentiments on the subject might appear whatever might be the fate of the amendment.
Mr. Sherman, did not regard the admission of the Negroes into the ratio of representation, as liable to such insuperable objections. It was the freemen of the Southn. States who were in fact to be represented according to the taxes paid by them, and the Negroes are only included in the Estimate of the taxes. This was his idea of the matter.
Mr. Pinkney, considered the fisheries & the Western frontier as more burdensome to the U. S. than the slaves. He thought this could be demonstrated if the occasion were a proper one.
Mr. Wilson. thought the motion premature. An agreement to the clause would be no bar to the object of it.
72 Question On 73 motion to insert “free” before “inhabitants.”
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pt no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 74
On the suggestion of Mr. Dickenson the words, "provided that each State shall have one representative at least."—were added nem. Con.
Art. IV. Sect. 4. as amended was agreed to nem. Con.
Art. IV. Sect. 5.75,76 taken up
Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out Sect. 5. As giving no peculiar advantage to the House of Representatives, and as clogging the Govt. If the Senate can be trusted with the many great powers proposed, it surely may be trusted with that of originating money bills.
Mr. Ghorum. was agst. allowing the Senate to originate; but 77 only to amend.
Mr. Gov.r Morris. It is particularly proper that the Senate shd. have the right of originating money bills. They will sit constantly, will consist of a smaller number, and will be able to prepare such bills with due correctness; and so as to prevent delay of business in the other House.
Col. Mason was unwilling to travel over this ground again. To strike out the section, was to unhinge the compromise of which it made a part. The duration of the Senate made it improper. He does not object to that duration. On the Contrary he approved of it. But joined with the smallness of the number, it was an argument against adding this to the other great powers vested in that body. His idea of an Aristocracy was that it was the governt. of the few over the many. An aristocratic body, like the screw in mechanics, workis. its way by slow degrees, and holding fast whatever it gains, should ever be suspected of an encroaching tendency. The purse strings should never be put into its hands.
Mr. Mercer. considered the exclusive power of originating Money bills as so great an advantage, that it rendered the equality of votes in the Senate ideal & of no consequence.
Mr. Butler was for adhering to the principle which had been settled.
Mr. Wilson was opposed to it on its merits without regard to the compromise
Mr. Elseworth did not think the clause of any consequence, but as it was thought of consequence by some members from the larger States, he was willing it should stand.
Mr. Madison was for striking it out: considering it as of no advantage to the large States as fettering the Govt. and as a source of injurious altercations between the two Houses.
On the question for striking out "Sect. 5. Art. IV"
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct no. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 78
Adjd.
Art: IV. Sect. 6.79, 80 Mr Randolph expressed his dissatisfaction at the disagreement yesterday to Sect. 5. concerning money bills, as endangering the success of the plan, and extremely objectionable in itself; and gave notice that he should move for a reconsideration of the vote.
Mr. WILLIAMSON said he had formed a like intention.
Mr. Wilson, gave notice that he shd. move to reconsider the vote, requiring seven instead of three years of Citizenship as a qualification of candidates for the House of Representatives.
Art. IV. Sect. 6 & 7.79, 81 Agreed to nem. Con.
Art. V. Sect 1.82, 83 taken up.
Mr. Wilson objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the Executives of the States. It was unnecessary as the Legislatures will meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people; the Executives in most of the States being elected by the Legislatures. As he had always thought the appointment of the Executives84 by the Legislative department wrong: so it was still more so that the Executive should elect into the Legislative department.
Mr. Randolph thought it necessary in order to prevent inconvenient chasms in the Senate. In some States the Legislatures meet but once a year. As the Senate will have more power & consist of a smaller number than the other House, vacancies there will be of more consequence. The Executives might be safely trusted he thought with the appointment for so short a time.
Mr. Elseworth. It is only said that the Executive *may *supply the 85 vacancies. When the Legislative meeting happens to be near, the power will not be exerted. As there will be but two members from a State vacancies may be of great moment.
Mr. WILLIAMSON. Senators may resign or not accept. This provision is therefore absolutely necessary.
On the question for striking out "vacancies shall be supplied by 86 Executives
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. divd. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 87
Mr. Williamson moved to insert after "vacancies shall be supplied by the Executives," the following 88 words "unless other provision shall be made by the Legislature" [of the State].
Mr. Elseworth. He was willing to trust the Legislature, or the Executive of a State, but not to give the former a discretion to refer appointments for the Senate to whom they pleased.
89 Question on Mr. Williamson's motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 99
Mr. Madison in order to prevent doubts whether resignations, could be made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved to strike out the words after "vacancies," insert the words "happening by refusals to accept, resignations or otherwise may be supplied by the Legislature of the State in' the representation of which such vacancies shall happen, or by the Executive thereof until the next meeting of the Legislature"
Mr. Govr. Morris this is absolutely necessary, otherwise, as members chosen into the Senate are disqualified from being appointed to any office by Sect. 9. of this art: it will be in the power of a Legislature by appointing a man a Senator agst. his consent to deprive the U. S. of his services.
The motion of Mr Madison was agreed to nem. Con.
Mr. Randolph called for division of the Section, so as to leave a distinct question on the last words ' ' each member shall have one vote." He wished this last sentence to be postponed until the reconsideration should have taken place on Sect. 5. Art. IV. concerning money bills. If that section should not be reinstated his plan would be to vary the representation in the Senate.
Mr. Strong concurred in Mr Randolphs ideas on this point
Mr. Read did not consider the section as to money bills of any advantage to the larger States and had voted for striking it out as being viewed in the same light by the larger States. If it was considered by them as of any value, and as a condition of the equality of votes in the Senate, he had no objection to its being re-instated.
Mr. Wilson—Mr. Elseworth & Mr. Madison urged that it was of no advantage to the larger States, and that it might be a dangerous source of contention between the two Houses. All the principal powers of the Natl. Legislature had some relation to money.
Docr. Franklin, considered the two clauses, the originating of money bills, and the equality of votes in the Senate, as essentially connected by the compromise which had been agreed to.
Col. Mason said this was not the time for discussing this point. When the originating of money bills shall be reconsidered, he thought it could be demonstrated that it was of essential importance to restrain the right to the House of Representatives the immediate choice of the people.
Mr. WILLIAMSON. The State of N. C. had agreed to an equality in the Senate, merely in consideration that money bills should be confined to the other House: and he was surprised to see the Smaller States forsaking the condition on which they had received their equality.
91 Question on the Section I.92 down to the last sentence
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no* Del. ay. Md. ay. Virga. ay N. C. no. S. C. divd. Geo. av. 93
Mr.. Randolph moved that the last sentence "each member shall have one vote." be postponed
It was observed that this could not be necessary; as in case the section as to originating 94 bills should not be reinstated, and a revision of the Constitution should ensue, it wd. still be proper that the members should vote per Capita. A postponement of the preceding sentence allowing to each State 2 members we have been more proper
Mr. MASON, did not mean to propose a change of this mode of voting per capita in any event. But as there might be other modes proposed, he saw no impropriety in postponing the sentence. Each State may have two members, and yet may have unequal votes. He said that unless the exclusive 95 orginating of money bills should be restored to the House of Representatives, he should, not from obstinacy, but duty and conscience, oppose throughout the equality of Representation in the Senate.
Mr. Govr. Morris. Such declarations were he supposed, addressed to the smaller States in order to alarm them for their equality in the Senate, and induce them agst. their judgments, to concur in restoring the section concerning money bills. He would declare in his turn that as he saw no prospect of amending the Constitution of the Senate & considered the section relating to money bills as intrinsically bad, he would adhere to the section establishing the equality at all events.
Mr Wilson. It seems to have been supposed by some that the section concerning money bills is desirable to the large States. The fact was that two of those States [Pa, Va.] had uniformly voted agst. it without reference to any other part of the system.
Mr. Randolph, urged as Col. Mason had done that the sentence under consideration was connected with that relating to Money bills, and might possibly be affected by the result of the motion for reconsidering the latter. That the postponement was therefore not improper.
96 Question for postponing "each member shall have one vote."
N. H. divd. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. 97
The words were then agreed to as part of the section.
Mr. RANDOLPH then gave notice that he should move to reconsider this whole Sect: 1. Art. V. as connected with the 5. Sect. art. IV. as to which he had already given such notice.
Art. V. Sect. 2d, 98, 99 taken up.
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert after the words "immediately after," the following "they shall be assembled in consequence of—" which was agreed to nem. con. as was then the whole Sect. 2.1
Art: V. Sect. 3.98, 2 taken up.
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to insert 14 instead of 4 years citizenship as a qualification for Senators: urging the danger of admitting strangers into our public Councils. Mr. Pinkney 2ds him
Mr. Elseworth. was opposed to the motion as discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this Country.
Mr. Pinkney. As the Senate is to have the power of making treaties managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign attachments. He quoted the jealousy of the Athenians on this subject who made it death for any stranger to intrude his voice into their Legislative proceedings.
Col. Mason highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were it not that many not natives of this Country had acquired great merit3 during the revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility into the Senate, to natives.
Mr. Madison, was not averse to some restrictions on this subject; but could never agree to the proposed amendment. He thought any restriction however in the *Constitution *unnecessary, and improper. unnecessary; because the Natl. Legislre. is to have the right of regulating naturalization, and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of residence as conditions of enjoying different privileges of Citizenship; Improper; because it will give a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution: because it will put it out of the power of the Natl. Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers because it will discourage the most desireable class of people from emigrating to the U. S. Should the proposed Constitution have the intended effect of giving stability reputation to our Govts. great numbers of respectable Europeans: men who love liberty and wish to partake its blessings, will be ready to transfer their fortunes hither. All such would feel the mortification of being marked with suspicious incapacitations though they sd. not covet the public honors He was not apprehensive that any dangerous number of strangers would be appointed by the State Legislatures, if they were left at liberty to do so: nor that foreign powers would made use of strangers as instruments for their purposes. Their bribes would be expended on men whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite jealousy & watchfulness in the public.
Mr. Butler was decidely opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the Country. They bring with them, not only attachments to other Countries; but ideas of Govt. so distinct from ours that in every point of view they are dangerous. He acknowledged that if he himself had been called into public life within a short time after his coming to America, his foreign habits opinions & attachments would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs. He mentioned the great strictness observed in Great Britain on this subject.
Docr. Franklin was not agst.* *a reasonable time, but should be very sorry to see any thing like illiberality inserted in the Constitution. The people in Europe are friendly to this Country. Even in the Country with which we have been lately at war, we have now & had during the war, a great many friends not only among the people at large but in both houses of Parliament. In every other Country in Europe all the people are our friends. We found in the course of the Revolution that many strangers served us faithfully- and that many natives took part agst. their Country. When foreigners after looking about for some other Country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a preference to ours it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our confidence& affection.
Mr. Randolph did not know but it might be problematical whether emigrations to this Country were on the whole useful or not: but be could never agree to the motion for disabling them for 14 years to participate in the public honours. He reminded the Convention of the language held by our patriots during the Revolution, and the principles laid down in all our American Constitutions. Many foreigners may have fixed their fortunes among us under the faith of these invitations. All persons under this description, with all others who would be affected by such a regulation, would enlist themselves under the banners of hostility to the proposed System. He would go as far as seven years, but no farther.
Mr. Wilson said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar; mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native, and the possibility, if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being incapacitated from holding a place under the very Constitution, which he had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal complexion which the motion would give to the System, & the effect which a good system would have in inviting meritorious foreigners among us, and the discouragement mortification they must feel from the degrading discrimination, now proposed. He had himself experienced this mortification. On his removal into Maryland, he found himself, from defect of residence, under certain legal incapacities which never ceased to produce chagrin, though he assuredly did not desire & would not have accepted the offices to which they related. To be appointed to a place may be matter of indifference. To be incapable of being appointed, is a circumstance grating and mortifying.
Mr. Govr. Morris. The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed as much by our reason, and as little by our feelings as possible. What is the language of Reason on this subject? That we should not be polite at the expence of prudence. There was a moderation in all things. It is said that some tribes of Indians, carried their hospitality so far as to offer to strangers their wives daughters. Was this a proper model for us? He would admit them to his house, he would invite them to his table, would provide for them confortable lodgings; but would not carry the complaisance so far as, to bed them with his wife. He would let them worship at the same altar, but did not choose to make Priests of them. He ran over the privileges which emigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of that of being eligible to the great offices of Government; observing that they exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the world; and that as every Society from a great nation down to a club had the right of declaring the conditions on which new members should be admitted, there could be no room for complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those Citizens of the World as they call themselves. He owned he did not wish to see any of them in our public Councils. He would not trust them. The men who can shake off their attachments to their own Country can never love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all Governments, Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France: an Englishman,4 he will feel an equal biass in favor of that of England. It has been said that The Legislatures will not chuse foreigners, at least improper ones. There was no knowing what Legislatures would do. Some appointments made by them, proved that every thing ought to be apprehended from the cabals practised on such occasions. He mentioned the case of a foreigner who left this State in disgrace, and worked himself into an appointment from another to Congress.
5 Question on the motion of Mr. Govr. Morris to insert 14 in place of 4 years
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 6
On 13 years, moved Mr. Govr. Morris7
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
On 10 years moved by Gen;. PINKNEY 8
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.
Dr. Franklin reminded the Convention that it did not follow from an omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution that the persons in question w4 be actually chosen into the Legislature.
Mr. Rutlidge. 7 years of Citizenship have been required for the House of Representatives. Surely a longer term is requisite for the Senate, which will have more power.
Mr. Williamson. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case than the other House. Bribery & cabal can be more easily practised in the choice of the Senate which is to be made by the Legislatures composed of a few men, than of the House of Represents. who will be chosen by the people.
Mr. RANDOLPH will agree to 9 years with the expectation that it will be reduced to seven if Mr. Wilson's motion to reconsider the vote fixing 7 years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period.
On a 9 question for 9 years.
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. divt S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 10
The term "Resident" was struck out, "inhabitant" inserted nem. Con.
Art. V Sect. 3, as amended 11 agreed to nem. Con.
Sect. 4.12 agreed to nem. Con.13
Art. VI. sect. I. 12, 14 taken up.
Mr. Madison & Govr. Morris moved to strike out "each House" & to insert "the House of Representatives"; the right of the Legislatures to regulate the times places c in the election of Senators being involved in the right of appointing them, which was disagreed to.
15 Division of the question being called,16 it was taken on the first, part down to "but their provisions concerning &c"
The first part was agreed to nem. Con.
Mr. Pinkney & Mr. Ruteidge moved to strike out the remaining part viz but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States." The States they contended could & must be relied on in such cases.
MR. Ghorum. It would be as improper17 take this power from the Natl. Legislature, as to Restrain the British Parliament from regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the Counties themselves-
Mr. Madison. The necessity of a Genl. Govt. supposes that the State Legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expence of their local conveniency 18 or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people and not to the Legislatures of the States, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the Legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrouled right of regulating the times places & manner of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot or viva voce, should assemble at this place or that place; should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, shd. all vote for all the representatives; or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district; these many other points would depend on the Legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the State Legislatures had a favorite measure to carry, they would take care so to mould their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the Representation in the Legislatures of particular States, would produce a like inequality in their representation in the Nati Legislature, as it was presumable that the Counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there be in giving a controuling power to the Natl. Legislature? Of whom was it to consist? 1.19 of a Senate to be chosen by the State Legislatures. If the latter therefore could be trusted, their representatives could not be dangerous. 2.19 of Representatives elected by the same people who elect the State Legislatures; surely then if confidence is due to the latter, it must be due to the former. It seemed as improper in principle, though it might be less inconvenient in practice, to give to the State Legislatures this great authority over the election of the Representatives of the people in the Genl. Legislature, as it would be to give to the latter a like power over the election of their Representatives in the State Legislatures.
Mr. King. If this power be not given to the Natl. Legislature, their right of judging of the returns of their members may be frustrated. No probability has been suggested of its being abused by them. Altho this scheme of erecting the Genl Govt on the authority of the State Legislatures has been fatal to the federal establishment, it would seem as if many gentlemen, still foster the dangerous idea.
Mr. Govr. Morris- observed that the States might make false returns and then make no provisions for new elections
Mr. Sherman did not know but it might be best to retain the clause, though he had himself sufficient confidence in the State Legislatures. The motion of Mr P. and Mr R. did not prevail. The word "respectively" was inserted after the word "State" On the motion of Mr. Read the word "their" was struck out, "regulations in such cases" inserted in place of "provisions concerning them." the clause then reading—"but regulations in each of the foregoing cases may at any time, be made or altered by the Legislature of the U. S" This was meant to give the Natl. legislature a power not only to alter the provisions of the States, but to make regulations in case the States should fail or refuse altogether.
Art. VI. Sect. I. as thus amended was agreed to nem. Con.
Adjourned.
Art. VI. Sect. 2.20, 21 taken up.
Mr. Pinkney. The Committee as he had conceived were instructed to report the proper qualifications of property for the members of the Natl. Legislature; instead of which they have referred the task to the Natl. legislature itself. Should it be left on this footing, the first Legislature will meet without any particular qualifications of property: and if it should happen to consist of rich men they might fix such such qualifications as may be too favorable to the rich; if of poor men, an opposite extreme might be run into. He was opposed to the establishment of an undue aristocratic influence in the Constitution but he thought it essential that the members of the Legislature, the Executive, and the Judges, should be possessed of competent property to make them independent & respectable. It was prudent when such great powers were to be trusted to connect the tie of property with that of reputation in securing a faithful administration. The Legislature would have the fate of the Nation put into their hands. The President would also have a very great influence on it. The Judges would have not only22 important causes between Citizen & Citizen but also, where foreigners are concerned. They will even be the Umpires between the U. States and individual States as well as between one State & another. Were he to fix the quantum of property which should be required, he should not think of less than one hundred thousand dollars for the President, half of that sum for each of the Judges, and in like proportion for the members of the Natl. Legislature. He would however leave the sums blank. His motion was that the President of the U. S. the Judges, and members of the Legislature should be required to swear that they were respectively possessed of a cleared 23 unincumbered Estate to the amount of in the case of the President &c &c.
Mr. Rutlidge seconded the motion; observing that the Committee had reported no qualifications because they could not agree on any among themselves, being embarrassed by the danger on one side of displeasing the people by making them high, and on the other of rendering them nugatory by making them low.
Mr. Elseworth. The different circumstances of different parts of the U. S. and the probable difference between the present and future circumstances of the whole, render it improper to have either uniform or fixed qualifications. Make them so high as to be useful in the S. States, and they will be inapplicable to the E. States. Suit them to the latter, and they will serve no purpose in the former. In like manner what may be accomodated to the existing State of things among us, may be very inconvenient in some future state of them. He thought for these reasons that it was better to leave this matter to the Legislative discretion than to attempt a provision for it in the Constitution.
Doctr. Franklin expressed his dislike of 24 every thing that tended to debase the spirit of the common people. If honesty was often the companion of wealth, and if poverty was exposed to peculiar temptation, it was not less true that the possession of property increased the desire of more property. Some of the greatest rogues he was ever acquainted with, were the richest rogues. We should remember the character which the Scripture requires in Rulers, that they should be men hating covetousness. This Constitution will be much read and attended to in Europe, and if it should betray a great partiality to the rich, will not only hurt us in the esteem of the most liberal and enlightened men there, but discourage the common people from removing into 25 this Country.
The Motion of Mr. Pinkney was rejected by so general a no, that the States were not called.
Mr. Madison was opposed to the Section as vesting an improper dangerous power in the Legislature. The qualifications of electors and elected were fundamental articles in a Republican Govt. and ought to be fixed by the Constitution. If the Legislature could regulate those of either, it can by degrees subvert the Constitution. A Republic may be converted into an aristocracy or oligarchy as well by limiting the number capable of being elected, as the number authorised to elect. In all cases where the representatives of the people will have a personal interest distinct from that of their Constituents, there was the same reason for being jealous of them, as there v/as for relying on them with full confidence, when they had a common interest. This was one of the former cases. It was as improper as to allow them to fix their own wages, or their own privileges. It was a power also which might be made subservient to the views of one faction agst. another. Qualifications founded on artificial distinctions may be devised, by the stronger in order to keep out partizans of a weaker faction.
Mr. Elseworth, admitted that the power was not unexceptionable; but he could not view it as dangerous. Such a power with regard to the electors would be dangerous because it would be much more liable to abuse.
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "with regard to property" in order to leave the Legislature entirely at large.
Mr. Williamson. This could 26 surely never be admitted. Should a majority of the Legislature be composed of any particular description of men,, of lawyers for example, which is no improbable supposition, the future elections might be secured to their own body.
Mr. Madison observed that the British Parliamt. possessed the power of regulating the qualifications both of the electors, and the elected; and the abuse they had made of it was a lesson worthy of our attention. They had made the changes in both cases subservient to their own views, or to the views of political or Religious parties.
27 Question on the motion to strike out with regard to property
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no.* Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.28
Mr. RUTLIDGE was opposed to leaving the power to the Legislature. He proposed that the qualifications should be the same as for members of the State Legislatures.
Mr. Wilson thought it would be best on the whole to let the Section go out. A uniform rule would probably be never 29 fixed by the Legislature, and this particular power would constructively exclude every other power of regulating qualifications.
On the question for agreeing to Art. VI. Sect. 2d-
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. ay.30
On Motion of Mr. Wilson to reconsider Art: IV. Sect. 2; so as to restore 3 in place of seven years of citizenship as a qualification for being elected into the House of Represents.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. 31
Monday next was then assigned for the reconsideration: all the States being ay. except Massts. Georgia
Art: VI. Sect. 3.32, 33 taken up.
Mr. Ghorum contended that less than a Majority in each House should be made of 34 Quorum, otherwise great delay might happen in business, and great inconvenience from the future increase of numbers.
Mr. Mercer was also for less than a majority. So great a number will put it in the power of a few by seceding at a critical moment to introduce convulsions, and endanger the Governmt. Examples of secession have already happened in some of the States. He was for leaving it to the Legislature to fix the Quorum, as in Great Britain, where the requisite number is small & no inconveniency 35 has been experienced.
Col. Mason. This is a valuable & necessary part of the plan. In this extended Country, embracing so great a diversity of interests, it would be dangerous to the distant parts to allow a small number of members of the two Houses to make laws. The Central States could always take care to be on the Spot and by meeting earlier than the distant ones, or wearying their patience, and outstaying them, could carry such measures as they pleased. He admitted that inconveniences might spring from the secession of a small number: But he had also known good produced by an apprehension, of it. He had known a paper emission prevented by that cause in Virginia. He thought the Constitution as now moulded was founded on sound principles, and was disposed to put into it extensive powers. At the same time he wished to guard agst.* *abuses as much as possible. If the Legislature should be able to reduce the number at all, it might reduce it as low as it pleased & the U. States might be governed by a Juncto-A majority of the number which had been agreed on, was so few that he feared it would be made an objection agst. the plan.
Mr. King admitted there might be some danger of giving an advantage to the Central States; but was of opinion that the public inconveniency 35 on the other side was more to be dreaded.
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to fix the quorum at 33 members in the H. of Reps. & 14 in the Senate. This is a majority of the present number, and will be a bar to the Legislature: fix the number low and they will generally attend knowing that advantage may be taken of their absence, the Secession of a small number ought not to be suffered to break a quorum. Such events in the States may have been of little consequence. In the national Councils, they may be fatal. Besides other mischiefs, if a few can break up a quorum, they may seize a moment when a particular part of the Continent may be in need of immediate aid, to extort, by threatening a secession, some unjust & selfish measure.
Mr. Mercer 2ded the motion
Mr. King said he had just prepared a motion which instead of fixing the numbers proposed by Mr. Govt. Morris as Quorums, made those the lowest numbers, leaving the legislature at liberty to increase them or not. He thought the future increase of members would render a majority of the whole extremely cumbersome.
Mr. Mercer agreed to substitute Mr. Kings motion in place of Mr. Morris's.
Mr. Elseworth was opposed to it. It would be a pleasing ground of confidence to the people that no law or burden could be imposed on them, by a few men. He reminded the movers that the Constitution proposed to give such a discretion with regard to the number of Representatives that a very incovenient number was not to be apprehended. The inconveniency 36 of secessions may be guarded agst. by giving to each House an authority to require the attendance of absent members.
Mr Wilson concurred in the sentiments of Mr Elseworth.
Mr Gerry seemed to think that some further precautions than merely fixing the quorum might be necessary. He observed that as 17 wd. be a majority of a quorum of 33, and 8 of 14, questions might by possibility be carried in the H. of Reps. by 2 large States, and in the Senate by the same States with the aid of two small ones.—He proposed that the number for a quorum in the H. of Reps. should not exceed 50 nor be less than 33, leaving the intermediate discretion to the Legislature.
Mr King, as the quorum could not be altered witht. the concurrence of the President by less than ⅔ of each House, he thought there could be no danger in trusting the Legislature.
Mr Carrol this will be no security agst. a continuance of the quorums at 33 & 14. when they ought to be increased.
On 37 question on Mr. Kings motion "that not less than 33 in the H. of Reps. nor less than 14 in the Senate shd. constitute a Quorum, which may be increased by a law, on additions to 37 members in either House.
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 38
Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison moved to add to the end of Art. VI. Sect 3. "and may be authorised to compel the attendance of absent members in such manner under such penalties as each House may provide." Agreed to by all except Pena. which was divided.
Art: VI. Sect. 3.39 agreed to as amended Nem. con.
Sect. 4.40}Agreed to nem. con.41
Sect. 5.40}
Mr. Madison observed that the right of expulsion (Art. VI. Sect. 6.) 40 was too important to be exercised by a bare majority of a quorum: and in emergencies of faction might be dangerously abused. He moved that "with the concurrence of ⅔" might be inserted between may & expel.
Mr. RANDOLPH & Mr. MASON approved the idea.
Mr. Govr. Morris. This power may be safely trusted to a majority. To require more may produce abuses on the side of the minority. A few men from factious motives may keep in a member who ought to be expelled.
Mr. Carrol thought that the concurrence of ⅔ at least ought to be required.
On the question for 42 requiring ⅔ in cases of expelling a member.43
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. divd. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 43
Art. VI. Sect. 6. as thus amended 44 agreed to nem. Con.
Art: VI. Sect. 7 44, 40 taken up.
Mr. Govr. Morris urged that if the yeas & nays were proper at all any individual ought to be authorised to call for them: and moved an amendment to that effect.- The small States may otherwise be under a disadvantage, and find it difficult, to get a concurrence of ⅕.
Mr. Randolph 2ded ye. Motion.
Mr. Sherman had rather strike out the yeas & nays altogether. They never have done any good, and have done much mischief. They are not proper as the reasons governing the voter never appear along with them.
Mr. Elseworth was of the same opinion.
Col. Mason liked the Section as it stood. it was a middle way between the two extremes.
Mr. Ghorum was opposed to the motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays, and recited the abuses of it, in Massts. 1 45 in stuffing the journals with them on frivolous occasions. 2 45 in misleading the people who never know the reasons determining the votes.
The motion for allowing a single member to call the yeas & nays was disagd. to nem. Con.
Mr. Carrol. & Mr. Randolph moved Here insert the motion at the bottom of page * 46
Mr. Govr. Morris & Mr. Wilson observed that if the minority were to have a right to enter their votes & reasons, the other side would have a right to complain, if it were not extended to them: & to allow it to both, would fill the Journals, like the records of a Court, with replications, rejoinders &c.
47 Question on Mr. Carrols motion to allow a member to enter his dissent
N. H. no. Mas. no. Cont. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay.. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no.48
Mr. Gerry moved to strike out the words "when it shall be acting in its legislative capacity" in order to extend the provision to the Senate when exercising its peculiar authorities and to insert "except such parts thereof as in their judgment require secrecy" after the words "publish them."—[It was thought by others that provision should be made with respect to these when that part came under consideration which proposed to vest those additional authorities in the Senate.]
On this question for striking out the words "when acting in its Legislative capacity"
N. H. divd. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.49
Mr. Madison & Mr. Rutlidge moved "that each House shall keep a journal of its proceeding, 50 & shall publish the same from time to time; except such part of the proceedings of the Senate, when acting not in its Legislative capacity as may be judged by that House to require secrecy."
Mr. MERCER. This implies that other powers than legislative will be given to the Senate which he hoped would not be given.
Mr Madison & Mr R's motion. was disaged.to by all the States except Virga.
Mr Gerry & Mr Sharman moved to insert after the words "publish them" the following "except such as relate to treaties military operations." Their object was to give each House a discretion in such cases.—On this question
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ca. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.51
Mr. Elseworth. As the clause is objectionable in so many shapes, it may as well be struck out altogether. The Legislature will not fail to publish their proceedings from time to time. The people will call for it if it should be improperly omitted.
Mr. Wilson thought the expunging of the clause would be very improper. The people have a right to know what their Agents are doing or have done, and it should not be in the option of the Legislature to conceal their proceedings. Besides as this is a clause in the existing confederation, the not retaining it would furnish the adversaries of the reform with a pretext by which week & suspicious minds may be easily misled.
Mr. Mason thought it would give a just alarm to the people, to make a conclave of their Legislature.
Mr Sherman thought the Legislature might be trusted in this case if in any.
52 Question on 53 1st part of the section down to ''publish them'' inclusive: 54 Agreed to nem. Con.
52 Question on the words to follow, to wit except such parts thereof as may in their Judgment require secrecy." N. H. divd. Mas. ay. ay. N. J. ay. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.55
The remaining part as to yeas & nays,—56 agreed to nem. con.
Art VI. Sect. 8.57,58 taken up.
Mr King remarked that the section authorized the 2 Houses to adjourn to a new place. He thought this inconvenient. The mutability of place had dishonored the federal Govt. and would require as strong a cure as we could devise. He thought a law at least should be made necessary to a removal of the Seat of Govt.
Mr. Madison, viewed the subject in the same light, and joined with Mr King in a motion requiring a law.
Mr. Governr. Morris proposed the additional alteration by inserting the words "during the Session" &c."
Mr. Spaight. this will fix the seat of Govt. at N. Y. The present Congress will convene them there in the first instance, and they will never be able to remove; especially if the Presidt. should be 59 Northern Man.
Mr. Govr. Morris such a distrust is inconsistent with all Govt.
Mr. Madison supposed that a central place for the seat of Govt. was so just and wd. be so must insisted on by the H. of Representatives, that though a law should be made requisite for the purpose, it could & would be obtained. The necessity of a central residence of the Govt wd. be much greater under the new than old Govt. The members of the new Govt. wd. be more numerous. They would be taken more from the interior parts of the States; they wd. not like members of ye. present Congs. come so often from the distant States by water. As the powers & objects of the new Govt. would be far greater yn. heretofore, more private individuals wd. have business calling them to the seat of it, and it was more necessary that the Govi should be in that position from which it could contemplate with the most equal eye, and sympathize most equally with, ever}^ part of the nation. These considerations he supposed would extort a removal even if a law were made necessary. But in order to quiet suspicions both within & without doors, it might not be amiss to authorize the 2 Houses by a concurrent vote to adjourn at their first meeting to the most proper place, and to require thereafter, the sanction of a law to their removal.
The motion was accordingly moulded into the following form– "the Legislature shall at their first assembling determine on a place at which their future sessions shall be held; neither House shall afterwards, during the session of the House of Reps. without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor shall they adjourn to any other place than such as shall have been fixt by law "
Mr. Gerry thought it would be wrong to let the Presidt. check the will of the 2 Houses on this subject at all
Mr. Williamson supported the ideas of Mr. Spaight
Mr. Carrol was actuated by the same apprehensions
Mr. Mercer, it will serve no purpose to require the two Houses at their first meeting to fix on a place. They will never agree.
After some further expressions from others denoting an apprehension that the seat of Govt. might be continued at an improper place if a law should be made necessary to a removal, and60 the motion above stated with another for recommitting the section had been negatived, the section was left in the shape it which it was reported as to this point. The words "during the session of the Legislature were prefixed to the 8th section—and the last sentence "But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate when it shall exercise the powers mention61 in the article" struck struck out. The 8th section as amended was then agreed to.
Mr. Randolph moved according to notice to reconsider .Art: IV. Sect. 5.62 concerning money-bills which had been struck out. He argued 1.63 that he had not wished for this privilege whilst a proportional Representation in the Senate was in contemplation, but since an equality had been fixed in that house, the large States would require this compensation at least. 2.63 that it would make the plan more acceptable to the people, because they will consider the Senate as the more aristocratic body, and will expect that the usual guards agst. its influence64 be provided according to the example in 65 G. Britain. 3.63 the privilege will give some advantage to the House of Reps. if it extends to the originating only—but still more, if it restrains the Senate from amendg. 4.63 he called on the smaller States to concur in the measure, as the condition by which alone the compromise had entitled them to an equality in the Senate. He signified that he should propose instead of the original Section, a clause specifying that the bills in question should be for the purpose of Revenue, in order to repel ye. objection agst. the extent of the words ''raising money,” which might happen incidentally, and that the Senate should not so amend or alter as to increase or diminish the sum; in order to obviate the inconveniences urged agst. a restriction of the Senate to a simple affirmative or negative.
Mr. WILLIAMSON 2ded the motion
Mr. PINKNEY was sorry to oppose the opportunity gentlemen asked to have the question again opened for discussion, but as he considered it a mere waste of time he could not bring himself to consent to it. He said that notwithstanding what had been said as to the compromise, he always considered this section as making no part of it. The rule of Representation in the 1st branch was the true condition of that in the 2d branch.—Several others spoke for & agst. the reconsideration, but without going into the merits—On the Question to reconsider
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J.* ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. divd. Geo. ay.—66 Monday was then assigned—67
Adjd.
Art. IV. Sect. 2 68, 69 reconsidered—
Mr Wilson & Mr Randolph moved to strike out "7 years" and insert "4 years," as the requisite term of Citizenship to qualify for the House of Reps. Mr Wilson said it was very proper the electors should govern themselves by this consideration; but unnecessary & improper that the Constitution should chain them down to it.
Mr. Gerry wished that in future the eligibility might be confined to Natives. Foreign powers will intermeddle in our affairs, and spare no expence to influence them. Persons having foreign attachments will be sent among us & insinuated into our councils, in order to be made instruments for their purposes. Every one knows the vast sums laid out in Europe for secret services. He was not singular in these ideas. A great many of the most influencial men in Massts. reasoned in the same manner.
Mr. Williamson moved to insert 9 years instead of seven. He wished this Country to acquire as fast as possible national habits. Wealthy emigrants do more harm by their luxurious examples, than good, by the money, they bring with them.
Col. Hamilton was in general agst. embarrassing the Govt. with minute restrictions. There was on one side the possible danger that had been suggested. On the other side, the advantage of encouraging foreigners was obvious & admitted. Persons in Europe of moderate fortunes will be fond of coming here where they will be on a level with the first Citizens. He moved that the section be so altered as to require merely citizenship & inhabitancy. The right of determining the rule of naturalization will then leave a discretion to the Legislature on this subject which will answer every purpose.
Mr. Madison seconded the motion. He wished to maintain the character of liberality which had been professed in all the Constitutions & publications of America. He wished to invite foreigners of merit & republican principles among us. America was indebted to emigrations for her settlement & Prosperity. That part of America which had encouraged them most had advanced most rapidly in population, agriculture & the arts. There was a possible danger he admitted that men with foreign predilections might obtain appointments but it was by no means probable that it would happen in any dangerous degree. For the same reason that they would be attached to their native Country, our own people wd. prefer natives of this Country to them. Experience proved this to be the case. Instances were rare of a foreigner being elected by the people within any short space after his coming among us. If bribery was to be practised by foreign powers, it would not be attempted among the electors but among the elected; and among natives having full Confidence of the people not among strangers who would be regarded with a jeoulous eye.
Mr Wilson, cited Pennsylva. as a proof of the advantage of encouraging emigrations. It was perhaps the youngest [except Georgia] settlemt. on the Atlantic; yet it was at least among the foremost in population & prosperity. He remarked that almost all the Genl. officers of the Pena. line of the late army were foreigners. And no complaint had ever been made against their fidelity or merit. Three of her deputies to the Convention [Mr. R. Morris, Mr. Fitzimmons & himself] were also not natives. He had no objection to Col. Hamiltons motion & would withdraw the one made by himself.
Mr. Butler was strenuous agst. admitting foreigners into our public Councils.
70 Question on Col. Hamilton's Motion
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Vª. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.71
70 Question on Mr Williamson's moution to insert 9 years instead of seven.
N. H. ay. Masts. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 72
Mr. Wilson's renewed the motion for 4 years instead of 7. & on 73 question
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 74
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to add to the end of the section [art IV. S. 2] a proviso that the limitation of seven years should not affect the rights of any person now a Citizen.
Mr Mercer 2ded the motion. It was necessary he said to prevent a disfranchisement of persons who had become Citizens under and on 75 the faith & according to the laws & Constitution from being on a 76 level in all respects with natives.
Mr. RUTLIDGE. It might as well be said that all qualifications are disfranchisemts. and that to require the age of 25 years was a disfranchisement. The policy of the precaution was as great with regard to foreigners now Citizens; as to those who are to be naturalized in future.
Mr. Sherman. The U. States have not invited foreigners nor pledged their faith that they should enjoy equal privileges with native Citizens. The Individual States alone have done this. The former therefore are at liberty to make any discriminations they may judge requisite.
Mr. Ghorum. When foreigners are naturalized it wd. seem as if they stand on an equal footing with natives. He doubted then the propriety of giving a retrospective force to the restriction.
Mr. Madison animadverted on the peculiarity of the doctrine of Mr. Sharman. It was a subtilty by which every national engagement might be evaded. By parity of reason, wherever our public debts, or foreign treaties become inconvenient nothing more would be necessary to relieve us from them, than to new77 model the Constitution. It was said that the U. S. as such have not pledged their faith to the naturalized foreigners, & therefore are not bound. Be it so, & that the States alone are bound. Who are to form the New Constitution by which the condition of that class of citizens is to be made worse than the other class? Are not the States ye. Agents? will they not be the members of it? Did they not appoint this Convention? Are not they to ratify its proceedings? Will not the new Constitution be their Act? If the new Constitution then violates the faith pledged to any description of people will not the makers of it, will not the States, be the violators. To justify the doctrine it must be said that the States can get rid of their78 obligation by revising the Constitution, though they could not do it by repealing the law under which foreigners held their privileges. He considered this a matter of real importance. It woud expose us to the reproaches of all those who should be affected by it, reproaches which wd. soon be ecchoed from the other side of the Atlantic; and would unnecessarily enlist among the Adversaries of the reform a very considerable body of Citizens: We should moreover reduce every State to the dilemma of rejecting it or of violating the faith pledged to a part of its Citizens.
Mr. Govr. Morris considered the case of persons under 25 years,79 as very different from that of foreigners. No faith could be pleaded by the former in bar of the regulation. No assurance had ever been given that persons under that age should be in all cases on a level with those above it. But with regard to foreigners among us, the faith had been pledged that they should enjoy the privileges of Citizens. If the restriction as to age had been confined to natives, & had left foreigners under 25 years,79 eligible in this case, the discrimination wd. have been an equal injustice on the other side.
Mr. Pinkney remarked that the laws of the States had varied much the terms of naturalization in different parts of America; and contended that the U. S. could not be bound to respect them on such an occasion as the present. It was a sort of recurrence to first principles.
Col. Mason was struck not like [Mr Madison] v/ith the peculiarity, but the *propriety *of the doctrine of Mr. Sharman. The States have formed different qualifications themselves, for enjoying different rights of citizenship. Greater caution wd. be necessary in the onset of the Govt. than afterwards. All the great objects wd. be then 80 provided for. Everything would be then set in Motion. If persons among us attached to G. B. should work themselves into our Councils, a turn might be given to our affairs & particularly to our Commercial regulations which might have pernicious consequences. The great Houses of British Merchants will spare no pains to insinuate the instruments of their views into the Govt.
Mr. Wilson read the clause in the Constitution of Pena. giving to foreigners after two years residence all the rights whatsoever of citizens, combined it with the article of Confederation making the Citizens of one State Citizens of all, inferred the obligation Pena. was under to maintain the faith thus pledged to her citizens of foreign birth, and the just complaints which her failure would authorize: He observed likewise that the Princes & States of Europe would avail themselves of such breach of faith to deter their subjects from emigrating to the U. S.
Mr. Mercer enforced the same idea of a breach of faith.
Mr. Baldwin could not enter into the force of the arguments agst. extending the disqualification to foreigners now Citizens. The discrimination of the place of birth, was not more objectionable than that of age which all had concurred in the propriety of.
81 Question on the proviso of Mr. Govtr. Morris in favor of foreigners now Citizens
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. no. Maryd. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 82
Mr. Carrol moved to insert "5 years" instead "of seven," in Section 2d Art: IV
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 83
The Section [Art IV. Sec. 2.] as formerly amended was then agreed to nem. Con.
Mr. Wilson moved that [in Art: V. Sect. 3.84] 9 years be reduced to seven, which was disagd. to and the 3d section [Art. V.] confirmed by the following vote.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 85
Art. IV. Sec 5.86 being reconsidered.
Mr. Randolph moved that the clause be altered so as to read—"Bills for raising money for the purpose of revenue or for appropriating the same shall originate in the House of Representatives and shall not be so amended or altered by the Senate as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised, or change the mode of levying it, or the objects of its appropriation."—He would not repeat his reasons, but barely remind the members from the smaller States of the compromise by which the larger States were entitled to this privilege.
Col. Mason. This amendment removes all the objections urged agst. the section as it stood at first. By specifying purposes of revenue, it obviated the objection that the Section extended to all bills under which money might incidentally arise. By authorising amendments in the Senate it got rid of the objections that the Senate could not correct errors of any sort, & that it would introduce into the House of Reps. the practice of tacking foreign matter to money bills. These objections being removed, the arguments in favor of the proposed restraint on the Senate ought to have their full force. 1.87 the Senate did not represent the people, but the *States *in their political character. It was improper therefore that it should tax the people. The reason was the same agst. their doing it; as it had been agst. Congs. doing it. 88Nor was it in any respect necessary in order to cure the evils of our Republican system. He admitted that notwithstanding the superiority of the Republican form over every other, it had its evils. The chief ones, were the danger of the majority oppressing the minority, and the mischievous influence of demagogues. The Genl. Government of itself will cure these.89 As the States will not concur at the same time in their unjust & oppressive plans, the General Govt. will be able to check & defeat them, whether thev result from the wickedness of the majority, or from the misguidance of demagogues. Again, the Senate is not like the H. of Reps. chosen frequently and obliged to return frequently among the people. They are to be chosen by the Sts for 6 years, will probably settle themselves at the seat of Govt. will pursue schemes for their own aggrandizement—will be able by wearyg. out the H. of Reps. and taking advantage of their impatience at the close of a long Session, to extort measures for that purpose. If they should be paid as he expected would be yet determined & wished to be so, out of the Natl. Treasury, they will particularly extort an increase of their wages. A bare negative was a very different thing from that of originating bills. The practice in Engld. was in point. The House of Lords does not represent nor tax the people, because not elected by the people. If the Senate can originate, they will in the recess of the Legislative Sessions, hatch their mischievous projects, for their own purposes, and have their money bills ready 90 cut & dried, (to use a common phrase) for the meeting of the H. of Reps. He compared the case to Poyning's law—and signified that the House of Reps. might be rendered by degrees like the Parliament of Paris, the mere depository of the decrees of the Senate. As to the compromise so much had passed on that subject that he would say nothing about it. He did not mean by what he had said to oppose the permanency of the Senate. On the contrary he had no repugnance to an increase of it—nor to allowing it a negative, though the Senate was not by its present constitution entitled to it. But in all events he would contend that the purse strings should be in the hands of the Representatives of the people.
Mr. Wilson was himself directly opposed to the equality of votes granted to the Senate by its present Constitution. At the same time he wished not to multiply the vices of the system. He did not mean to enlarge on a subject which had been so much canvassed, but would remark as an insuperable objection agst. the proposed restriction of money bills to the H. of Reps. that it would be a source of perpetual contentions where there was no mediator to decide them. The Presidt. here could not like the Executive Magistrate in England interpose by a prorogation, or dissolution. This restriction had been found pregnant with altercation in every State where the Constitution had established it. The House of Reps. will insert other things in money bills, and by making them conditions of each other, destroy the deliberative liberty of the Senate. He stated the case of a Preamble to a money bill sent up by the House of Commons in the reign of Queen Anne, to the H. of Lords, in which the conduct of the displaced Ministry, who were to be impeached before the Lords, was condemned; the Commons thus extorting a premature judgmt. without any hearing of the Parties to be tried, and the H. of Lords being thus reduced to the poor & disgraceful expedient of opposing to the authority of a law, a protest on their Journals agst. its being drawn into precedent. If there was any thing like Poynings law in the present case, it was in the attempt to vest the exclusive right of originating in the H. of Reps. and so far he was agst. It. He should be equally so if the right were to be exclusively vested in the Senate. With regard to the purse strings, it was to be observed that the purse was to have two strings, one of which was in the hands of the H. of Reps. the other in those of the Senate. Both houses must concur in untying, and of what importance could it be which untied first, which last. He could not conceive it to be any objection to the Senate's preparing the bills, that they would have leisure for that purpose and would be in the habits of business. War, Commerce, & Revenue were the great objects of the Genl. Government. All of them are connected with money. The restriction in favor of the H. of Represts. would exclude the Senate from originating any important bills whatever—
Mr. Gerry considered this as a part of the plan that would be much scrutinized. Taxation & representation are strongly associated in the minds of the people, and they will not agree that any but their immediate representatives shall meddle with their purses. In short the acceptance of the plan will inevitably fail, if the Senate be not restrained from originating Money bills.
Mr Governr. Morris All the arguments suppose the right to originate money91 & to tax, to be exclusively vested in the Senate. —The effects commented on may be produced by a Negative only in the vSenate. They can tire out the other House, and extort their concurrence in favorite measures, as well by withholding their negative, as by adhering to a bill introduced by themselves.
Mr. Madison thought If the substitute offered by Mr. Randolph for the original section is to be adopted it would be proper to allow the Senate at least so to amend as to *diminish *the sum 92 to be raised. Why should they be restrained from checking the extravagance of the other House? One of the greatest evils incident to Republican Govt. was the spirit of contention & faction. The proposed substitute, which in some respects lessened the objections agst. the section, had a contrary effect with respect to this particular. It laid a foundation for new difficulties and disputes between the two houses. The word *revenue *was ambiguous. In many acts, particularly in the regulations of trade, the object would be twofold. The raising of revenue would be one of them. How could it be determined which was the primary or predominant one; or whether it was necessary that revenue shd. be the sole object, in exclusion even of other incidental effects. When the Contest was first opened with G. B. their power to regulate trade was admitted. Their power to raise revenue rejected. An accurate investigation of the subject afterward proved that no line could be drawn between the two cases. The words amend or alter, form an equal source of doubt & altercation. When an obnoxious paragraph shall be sent down from the Senate to the House of Reps.—it will be called an origination under the name of an amendment. The Senate may actually couch extraneous matter under that name. In these cases, the question will turn on the degree of connection between the matter & object of the bill and the alteration or amendment offered to it. Can there be a more fruitful source of dispute, or a kind of dispute more difficult to be settled? His apprehensions on this point were not conjectural. Disputes had actually flowed from this source in Virga. where the Senate can originate no bill. The words "so as to increase or diminish the sum to be raised," were liable to the same objections. In levying indirect taxes, which it seemed to be understood were to form the principal revenue of the new Govt. the sum to be raised, would be increased or diminished by a variety of collateral circumstances influencing the consumption, in general, the consumption of foreign or of domestic articles—of this or that particular species of articles, and even by the mode of collection which may be closely connected with the productiveness of a tax.—The friends of the section had argued its necessity from the permanency of the Senate. He could not see how this argumt. applied. The Senate was not more permanent now than in the form it bore in the original propositions of Mr. Randolph and at the time when no objection whatever was hinted agst. its originating money bills. Or if in consequence of a loss of the present question, a proportional vote in the Senate should be reinstated as has been urged as the indemnification the permanency of the Senate will remain the same.—If the right to originate be vested exclusively in the House of Reps. either the Senate must yield agst. its judgment to that House, in which case the Utility of the check will be lost—or the Senate will be inflexible & the H. of Reps. must adapt its money bill to the views of the Senate, in which case, the exclusive right will be of no avail.—As to the Compromise of which so much had been said, he would make a single observation. There were 5 States which had opposed the equality of votes in the Senate, viz. Masts. Penna. Virga. N. Carolina & S. Carola. As a compensation for the sacrifice extorted from them on this head, the exclusive origination of money bills in the other House had been tendered. Of the five States a majority viz. Penna Virga. & S. Carola. have uniformly voted agst. the proposed compensation, on its own merits, as rendering the plan of Govt. still more objectionable. Massts. has been divided. N. Carolina alone has set a value on the compensation, and voted on that principle. What obligation then can the small States be under to concur agst. their judgments in reinstating the section?
Mr. Dickenson. Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us. It was not Reason that discovered the singular & admirable mechanism of the English Constitution. It was not Reason that discovered or ever could have discovered the odd in the eye of those who are governed by reason, the absurd mode of trial by Jury. Accidents probably produced these discoveries, and experience has give a sanction to them. This is then our guide. And has not experience verified the utility of restraining money bills to the immediate representatives of the people. Whence the effect may have proceeded he could not say; whether from the respect with which this privilege inspired the other branches of Govt. to the H. of Commons, or from the turn of thinking it gave to the people at large with regard to their rights, but the effect was visible & could not be doubted—Shall we oppose to this long experience, the short experience of 11 years which we had ourselves, on this subject. As to disputes, they could not be avoided any way. If both Houses should originate, each would have a different bill to which it would be attached, and for which it would contend.—He observed that all the prejudices of the people would be offended by refusing this exclusive privilege to the H. of Repress. and these prejudices shd. never be disregarded by us when no essential purpose was to be served. When this plan goes forth it will be attacked by the popular leaders. Aristocracy will be the watchword; the Shibboleth among its adversaries. Eight States have inserted in their Constitutions the exclusive right of originating money bills in favor of the popular branch of the Legislature. Most of them however allowed the other branch to amend. This he thought would be proper for us to do.
Mr. Randolph regarded this point as of such consequence, that as he valued the peace of this Country, he would press the adoption of it. We had numerous & monstrous difficulties to combat. Surely we ought not to increase them. When the people behold in the Senate, the countenance of an aristocracy; and in the president, the form at least of a little monarch, will not their alarms be sufficiently raised without taking from their immediate representatives, a right which has been so long appropriated to them. The Executive will have more influence over the Senate, than over the H. of Reps. Allow the Senate to originate in this case, & that influence will be sure to mix itself in their deliberations & plans. The Declaration of War he conceived ought not to be in the Senate composed of 26 men only, but rather in the other House. In the other House ought to be placed the origination of the means of war. As to Commercial regulations which may involve revenue, the difficulty may be avoided by restraining the definition to bills, for the *mere *or sole, purpose of raising revenue. The Senate will be more likely to be corrupt than the H. of Reps. and should therefore have less to do with money matters. His principal object however was to prevent popular objections against the plan, and to secure its adoption.
Mr. Rutlidge. The friends of this motion are not consistent in their reasoning. They tell us that we ought to be guided by the long experience of G. B. & not our own experience of 11 years: and yet they themselves propose to depart from it. The H. of Commons not only have the exclusive right of originating, but the *Lords *are not allowed to alter or amend a money bill. Will not the people say that this restriction is but a mere tub to the whale. They cannot but see that it is of no real consequence; and will be more likely to be displeased with it as an attempt to bubble them, than to impute it to a watchfulness over their rights. For his part, he would prefer giving the exclusive right to the Senate, if it was to be given exclusively at all. The Senate being more conversant in business, and having more leisure, will digest the bills much better, and as they are to have no effect, till examined & approved by the H. of Reps. there can be no possible danger. These clauses in the Constitutions of the States had been put in through a blind adherence to the British model. If the work was to be done over now, they would be omitted. The experiment in S. Carolina, where the Senate cannot originate or amend money bills, has shewn that it answers no good purpose; and produces the very bad one of continually dividing & heating the two houses. Sometimes indeed if the matter of the amendment of the Senate is pleasing to the other House they wink at the encroachment; if it be displeasing, then the Constitution is appealed to. Every Session is distracted by altercations on this subject. The practice now becoming frequent is for the Senate not to make formal amendments; but to send down a schedule of the alterations which will procure the bill their assent.
Mr. Carrol. The most ingenious men in Maryd. are puzzled to define the case of money bills, or explain the Constitution on that point; tho' it seemed to be worded with all possible plainness precision. It is a source of continual difficulty & squabble between the two houses.
Mr. McHenry mentioned an instance of extraordinary subterfuge, to get rid of the apparent force of the Constitution.
On93 Question on the first part of the motion as to the exclusive originating of Money bills in 93 H. of Reps.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Virga. ay. Mr. Blair & Mr. M. no. Mr. R. Col. Mason and * Genl. Washington ay N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. 94
95 Question on Originating by 96 H. of Reps. & *amending *by 96 Senate, as reported Art. IV. Sect. 5.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va† ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. 97
95 Question on the last clause of Sect: 5—Art. IV—viz "No money shall be drawn from the Public Treasury, but in pursuance of *appropriations *that shall originate in the House of Reps. It passed in the negative
N. H. no. Mas. ay Con. no. N. J. no. Pa. no Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no. 98
Adjd.
Article VI. Sect. 9.99, 1 taken up.
Mr. PINKNEY argued that the making the members ineligible to offices was *degrading *to them, and the more improper as their election into the Legislature implied that they had the confidence of the people; that it was inconvenient, because the Senate might be supposed to contain the fittest men. He hoped to see that body become a School of public Ministers, a nursery of Statesmen: that it was impolitic, because the Legislature would cease to be a magnet to the first talents and abilities. He moved to postpone the section in order to take up the following proposition viz—"the members of each House shall be incapable of holding any office under the U. S. for which they or any of 2 others for their benefit receive any salary, fees, or emoluments of any kind—and the acceptance of such office shall vacate their seats respectively"
Genl. Mifflin 2ded the motion.
Col. Mason ironically proposed to strike out the whole section, as a more effectual expedient for encouraging that exotic corruption which might not otherwise thrive so well in the American Soil- for compleating that Aristocracy which was probably in the contemplation of some among us, and for inviting into the Legislative Service, those generous & benevolent characters who will do justice to each other's merit, by carving out offices & rewards for it. In the present state of American morals & manners, few friends it may be thought will be lost to the plan, by the opportunity of giving premiums to a mercenary & depraved ambition.
Mr. Mercer. It is a first principle in political science, that wherever the rights of property are secured, an aristocracy will grow out of it. Elective Governments also necessarily become aristocratic, because the rulers being few can & will draw emoluments for themselves from the many. The Governments of America will become aristocracies. They are so already. The public measures are calculated for the benefit of the Governors, not of the people. The people are dissatisfied & complain. They change their rulers, and the public measures are changed, but it is only a change of one scheme of emolument to the rulers, for another. The people gain nothing by it, but an addition of instability & uncertainty to their other evils.—Governmts. can only be maintained by *force *or influence. The Executive has not force, deprive him of influence 3 by rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to Executive offices, and he becomes a mere phantom of authority. The aristocratic part will not even let him in for a share of the plunder. The Legislature must & will be composed of wealth & abilities, and the people will be governed by a Junto. The Executive ought to have a Council, being members of both Houses. Without such an influence, the war will be between the aristocracy & the people. He wished it to be between the Aristocracy & the Executive. Nothing else can protect the people agst. those speculating Legislatures which are now plundering them throughout the U. States.
Mr. Gerry read a resolution of the Legislature of Massts. passed before the Act of Congs. recommending the Convention, in which her deputies were instructed not to depart from the rotation established in the 5th art: of 4 Confederation, nor to agree in any case to give to the members of Congs. a capacity to hold offices under the Government. This he said was repealed in consequence of the Act of Congs. with which the State thought it proper to comply in an unqualified manner. The Sense of the State however was still the same. He could not think with Mr. Pinkney that the disqualification was degrading. Confidence is the road to tyranny. As to Ministers & Ambassadors few of them were necessary. It is the opinion of a great many that they ought to be discontinued, on our part; that none may be sent among us, that source of influence be 5 shut up. If the Senate were to appoint Ambassadors as seemed to be intended, they will multiply embassies for their own sakes. He was not so fond of those productions as to wish to establish nurseries for them. If they are once appointed, the House of Reps. will be obliged to provide salaries for them, whether they approve of the measures or not. If men will not serve in the Legislature without a prospect of such offices, our situation is deplorable indeed. If our best Citizens are actuated by such mercenary views, we had better chuse a single despot at once. It will be more easy to satisfy the rapacity of one than of many. According to the idea of one Gentleman [Mr. Mercer] our Government it seems is to be a Govt. of plunder. In that case it certainly would be prudent to have but one rather than many to be employed in it. We cannot be too circumspect in the formation of this System. It will be examined on all sides and with a very suspicious eye. The People who have been so lately in arms agst. G. B. for their liberties, will not easily give them up. He lamented the evils existing at present under our Governments, but imputed them to the faults of those in office, not to the people. The misdeeds of the former will produce a critical attention to the opportunities afforded by the new system to like or greater abuses. As it now stands it is as compleat an aristocracy as ever was framed If great powers should be given to the Senate we shall be governed in reality by a Junto as has been apprehended. He remarked that it would be very differently constituted from Congs.- 1. 6 there will be but 2 deputies from each State, in Congs. there may be 7. and are generally 5.—2.7 they are chosen for six years, those of Congs. annually. 3.8 they are not subject to recall; those of Congs. are. 4. In Congs. 9 *States *9 are necessary for all great purposes—here 8 *persons *will suffice. Is it to be presumed that the people will ever agree to such a system? He moved to render the members of the H. of Reps. as well as of the Senate ineligible not only during, but for one year after the expiration of their terms.–If it should be thought that this will injure the Legislature by keeping out of it men of abilities who are willing to serve in other offices it may be required as a qualification for other offices, that the Candidate shall have served a certain time in the Legislature.
Mr. Govr. Morris. Exclude the officers of the army & navy, and you form a band having a different interest from & opposed to the civil power: you stimulate them to despise & reproach those "talking Lords who dare not face the foe." Let this spirit be roused at the end of a war, before your troops shall have laid down their arms, and though the Civil authority ' ' be intrenched in parchment to the teeth ' ' they will cut their way to it. He was agst. rendering the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. He was for rendering them eligible agn. after having vacated their Seats by accepting office. Why should we not avail ourselves of their services if the people chuse to give them their confidence. There can be little danger of corruption either among the people or the Legislatures who are to be the Electors. If they say, we see their merits, we honor the men, we chuse to renew our confidence in them, have they not a right to give them a preference; and can they be properly abridged of it.
Mr. Williamson; introduced his opposition to the motion by referring to the question concerning "money bills." That clause he said was dead. Its ghost he was afraid would notwithstanding haunt us. It had been a matter of conscience with him, to insist upon 10 it as long as there was hope of retaining it. He had swallowed the vote of rejection, with reluctance. He could not digest it. All that was said on the other side was that the restriction was not convenient. We have now got a House of Lords which is to originate money-bills.—To avoid another inconveniency,11 we are to have a whole Legislature at liberty to cut out offices for one another. He thought a self-denying ordinance for ourselves would be more proper. Bad as the Constitution has been made by expunging the restriction on the Senate concerning money bills he did not wish to make it worse by expunging the present Section. He had scarcely seen a single corrupt measure in the Legislature of N. Carolina, which could not be traced up to office hunting.
Mr. Sherman. The Constitution shd. lay as few temptations as possible in the way of those in power. Men of abilities will increase as the Country grows more populous and, and 12 the means of education are more diffused.
Mr. Pinkney. No State has rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices. In S. Carolina the Judges are eligible into the Legislature. It can not be supposed then that the motion will be offensive to the people. If the State Constitutions should be revised he believed restrictions of this sort wd. be rather diminished than multiplied.
Mr. Wilson could not approve of the Section as it stood, and could not give up his judgment to any supposed objections that might arise among the people. He considered himself as acting & responsible for the welfare of millions not immediately represented in this House. He had also asked himself the serious question what he should say to his constituents in case they should call upon him to tell them why he sacrificed his own Judgment in a case where they authorised him to exercise it? Were he to own to them that he sacrificed it in order to flatter their prejudices, he should dread the retort: did you suppose the people of Penna. had not good sense enough to receive a good Government? Under this impression he should certainly follow his own Judgment which disapproved of the section. He would remark in addition to the objections urged agst. it, that as one branch of the Legislature was to be appointed by the Legislatures of the States, the other by the people of the States, as both are to be paid by the States, and to be appointable to State offices, nothing seemed to be wanting to prostrate the Natl. Legislature, but to render its members ineligible to Natl. offices, & by that means take away its power of attracting those talents which were necessary to give weight to the Governt. and to render it useful to the people. He was far from thinking the ambition which aspired to Offices of dignity and trust, an ignoble or culpable one. He was sure it was not politic to regard it in that light, or to withold from it the prospect of those rewards, which might engage it in the career of public service. He observed that the State of Penna. which had gone as far as any State into the policy of fettering power, had not rendered the members of the Legislature ineligible to offices of Govt.
Mr. Elsworth did not think the mere postponement of the reward would be any material discouragement of merit. Ambitious minds will serve 2 years or 7 years in the Legislature for the sake of qualifying themselves for other offices. This he thought a sufficient security for obtaining the services of the ablest men in the Legislature, although whilst members they should be ineligible to Public offices. Besides, merit will be most encouraged, when most impartially rewarded. If rewards are to circulate only within the Legislature, merit out of it will be discouraged.
Mr. Mercer was extremely anxious on this point. What led to the appointment of this Convention? The corruption & mutability of the Legislative Councils of the States. If the plan does not remedy these, it will not recommend itself; and we shall not be able in our private capacities to support & enforce it: nor will the best part of our Citizens exert themselves for the purpose.—It is a great mistake to suppose that the paper we are to propose will govern the U. States? It is The men whom it will bring into the Governt. and interest in maintaining it that is 13 to govern them. The paper will only mark out the mode & the form. Men are the substance and must do the business. All Govt. must be by force or influence. It is not the King of France—but 200,000 janisaries of power that govern that Kingdom. There will be no such force here; influence then must be substituted; and he would ask whether this could be done, if the members of the Legislature should be ineligible to offices of State; whether such a disqualification would not determine all the most influencial men to stay at home, and & prefer appointments within their respective States.
Mr. Wilson was by no means satisfied with the answer given by Mr. Elsewoth to the argument as to the discouragement of merit. The members must either go a second time into the Legislature, and disqualify themselves—or say to their Constituents, we served you before only from the mercenary view of qualifying ourselves for offices, and haveg. answered this purpose we do not chuse to be again elected.
Mr. Govt. Morris put the case of a war, and the Citizen the 14 most capable of conducting it, happening to be a member of the Legislature. What might have been the consequence of such a regulation at the commencement, or even in the Course of the late contest for our liberties?
On 15 question for postponing in order to take up Mr. Pinkneys motion, it was lost.
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. div. 16
Mr. Govt. Morris moved to insert, after "office," except offices in the army or navy: but in that case their offices shall be vacated.
Mr. Broom 2ds him.
Mr. Randolph had been & should continue uniformly opposed to the striking out of the clause; as opening a door for influence corruption. No arguments had made any impression on him, but those which related to the case of war, and a co-existing incapacity of the fittest commanders to be employed. He admitted great weight in these, and would agree to the exception proposed by Mr. Govr. Morris.
Mr. Butler & Mr. Pinkney urged a general postponemt. of 9 Sect. Art. VI. till it should be seen what powers would be vested in the Senate, when it would be more easy to judge of the expediency of allowing the officers of State to be chosen out of that body. —a general postponement was agreed to nem. Con.
Art: VI. sect. 10.17,18 taken up—''that members be paid by their respective States."
Mr. Elseworth said that in reflecting on this subject he had been satisfied that too much dependence on the States would be produced by this mode of payment. He moved to strike 19 out and insert "that they should" be paid out of the Treasury of the U. S. an allowance not exceeding (blank) dollars per day or the present value thereof.
Mr. Govt. Morris, remarked that if the members were to be paid by the States it would throw an unequal burden on the distant States, which would be unjust as the Legislature was to be a national Assembly. He moved that the payment be out of the Natl. Treasury; leaving the quantum to the discretion of the Nati Legislature. There could be no reason to fear that they would overpay themselves.
Mr. Butler contended for payment by the States; particularly in the case of the Senate, who will be so long out of their respective States, that they will lose sight of their Constituents unless dependent on them for their support.
Mr. Langdon was agst. payment by the States. There would be some difficulty in fixing the sum; but it would be unjust to oblige the distant States to bear the expence of their members in travelling to and from the Seat of Govt.
Mr. Madison If the H. of Reps. is to be chosen *biennially *and the Senate to be constantly dependent on the Legislatures which are chosen annually, he could not see any chance for that stability in the Genl. Govt. the want of which was a principal evil in the State Govts. His fear was that the organization of the Govt. supposing the Senate to be really independt. for six years, would not effect our purpose. It was nothing more than a combination of the peculiarities of two of the State Govts. which separately had been found insufficient. The Senate was formed on the model of that of Maryd. The Revisionary check, on that of N. York. What the effect of a union of these provisions might be, could not be foreseen. The enlargement of the sphere of the Government was indeed a circumstance which he thought would be favorable as he had on several occasions undertaken to shew. He was however for fixing at least two extremes not to be exceeded by the Natl. Legislre. in the payment of themselves.
Mr. Gerry. There are difficulties on both sides. The observation of Mr. Butler has weight in it. On the other side, the State Legislatures may turn out the Senators by reducing their salaries. Such things have been practised.
Col. Mason. It has not yet been noticed that the clause as it now stands makes the House of Represents. also dependent on the State Legislatures; so that both houses will be made the instruments of the politics of the States whatever they may be.
Mr. Broom could see no danger in trusting the Genl. Legislature with the payment of themselves. The State Legislatures had this power, and no complaint had been made of it.
Mr. Sherman was not afraid that the Legislature would make their own wages too high ; but too low, so that men ever so fit could not serve unless they were at the same time rich. He thought the best plan would be to fix a moderate allowance to be paid out of the Natl. Treasure. and let the States make such additions as they might judge fit. He moved that 5 dollars per day be the sum, any further emoluments to be added by the States.
Mr. Carrol had been much surprised at seeing this clause in the Report. The dependence of both Houses on the State Legislatures is compleat; especially as the members of the former are eligible to State offices. The States can now say : if you do not comply with our wishes, we will starve you: if you do we will reward you. The new Govt. in this form was nothing more than a second edition of Congress in two volumes, instead of one, and perhaps with very few amendments—
Mr. Dickenson took it for granted that all were convinced of the necessity of making the Genl. Govt. independent of the prejudices, passions, and improper views of the State Legislatures. The contrary of This was effected by the section as it stands. On the other hand there were objections agst. taking a permanent standard as wheat which had been suggested on a former occasion, as well as against leaving the matter to the pleasure of the Natl. Legislature. He proposed that an Act should be passed every 12 years by the Natl. Legislre. settling the quantum of their wages. If the Genl. Govt. should be left dependent on the State Legislatures, it would be happy for us if we had never met in this Room.
Mr. Elseworth was not unwilling himself to trust the Legislature with authority to regulate their own wages, but well knew that an unlimited discretion for that purpose would produce strong, tho' perhaps not insuperable objections. He thought changes in the value of money, provided for by his motion in the words, "or the present value thereof."
Mr. L. Martin. As the Senate is to represent the States, the members of it ought to be paid by the States.
Mr. Carrol. The Senate was to represent & manage the affairs of the whole, and not to be the advocates of State interests. They ought then not to be dependent on nor paid by the States.
On the question for paying the Members of the Legislature out of the Natl. Treasury,
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay.20
Mr. Elsewth moved that the pay be fixed at 5 dollrs. or the present value thereof per day during their attendance for every thirty miles in travelling to & from Congress.
Mr. Strong preferred 4 dollars, leaving the Sts. at liberty to make additions.
On 21 question for fixing the pay at 5 dollars.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.22
Mr. Dickenson proposed that the wages of the members of both houses sd. be required to be the same.
Mr. Broome seconded him.
Mr. Ghorum, this would be unreasonable. The Senate will be detained longer from home, will be obliged to remove their families, and in time of war perhaps to sit constantly. Their allowance should certainly be higher. The members of the Senates in the States are allowed more, than those of the other house.
Mr. Dickenson withdrew his motion
It was moved & agreed to amend the Section by adding—''to be ascertained by law."
The Section [Art VI. Sec. 10] as amended, agreed to nem. con.
Adjd.
Art: VI. Sect. 11,23,24 Agreed to nem. Con.
Art: VI Sect. 12.23,25 taken up.
Mr. Strong moved to amend the article so as to read—"Each House shall possess the right of originating all bills, except bills for raising money for the purposes of revenue, or for appropriating the same and for fixing the salaries of the officers of the Govt. which shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments as in other cases "
Col. Mason, 2ds the motion. He was extremely earnest to take this power from the Senate, who he said could already sell the whole Country by means of Treaties.
Mr Ghorum urged the amendment as of great importance. The Senate will first acquire the habit of preparing money bills, and then the practice will grow into an exclusive right of preparing them.
Mr. Governor. Morris opposed it as unnecessary and inconvenient.
Mr. Williamson, some think this restriction on the Senate essential to liberty, others think it of no importance. Why should not the former be indulged, he was for an efficient and stable Govt. but many would not strengthen the Senate if not restricted in the case of money bills. The friends of the Senate would therefore lose more than they would gain by refusing to gratify the other side. He moved to postpone the subject till the powers of the Senate should be gone over.
Mr. Rutlidge 2ds the motion.
Mr. Mercer should hereafter be agst. returning to a reconsideration of this section. He contended, (alluding to Mr. Mason's observations) that the Senate ought not to have the power of treaties. This power belonged to the Executive department; adding that Treaties would not be final so as to alter the laws of the land, till ratified by legislative authority. This was the case of Treaties in Great Britain; particularly the late Treaty of Commerce with France.
Col. Mason. did not say that a Treaty would repeal a law; but that the Senate by means of treaty 26 might alienate territory &c, without legislative sanction. The cessions of the British Islands in 27 W. Indies by Treaty alone were an example. If Spain should possess herself of Georgia therefore the Senate might by treaty dismember the Union. He wished the motion to be decided now, that the friends of it might know how to conduct themselves.
On 27 question for postponing Sec: 12. it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. ay. Mas. ay Ct. no. N. J. no Pena .no. Del. no Maryd. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. —28
Mr. Madison moved that all acts before they become laws should be submitted both to the Executive and Supreme Judiciary Departments, that if either of these should object ⅔ of each House, if both should object, ¾ of each House, should be necessary to overrule the objections and give to the acts the force of law—29
See the motion at large in the Journal of this date, page 253, insert it here." 30
["Every bill which shall have passed the two houses, shall, before it become a law, be severally presented to the President of the United States, and to the judges of the supreme court for the revision of each. If, upon such revision, they shall approve of it, they shall respectively signify their approbation by signing it; but if, upon such revision, it shall appear improper to either, or both, to be passed into a law, it shall be returned, with the objections against it, to that house, in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider the bill: but if, after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house, when either the President, or a majority of the judges shall object, or three fourths, where both shall object, shall agree to pass it, it shall, together with the objections, be sent to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and, if approved by two thirds, or three fourths of the other house, as the case may be, it shall become a law."]
Mr. Wilson seconds the motion
Mr. Pinkney opposed the interference of the Judges in the Legislative business: it will involve them in parties, and give a previous tincture to their opinions.
Mr. Mercer heartily approved the motion. It is an axiom that the Judiciary ought to be separate from the Legislative: but equally so that it ought to be independent of that department. The true policy of the axiom is that legislative usurpation and oppression may be obviated. He disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the Constitution should have authority to declare a law void. He thought laws ought to be well and cautiously made, and then to be uncontroulable.
Mr. Gerry. This motion comes to the same thing with what has been already negatived.
32 Question on the motion of Mr. Madison.
N. H. no. Mass. no. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. no. Del. ay. Maryd. ay. Virga. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. no.33
Mr. Govt. Morris regretted that something like the proposed check could not be agreed to. He dwelt on the importance of public credit, and the difficulty of supporting it without some strong barrier against the instability of legislative Assemblies. He suggested the idea of requiring three fourths of each house to *repeal *laws where the President should not concur. He had no great reliance on the revisionary power as the Executive was now to be constituted [elected by the 34 Congress]. The legislature will contrive to soften down the President. He recited the history of paper emissions, and the perseverance of the legislative assemblies in repeating them, with all the distressing effects of such measures before their eyes. Were the National legislature formed, and a war was now to break out, this ruinous expedient would be again resorted to, if not guarded against. The requiring ¾ to repeal would, though not a compleat remedy, prevent the hasty passage of laws, and the frequency of those repeals which destroy faith in the public, and which are among our greatest calamities.—
Mr. Dickenson was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. Mercer as to the power of the Judges to set aside the law. He thought no such power ought to exist. He was at the same time at a loss what expedient to substitute. The Justiciary of Arragon he observed became by degrees, the lawgiver.
Mr. Govr. Morris, suggested the expedient of an absolute negative in the Executive. He could not agree that the Judiciary which was part of the Executive, should be bound to say that a direct violation of the Constitution was law. A controul over the legislature might have its inconveniences. But view the danger on the other side. The most virtuous Citizens will often as members of a legislative body concur in measures which afterwards in their private capacity they will be ashamed of. Encroachments of the popular branch of the Government ought to be guarded agst. The Ephori at Sparta became in the end absolute. The Report of the Council of Censors in Pennsylva. points out the many invasions of the legislative department on the Executive numerous as the latter* is, within the short term of seven years, and in a State where a strong party is opposed to the Constitution, and watching every occasion of turning the public resentments agst. it. If the Executive be overturned by the popular branch, as happened in England, the tyranny of one man will ensue. In Rome where the Aristocracy overturned the throne, the consequence was different. He enlarged on the tendency of the legislative Authority to usurp on the Executive and wished the section to be postponed, in order to consider of some more effectual check than requiring ⅔ only to overrule the negative of the Executive.
Mr. Sherman. Can one man be trusted better than all the others if they all agree? This was neither wise nor safe. He disapproved of Judges meddling in politics and parties. We have gone far enough in forming the negative as it now stands.
Mr. Carrol. when the negative to be overruled by ⅔, only was agreed to, the *quorum *was not fixed. He remarked that as a majority was now to be the quorum, 17. in the larger, and 8 in the smaller house might carry points. The advantage that might be taken of this seemed to call for greater impediments to improper laws. He thought the controuling power however of the Executive could not be well decided, till it was seen how the formation of that department would be finally regulated. He wished the consideration of the matter to be postponed.
Mr. Ghorum saw no end to these difficulties and postponements. Some could not agree to the form of Government before the powers were defined. Others could not agree to the powers till it was seen how the Government was to be formed. He thought a majority as large a quorum as was necessary. It was the quorum almost every where fixt in the U. States.
Mr. Wilson; after viewing the subject with all the coolness and attention possible was most apprehensive of a dissolution of the Govt. from the legislature swallowing up all the other powers. He remarked that the prejudices agst. the Executive resulted from a misapplication of the adage that the parliament was the palladium of liberty. Where the Executive was really formidable, *King *and Tyrant, were naturally associated in the minds of people; not *legislature *and tyranny. But where the Executive was not formidable, the two last were most properly associated. After the destruction of the King in Great Britain, a more pure and unmixed tyranny sprang up in the parliament than had been exercised by the monarch. He insisted that we had not guarded agst. the danger on this side by a sufficient self-defensive power either to the Executive or Judiciary department.
Mr. Rutlidge was strenuous agst. postponing; and complained much of the tediousness of the proceedings.
Mr. Elseworth held the same language. We grow more & more skeptical as we proceed. If we do not decide soon, we shall be unable to come to any decision.
The question for postponement passed in the negative: Del: & Maryd. only being in the affirmative.
Mr. Williamson moved to change "⅔ of each House" into "¾” as requisite to overrule the dissent of the President. He saw no danger in this, and preferred giving the power to the Presidt. alone, to admitting the Judges into the business of legislation.
Mr. Wilson 2ds the motion; referring to and repeating the ideas of Mr. Carroll.
On this motion for ¾. instead of two thirds; it passed in the affirmative.
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pent. divided. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. no.36
Mr. Madison, observing that if the negative of the President was confined to bills; it would be evaded by acts under the form and name of Resolutions, votes &c, proposed that or resolve" should be added after "bill" in the beginning of sect 13. with an exception as to votes of adjournment &c .—after a short and rather confused conversation on the subject, the question was put rejected, the States 37 being as follows,
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pena. no. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. no. 38
"Ten 39 days (Sundays excepted)" instead of "seven" were allowed to the President for returning bills with his objections N. H. & Mas: only voting agst. It.
The 13 Sect: of art. VI as amended was then agreed to.
Adjourned
Mr. Randolph having thrown into a new form the motion, putting votes, Resolutions &c. on a footing with Bills, renewed it as follows "Every order resolution or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate & House of Reps. may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment and in the cases hereinafter mentioned) shall be presented to the President for his revision; and before the same shall have force shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him shall be repassed by the Senate House of Reps. according to the rules limitations prescribed in the case of a Bill."
Mr. Sherman thought it unnecessary, except as to votes taking money out of the Treasury which might be provided for in another place.
On 40 Question as moved by Mr. Randolph 41
N. H. ay. Mas: not present, Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 42
The Amendment was made a Section 14. of Art VI.
Art: VII. Sect. 1.43, 44 taken up.
Mr. L. Martin asked what was meant by the Committee of detail in the expression "duties" and "imposts." If the meaning were the same, the former was unnecessary; if different, the matter ought to be made clear.
Mr. Wilson, *duties *are applicable to many objects to which the word imposts does not relate. The latter are appropriated to commerce; the former extend to a variety of objects, as stamp duties &c.
Mr. Carroll reminded the Convention of the great difference of interests among the States, and doubts the propriety in that point of view of letting a majority be a quorum.
Mr. Mason urged the necessity of connecting with the power of levying taxes duties &c, the prohibition in Sect 4 of art VI that no tax should be laid on exports. He was unwilling to trust to its being done in a future article. He hoped the Northn. States did not mean to deny the Southern this security. It would hereafter be as desirable to the former when the latter should become the most populous. He professed his jealousy for the productions of the Southern or as he called them, the staple States. He moved to insert the following amendment "provided that no tax duty or imposition shall be laid by the Legislature of the U. States on articles exported from any State"
Mr. Sherman had no objection to the proviso here, other than 45 it would derange the parts of the report as made by the Committee, to take them in such an order.
Mr. Rutlidge. It being of no consequence in what order points are decided, he should vote for the clause as it stood, but on condition that the subsequent part relating to negroes should also be agreed to.
Mr. Governeur Morris considered such a proviso as inadmissible any where. It was so radically objectionable, that it might cost the whole system the support of some members. He contended that it would not in some cases be equitable to tax imports without taxing exports; and that taxes on exports would be often the most easy and proper of the two.
Mr. Madison 1.46 the power of taxing 47 exports is proper in itself, and as the States can not with propriety exercise it separately, it ought to be vested in them collectively. 2.46 it might with particular advantage be exercised with regard to articles in which America was not rivalled in foreign markets, as Tobo. &c. The contract between the French Farmers Genl. and Mr. Morris stipulating that if taxes sd. be laid in America on the export of Tobo. they sd. be paid by the Farmers, shewed that it was understood by them, that the price would be thereby raised in America, and consequently the taxes be paid by the European Consumer. 3.48 it would be unjust to the States whose produce was exported by their neighbours, to leave it subject to be taxed by the latter. This was a grievance which had already filled N. H. Cont. N, Jery. Del: and N. Carolina with loud complaints, as it related to imports, and they would be equally authorised by taxes by the States on exports. 4.48 The Southn States being most in danger and most needing naval protection, could the less complain if the burden should be somewhat heaviest on them. 5.49 we are not providing for the present moment only, and time will equalize the situation of the States in this matter. He was for these reasons agst. the motion
Mr. Williamson considered the clause proposed agst. taxes on exports as reasonable and necessary.
Mr. Elseworth was agst. Taxing exports; but thought the prohibition stood in the most proper place, and was agst. deranging the order reported by the Committee
Mr. Wilson was decidedly agst. prohibiting general taxes on exports. He dwelt on the injustice and impolicy of leaving N. Jersey Connecticut &c any longer subject to the exactions of their commercial neighbours.
Mr. Gerry thought the legislature could not be trusted with such a power. It might ruin the Country. It might be exercised partially, raising one and depressing another part of it.
Mr. Govr. Morris. However the legislative power may be formed, it will if disposed be able to ruin the Country. He considered the taxing of exports to be in many cases highly politic. Virginia has found her account in taxing Tobacco. All Countries having peculiar articles tax the exportation of them; as France her wines and brandies. A tax here on lumber, would fall on the W. Indies & punish their restrictions on our trade. The same is true of live stock and in some degree of flour. In case of a dearth in the West Indies, we may extort what we please. Taxes on exports are a necessary source of revenue. For a long time the people of America will not have money to pay direct taxes. Seize and sell their effects and you push them into Revolts.
Mr. Mercer was strenuous against giving Congress power to tax exports. Such taxes were 50 impolitic, as encouraging the raising of articles not meant for exportation. The States had now a right where their situation permitted, to tax both the imports and exports of their uncommercial neighbours. It was enough for them to sacrifice one half of it. It had been said the Southern States had most need of naval protection. The reverse was the case. Were it not for promoting the carrying trade of the North? States, the South? States could let their trade go into foreign bottoms, where it would not need our protection. Virginia by taxing her tobacco had given an advantage to that of Maryland.
Mr. Sherman. To examine and compare the States in relation to imports and exports will be opening a boundless field. He thought the matter had been adjusted, and that imports were to be subject, and exports not, to be taxed. He thought it wrong to tax exports except it might be such articles as ought not to be exported. The complexity of the business in America would render an equal tax on exports impracticable. The oppression of the uncommercial States was guarded agst. by the power to regulate trade between the States. As to compelling foreigners, that might be done by regulating trade in general. The Government would not be trusted with such a power. Objections are most likely to be excited by considerations relating to taxes & money. A power to tax exports would shipwreck the whole.
Mr. Carrol was surprised that any objection should be made to an exception of exports from the power of taxation.
It was finally agreed that the question concerning exports shd. lie over for the place in which the exception stood in the report: Maryd. alone voting agst. It
Sect: 1. [art. VII]51,52 agreed to: Mr. Gerry alone answering no. 53 Clause for regulating commerce with foreign nations &c.54 agreed to nem. Con.
55 for coining money. agd. to nem. con.
55 for regulating foreign coin. do. do.
55 for fixing the standard of weights & measures. do. Do.
56 "To establish post-offices." Mr Gerry moved to add, and post-roads. Mr. Mercer 2ded & on 57 question
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pena. no. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 58
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "and emit bills on the credit of the U. States"—If the United States had credit such bills would be unnecessary: if they had not, unjust & useless.
Mr Butler, 2ds the motion.
Mr. Madison, will it not be sufficient to prohibit the making them a tender? This will remove the temptation to emit them with unjust views. And promissory notes in that shape may in some emergencies be best.
Mr. Govr. Morris. striking out the words will leave room still for notes of a responsible minister which will do all the good without the mischief. The Monied interest will oppose the plan of Government, if paper emissions be not prohibited.
Mr. Ghorum was for striking out, without inserting any prohibition. if the words stand they may suggest and lead to the measure.
Col.59 Mason had doubts on the subject. Congs. he thought would not have the power unless it were expressed. Though he had a mortal hatred to paper money, yet as he could not foresee all emergences, he was unwilling to tie the hands of the Legislature. He observed that the late war could not have been carried on, had such a prohibition existed.
Mr. Ghorum. The power as far as it will be necessary or safe, is involved in that of borrowing.
Mr. Mercer was a friend to paper money, though in the present state & temper of America, he should neither propose nor approve of such a measure. He was consequently opposed to a prohibition of it altogether. It will stamp suspicion on the Government to deny it a discretion on this point. It was impolitic also to excite the opposition of all those who were friends to paper money. The people of property would be sure to be on the side of the plan, and it was impolitic to purchase their further attachment with the loss of the opposite class of Citizens
Mr. Elseworth thought this a favorite moment to shut and bar the door against paper money. The mischiefs of the various experiments which had been made, were now fresh in the public mind and had excited the disgust of all the respectable part of America. By withholding the power from the new governt. More friends of influence would be gained to it than by almost any thing else. Paper money can in no case be necessary. Give the Government credit, and the other resources will offer. The power may do harm, never good.
Mr. Randolph, notwithstanding his antipathy to paper money, could not agree to strike out the words, as he could not foresee all the occasions which 60 might arise.
Mr. Wilson. It will have a most salutary influence on the credit of the U. States to remove the possibility of paper money. This expedient can never succeed whilst its mischiefs are remembered, and as long as it can be resorted to, it will be a bar to other resources.
Mr. Butler. remarked that paper was a legal tender in no Country in Europe. He was urgent for disarming the Government of such a power.
Mr. Mason was still averse to tying the hands of the Legislature altogether. If there was no example in Europe as just remarked, it might be observed on the other side, that there was none in which the Government was restrained on this head.
Mr. Read, thought the words, if not struck out, would be as alarming as the mark of the Beast in Revelations.
Mr. Langdon had rather reject the whole plan than retain the three words "(and emit bills")
On the motion for striking out
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. ay. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay.* N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.61
The clause for borrowing money,63 agreed to nem. con.
Adjd.
Art VII. Sect. 1.64.65 resumed. on the clause "to appoint 68 Treasurer by ballot."
Mr. Ghorum moved to insert "joint" before ballot, as more convenient as well as reasonable, than to require the separate concurrence of the Senate.
Mr. Pinkney 2ds the motion. Mr. Sherman opposed it as favoring the larger States.
Mr. Read moved to strike out the clause, leaving the appointment of the Treasurer as of other officers to the Executive. The Legislature was an improper body for appointments. Those of the State legislatures were a proof of it. The Executive being responsible would make a good choice.
Mr. Mercer 2ds the motion of Mr. Read.
On the motion for inserting the word "joint" before ballot
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 67
Col. Mason in opposition to Mr. Reads motion desired it might be considered to whom the money would belong; if to the people, the legislature representing the people ought to appoint the keepers of it.
On striking out the clause as amended by inserting "Joint"
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. no. 68
69 "To constitute inferior tribunals" 70 agreed to nem. con. 71
"To make rules as to captures on land & water"-do. d 72
69 "To declare the law and punishment of piracies and felonies &c" &c 73 considered.
Mr. Madison moved to strike out "and punishment" &c.74
Mr. Mason doubts the safety of it, considering the strict rule of construction in criminal cases. He doubted also the propriety of taking the power in all these cases wholly from the States.
Mr. Governr. Morris thought it would be necessary to extend the authority farther, so as to provide for the punishment of counterfeiting in general. Bills of exchange for example might be forged in one State and carried into another:
It was suggested by some other member that *foreign *paper might be counterfeited by Citizens; and that it might be politic to provide by national authority for the punishment of it.
Mr. Randolph did not conceive that expunging "the punishment" would be a constructive exclusion of the power. He doubted only the efficacy of the word "declare."
Mr. Wilson was in favor of the motion. Strictness was not necessary in giving authority to enact penal laws; though necessary in enacting expounding them.
On motion 75 for striking out "and punishment" as moved by Mr. Madison
N. H. no. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.76
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "declare the law" and insert "punish" before "piracies." and on the question
N. H. ay. Mas. ay. Ct. no. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. ay.77
Mr. Madison, and Mr. Randolph moved to insert, "define &," before "punish."
Mr. Wilson, thought "felonies" sufficiently defined by common law.
Mr. Dickenson concurred with Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Mercer was in favor of the amendment.
Mr. Madison, felony at common law is vague. It is also defective. One defect is supplied by Stat: of Anne as to running away with vessels which at common law was a breach of trust only. Besides no foreign law should be a standard farther than 78 is expressly adopted—If the laws of the States were to prevail on this subject, the citizens of different States would be subject to different punishments for the same offence at sea. There would be neither uniformity nor stability in the law—The proper remedy for all these difficulties was to vest the power proposed by the term "define" in the Natl. legislature.
Mr. Govr. Morris would prefer *designate *to define, the latter being as he he conceived, limited to the preexisting meaning.
It was said by others to be applicable to the creating of offences also, and therefore suited the case both of felonies & of piracies. The motion of Mr. M & Mr. R was agreed to.
Mr. Elseworth enlarged the motion so as to read "to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the U. States, and offences agst. the law of Nations" which was agreed to nem. Con.
79 "To subdue a rebellion in any State, on the application of its legislature." 80
Mr. Pinkney moved to strike out "on the application of its legislature"
Mr. Govr. Morris 2ds
Mr. L. Martin opposed it as giving a dangerous & unnecessary power. The consent of the State ought to precede the introduction of any extraneous force whatever.
Mr. Mercer supported the opposition of Mr. Martin.
Mr. Elseworth proposed to add after "legislature" "or Executive."
Mr. Govr. Morris. The Executive may possibly be at the head of the Rebellion. The Genl. Govt. should enforce obedience in all cases where it may be necessary.
Mr. Elseworth. In many cases The Genl. Govt. ought not to be able to interpose, unless called upon. He was willing to vary his motion so as to read, " or without it when the legislature cannot meet."
Mr. Gerry was ags.t letting loose the myrmidons of the U. States on a State without its own consent. The States will be the best Judges in such cases. More blood would have been spilt in Massts. in the late insurrection, if the Genl. authority had intermeddled.
Mr. Langdon was for striking out as moved by Mr. Pinkney. The apprehension of the national force, will have a salutary effect in preventing insurrections.
Mr. Randolph. If the Natl. Legislature is to judge whether the State legislature can or cannot meet, that amendment would make the clause as objectionable as the motion of Mr. Pinkney.
Mr. Govr. Morris. We are acting a very strange part. We first form a strong man to protect us, and at the same time wish to tie his hands behind him, The legislature may surely be trusted with such a power to preserve the public tranquility.
On the motion to add "or without it [application] when the legislature cannot meet" 81
N. H. ay. Mas. no. Ct. ay. Pa. divd. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. div. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 82 So agreed to—83
Mr. Madison and Mr. Dickenson moved to insert as explanatory, after "State"—"against the Government thereof" There might be a rebellion agst. the U. States—which 84 was Agreed to nem. Con.
On the clause as amended
N. H. ay. Mas * abst. Ct. ay. Pen. abst. Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Georg. ay—so it was lost.85
86 "To make war"
Mr. Pinkney opposed the vesting this power in the Legislature. Its proceedings were too slow. It wd. meet but once a year. The Hs. of Reps. would be too numerous for such deliberations. Senate would be the best depositary, being more acquainted with foreign affairs, and most capable of proper resolutions. If the States are equally represented in 87 Senate, so as to give no advantage to 87 large States, the power will notwithstanding be safe, as the small have their all at stake in such cases as well as the large States. It would be singular for one authority to make war, and another peace.
Mr. Butler. The objections agst. the Legislature lie in 88 great degree agst. the Senate. He was for vesting the power in the President, who will have all the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it.
Mr. Madison and Mr. Gerry moved to insert "declare," striking out "make" war; leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks.
Mr. Sharman thought it stood very well. The Executive shd. be able to repel and not to commence war. "Make" 89 better than "declare" the latter narrowing the power too much.
Mr. Gerry never expected to hear in a republic a motion to empower the Executive alone to declare war.
Mr. Elsworth. there is a material difference between the cases of making *war *and making peace. It shd. be more easy to get out of war, than into it. War also is a simple and overt declaration. peace attended with intricate & secret negociations.
Mr. Mason was agst. giving the power of war to the Executive, because not safely to be trusted with it; or to the Senate, because not so constructed as to be entitled to it. He was for clogging rather than facilitating war; but for facilitating peace. He preferred "declare" to "make."
On the motion to insert declare—in place of make, it was agreed to.
N. H. no. Mas. abst. Cont. no.* Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. 92
Mr. Pinkney's motion to strike out 93 whole clause,94 disagd. to without call of States.
Mr. Butler moved to give the Legislature 93 power of peace, as they were to have that of war.
Mr. Gerry 2ds him. 8 Senators may possibly exercise the power if vested in that body, and 14 if all should be present; and may consequently give up part of the U. States. The Senate are more liable to be corrupted by an Enemy than the whole Legislature.
On the motion for adding ''and peace" after "war" 95
N. H. no. Mas. no. Ct. no. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. no S. C. no. Geo. no.96
FOOTNOTES
1 Text and footnotes reprinted from The Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, edited by Gaillard Hunt and James Brown Scott (Wash., 1920). The text of the present edition of Madison's Debates has been read against the manuscript of the transcript in the Library of Congress, and every difference between Madison's original manuscript and the transcript has been noted except typographical differences, such as capitalization, spelling (including abbreviation of words and figures), punctuation and paragraphing.
The word "Debates" is used as a heading in the transcript.
2 Madison is not uniform in the spelling of proper names, but the correct form in each instance is to be found in the credentials of the delegates.
3 The words "to wit: see Note A. viz," are omitted in the transcript.
4 The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.
5 The paragraph in brackets beginning with the words "The nomination" and ending with the word "house" is printed as a footnote in the transcript with reference mark after the word "Convention."
6 See footnote.5
7 The phrase "on the motion of Mr. C. Pinckney" is transposed in the transcript so that it reads: "The appointment of a Committee, on the motion of Mr. C. Pinckney, consisting," etc.
8 The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.
9 The words "In Convention" are here inserted in the transcript.
*Previous to the arrival of a majority of the States, the rule by which they ought to vote in the Convention had been made a subject of conversation among the members present. It was pressed by Governeur Morris and favored by Robert Morris and others from Pennsylvania, that the large States should unite in firmly refusing to the small states an equal vote, as unreasonable, and as enabling the small States to negative every good system of Government, which must in the nature of things, be founded on a violation of that equality. The members from Virginia, conceiving that such an attempt might beget fatal altercations between the large small States, and that it would be easier to prevail on the latter, in the course of the deliberations, to give up their equality for the sake of an effective Government, than on taking the field of discussion to disarm themselves of the right thereby throw themselves on the mercy of the large States, discountenanced stifled the project.10 Madison's reference mark after the word "rules" is placed in the transcript after the word "him" (page 20) thus placing the footnote at the end of the rules instead of at the beginning.
11 Madison's direction is omitted from the transcript and the word "Rules" is inserted.
12 The word "viz." is omitted in the transcript.
13 The words "to speak" are inserted in the transcript after "rising."
14 The word "upon" is substituted for "on" in the transcript.
15 The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.
16 The word "shall" is omitted in the transcript.
17 See footnote 10
18 The words "the Honorable" are omitted in the transcript.
19 The footnote in the transcript reads as follows: " For the letter, see Appendix No. blank."
20 The word "for" is substituted in tne transcript for the word "to."
21 The word "at" is here inserted in the transcript.
22 The words " In convention" are here inserted in the transcript.
23 Madison's directions "[see the Journal]—" and "[see preceding page]" are omitted in the transcript as are also the words "Additional rules."
24 The word "has" is substituted in the transcript for "had."
25 The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "the."
26 The speech is in Randolph's handwriting.
27 Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.
28 The figures indicated by the reference mark " are changed in the transcript to "first," "secondly," "thirdly," etc.
29 The words "it should" are here inserted in the transcript.
30 The figures indicated by the reference mark 30 are changed in the transcript to "First," "Secondly," etc.
30 The figures indicated by the reference mark are changed in the transcript to "First," "Secondly," etc.
31 The word "the" is crossed out in the transcript.
32 The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.
32 This direction and the heading are omitted in the transcript.
1 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The word "independency" is changed to "independence" in the transcript.
3 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
4 The phrase "of any treaty subsisting under the authority of the Union" is here added in the transcript.
5 The word "years" is omitted in the transcript.
6 The word "or" is changed to "nor" in the transcript.
7 The fifteen resolutions, constituting the "Virginia Plan," are in Madison's handwriting.
34 This sentence is omitted in the transcript.
35 Robert Yates, a delegate from New York, gives the following account of Pinckney's motion: "Mr. C. Pinkney, a member from South-Carolina, then added, that he had reduced his ideas of a new government to a system, which he read, and confessed that it was grounded on the same principle as of the above resolutions." (Secret Proceedings of the Federal Convention (1821), p. 97.)
36 The words, "Mr. P. plan," are omitted in the transcript, and what purports to be the plan itself is here inserted.
Madison himself did not take a copy of the draft nor did Pinckney furnish him one, as he did a copy of his speech which he later delivered in the Convention and which is printed as a part of the debates (session of Monday, June 25). Many years later, in 1818, when John Quincy Adams, then Secretary of State, was preparing the Journal of the Convention for publication, he wrote to Pinckney, requesting a copy of his plan, and, in compliance with this request, Pinckney sent him what purported to be the draft, but which appears to have been a copy of the report of the Committee of Detail of August 6, 1787, with certain alterations and additions. The alleged draft and Pinckney's letter transmitting it were written upon paper bearing the water-mark, "Russell Co. 1797."
The Pinckney draft was not debated; it was neither used in the Committee of the Whole nor in the Convention. It was however referred to the Committee of Detail, which appears to have made some use of it, as extracts from it have been identified by J. Franklin Jameson and an outline of it discovered by Andrew C. McLaughlin, among the papers and in the handwriting of James Wilson, a delegate from Pennsylvania, deposited with the Pennsylvania Historical Society.
37 The resolution is italicized in the transcript.
38 The word "with" is substituted in the transcript for "into."
39 The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "could."
40 The words "not only" are transposed in the transcript, which reads as follows: "Mr. Mason observed, not only that the present Confederation was deficient," , . .
41 The phrase "who took his seat today" is omitted in the transcript.
42 The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.
43 The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.
44 The word "Yeas" is omitted in the transcript and the word "aye" inserted before the figure "4."
45 The word "Nays" is omitted in the transcript and the word "no" inserted before the figure "4."
46 In the transcript the vote reads: Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—6; Connecticut, no—1; New York, divided (Colonel Hamilton, aye, Mr. Yates, no)." [Note E] 47
47 Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.
48 The resolution is italicized in the transcript.
49 The year " 1787" is here inserted in the transcript.
50 The transcript changes "Resol: 4 ." to "The fourth Resolution."
51 In the transcript the words "Resolution 4th'' are changed to "the fourth Resolution" and the phrase "the qualifications of members of the National Legislature" is italicized.
52 In the transcript the words "Resolution 5," are changed to "the fifth Resolution" and the words of the resolution are italicized.
*This question53 omitted in the printed Journal, the votes applied to the succeeding one, instead of the votes as here stated [this note to be in the bottom margin].53
53 In the transcript the vote reads: "*Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9; Delaware divided"; and Madison's direction concerning the footnote is omitted. The word "is" is inserted after the word "question."
54 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Virginia, South Carolina, aye—3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no—7."
55 In this paragraph the transcript italicizes the following phrases: "the cases in which the national Legislature ought to legislate," "whether each branch shd originate laws," "for transferring all the Legislative powers of the existing Cong. to this Assembly"; and the phrase "a silent affirmative nem. con." is changed to "an unanimous affirmative, without debate."
56 In the transcript the vote reads: “Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—9; Connecticut divided (Sherman, no, Ellsworth, aye)."
57 The phrase, "giving powers necessary to preserve harmony among the States to negative all State laws contravening in the opinion of the Nat. Leg. the articles of union" is italicized in the transcript.
58 The words "the sixth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resolution 6" and the phrase authorizing and exertion of the force of the whole agest a delinquent State" is italicized.
59 The word "resource" is substituted in the transcript for "recourse."
60 The words "the seventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resolution 7" and the words of the resolution are italicized.
61 The transcript here substitutes the word "considered" for "conceived."
62 The transcript uses the word "power" in the plural.
63 The transcript changes the word "inconveniency" to "inconvenience."
64 In the transcript the figures "7" and "3" are inserted after the States Georgia and South Carolina respectively.
65 The words "the seventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resolution 7."
66 The transcript italicizes the phrase "for seven years."
67 In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, aye—5; Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—4; Massachusetts, divided."
68 The year "1787" is here inserted in the transcript.
69 Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.
70 In the transcript the figures "7" and "3" are inserted after the States Georgia and Maryland, respectively.
*N. Y. in the printed Journal-'divided.'
71 The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.
72 In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, aye—2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York,* Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8."
73 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Pennsylvania, Maryland, no—2."
74 The word "one" is substituted in the transcript for "an."
75 The word “is” is substituted in the transcript for “was.”
76 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
77 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
78 The word "which" is here inserted in the transcript.
79 The phrase "ineligible after seven years" is italicized in the transcript.
80 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-7; Connecticut, Georgia,* no-2; Pennsylvania, divided."
81 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
82 The figures "1," "2," "3" and "4" are changed to "first," "secondly," "thirdly" and "fourthly."
83 The transcript italicizes the phrase "plurality of military heads."
84 The year " 1787" is here inserted in the transcript.
85 'The transcript inserts the word "Mr." before ' Wilson,
86 The word "was" is changed to "were" in the transcript.
87 The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.
88 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, (Mr. Randolph and Mr. Blair, no; Doctor McClurg, Mr. Madison, and General Washington, aye; Colonel Mason bein ,no, but not in the House, Mr. Wythe, aye, but gone home), North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye; New York, Delaware, Maryland, no—3."
89 The phrase "the eighth Resolution" is substituted in the transcript for "Proposition 8th."
90 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no—4."
91 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
92 The word "unless" is crossed out in the transcript.
93 In the transcript the syllable "ten" is stricken from the word "gotten."
94 In the transcript the syllable 'tive" is stricken from the word "Legislative" and "ture" is written above it.
95 The word "to" is omitted in the transcript.
96 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
97 In the transcript the vote reads "Masssachuetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-10."
98 The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "a."
99 In the transcript the word "provisionary" was erroneously used in place of "revisionary."
1 In the transcript this vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; Connecticut, Maryland, no-2."
2 The phrase "(the day after)" is crossed out in the transcript.
3 The phrase "Resolved that a National Judiciary be established" is italicized in the transcript.
4 The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "from."
5 The phrase "the ninth Resolution" is used in the transcript in place of "Resoln 9th"
6 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no, Georgia, aye—9; Connecticut, South Carolina,—2."
7 The transcript uses the phrase "the ninth Resolution" in place of "Resol: 9," and italicizes the resolution.
8 The transcript here uses the phrase "the ninth Resolution."
*New Jersey omitted in the printed Journal.
9 The phrase "The tenth Resolution" is here used in the transcript.
10 In place of the words "The 11. propos:" the transcript reads: "The eleventh Resolution."
11 The transcript changes "Propos. 12" to "The twelfth Resolution."
12 The transcript changes "Propos: 13" to read as follows: "The thirteenth Resolution, to the effect."
13 The transcript changes "Propos. 14" to "The fourteenth Resolution."
14 The transcript changes " Propos. 15 " to " The fifteenth Resolution. "
*The note in brackets to be transferred to bottom margin. 15
[This hint was probably meant in terrorem to the smaller States of N. Jersey Delaware. Nothing was said in reply to it.]
15 Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.
16 The transcript changes "The propos. 15" to "The fifteenth Resolution."
17 The transcript changes "Propos. 4" to "the fourth Resolution."
18 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
19 The transcript changes "propos. 9" to "the ninth Resolution."
20 The phrase "it passed in the affirmative" is here inserted in the transcript.
21 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—5; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no—4; Massachusetts, divided." New York which was "divided" was erroneously placed among the "ayes" in copying, although the number was correctly given as "5."
22 The transcript changes "Resol: 9" to "the ninth Resolution."
23 The transcript omits the phrase "to 11 OC tomw "
24 The phrase ' 'with all the necessary powers" is italicized in the transcript.
25 The figures "i," "2," "3" and "4" are changed to "first," "secondly," etc. in the transcript.
26 The word "in" is here inserted in the transcript.
27 The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.
28 The transcript italicizes the word "individuals."
29 The word "so" is here inserted in the transcript.
30 The word "as" is omitted in the transcript.
31 The word " check" is substituted in the transcript for '' speak."
32 The words ''them all" are substituted in the transcript for '' all of them."
33 In the transcript the vote reads "Connecticut. New Jersey, South Carolina, aye—3: Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no—8."
34 The word "of" is omitted in the transcript.
35 The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for in.
36 The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "an. "
37 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, Virginia, aye—3: Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no 8.
38 The expression "to 11 OC" is omitted in the transcript.
39 The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.
40 The words "for fixed" are corrected in the transcript to "fixed for."
41 The figures "1" and ' '2" are changed to ' 'First" and 'secondly" in the transcript.
42 The word ' 'he" is here inserted in the transcript
43 The transcript uses the word "nvunber" in the pluraL
44 The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript
45 The figures 'is,"1, "2", "3" and "4" are changed to 'First," "Secondly," etc, in the transcript.
46 The figures "1," "2" and "3" are changed to "First," ' 'Secondly, " and "Thirdly" in the transcript.
47 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
48 The word "appointment" is used in the plural in the transcript.
49 In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, aye—1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10."
50 The word "with" is substituted in the transcript for "in."
51 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—10."
52 The word "be" is substituted in the transcript for "lie."
53 The word "then" is omitted in the transcript.
54 The word "restrain" is substituted in the transcript for "reclaim."
55 The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "a."
56 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
57 The word "that" is changed to "than" in the transcript.
58 The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "his."
59 The word "more" is here inserted in the transcript.
60 The transcript uses the word ''deliberations'' in the singular.
61 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, [Mr. Randolph and Mr. Mason, no; Mr. Blair, Doctor McClurg and Mr. Madison, aye; General Washington not consulted,] aye—3; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7; Delaware, divided, [Mr. Read and Mr. Dickinson, aye; Mr. Bedford and Mr. Basset, no]."
62 The words "the fourth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resoln 4 .'!
63 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no; Delaware divided."
64 The word "that" is omitted in the transcript.
65 The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.
66 The words ' 'n? of' ' are omitted in the transcript.
67 The word "was" is substituted in the transcript for "were."
68 The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.
69 The transcript uses the word "interest" in the plural.
70 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
71 The word "up" is here inserted in the transcript.
72 The word "will" is changed to "would" in the transcript.
73 The word "more" is in the Franklin manuscript.
74 The word "These" is substituted in the transcript for '.'Those."
75 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no—3; Maryland divided."
76 In place of the phrase "were in the affirmative" the transcript substitutes "aye—9;" and instead of "in the negative" the expression "no—2" is used.
77 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye—s; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6."
78 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Jilaryland, no."
79 The words "The eleventh Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resol: ii."
80 The figures "7" and "4" are inserted in the transcript after "ay" and "no," respectively.
81 The words "The thirteenth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resolution 13."
82 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
83 The word "assent" is substituted in the transcript for "consent."
84 The words "The fourteenth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resolution 14."
85 The word "as" is crossed out in the transcript.
86 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey. Delaware, Maryland, aye—4; Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no 7.
87 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
88 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no—5."
89 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
90 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
91 The words "the fifteenth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resolution 15."
92 The word "United" is here inserted in the transcript.
93 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,* Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, no—3; Delaware, Maryland, divided."
94 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
95 In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye—7; Massachusetts [Mr. King, aye, Mr. Gorham, wavering] Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—4."
96 The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "First" and "Secondly" in the transcript.
97 In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Massachusetts, Connecticut, South Carolina, no—3."
98 In the transcript the vote reads: "New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no—3."
99 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript. 99 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
1 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye-8; Connecticut, New York, South Carolina, no-3.
2 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-4; New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, Georgia, no-5; Massachusetts, Maryland, divided."
3 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-10; Connecticut, no-1."
4 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
5 In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, aye-1; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-10.
6 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—8; New York, Georgia, no—2; Maryland, divided."
7 The words "the fifth Resolution" are substituted in the transcript for "Resol: 5."
8 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, aye-3; Massachusetts, New York, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, no-6; North Carolina, Georgia, divided."
9 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye—7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia, no—4."
10 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
11 The word "have" is substituted in the transcript for "had."
*[It is probable yo votes here turned chiefly on the idea that if the salaries were not here provided for the members would be paid by their respective States]
This note for the bottom margin. 13
12 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Connecticut, no—1; Massachusetts [Mr. Gorham and Mr. King, aye; Mr. Gerry and Mr. Strong, no] New York, divided."
13 Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.
14 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Delaware, South Carolina, aye—3; New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no—7; Massachusetts, divided."
15 The words "the ninth Resolution'' are substituted in the transcript for " Resol: 9."
16 The word "are'' is substituted in the transcript for "were."
17 The word "may"' is here inserted in the transcript.
18 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
19 In the transcript the vote reads; "New York, Delaware, Virginia, aye—3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia no—7."
20 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
21 This heading is omitted in the transcript.
22 The word "independency" is changed to "independence" in the transcript.
23 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
24 The word "unless" is omitted in the transcript.
25 The word "shall" is substituted in the transcript for "to."
26 The words "In Convention" are crossed out in the transcript.
[* this plan had been concerted among the deputations or members thereof, from Cont N. Y. N. J Del. and perhaps Mr. Martin from Maryd who made with them a common cause 30 on different principles Cont & N. Y. were agst a departure from the principle of the Confederation, wishing rather to add a few new powers to Congs than to substitute a National Govt The States of N. J. & Del. were opposed to a National Govt because its patrons considered a proportional representation of the States as the basis of it. The eagourness displayed by the members opposed to a Nat1 Govt from these different motives began now to produce serious anxiety for the result of the Convention. Mr Dickenson said to Mr Madison-You see the consequence of pushing things too far. Some of the members from the small States wish for two branches in the General Legislature, and are friends to a good National Government; but we would sooner submit to a foreign power than submit to be deprived of an equality of suffrage, 31 in both branches of the legislature, and thereby be thrown under the domination of the large States]
27 The year "1787" is omitted in the transcript.
28 The words "In Convention" are here inserted in the transcript.
29 The word "request" is substituted in the transcript for "desire."
30 The word "though" is here inserted in the transcript.
31 The phrase "of an equality of suffrage" is transposed so that the transcript reads "deprived, in both branches of the legislature of an equality of suffrage, and thereby" . . .
32 Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.
a The transcript uses the word " Executives" in the singular.
b The word "military" is here inserted in the transcript.
c The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
d The word "term" is substituted in the transcript for "time."
** *This copy of Mr Patterson's
propositions varies in a few clauses from that in the printed Journal furnished
from the papers of Mr Brearley a Colleague of Mr Patterson. A confidence is
felt, notwithstanding, in its accuracy. That the copy in the Journal is not
entirely correct is shewn by the ensuing speech of Mr Wilson [June 16] in which
he refers to the mode of removing the Executive by impeachment & conviction
as a feature in the Virga plan forming one of its contrasts to that of Mr
Patterson, which proposed a removal on the application of a majority of the
Executives of the States. In the copy printed in the Journal, the two modes are
combined in the same clause; whether through inadvertence, or as a contemplated
amendment does not appear.
5 The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.
33 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
34 The word "to" is substituted in the transcript
for "agst"
35 The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.
36 The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.
37 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
38 The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.
39 The word "for" is substituted in the transcript for "of."
40 The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.
41 The word "a" is substituted in the transcript for "the."
42 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
43 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
44 The transcript does not italicize the word "States."
45 The figures "i" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.
46 The word "in" is here inserted in the transcript.
47 The word "we" is substituted in the transcript for "he."
48 The words "certainly seasons" are transposed to read "seasons certainly" in the transcript; but the word "seasons" was erroneously printed "reasons," which error has been followed in other editions of Madison's notes.
49 The word ''is'' is omitted in the transcript.
50 The figure ''2" is changed to 'the second' in the transcript.
51 The transcript italicizes the word "National."
52 The word "not" is blotted in the notes but is retained because it is in the transcript.
53 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
54 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
55 The word " all" is substituted in the transcript for " the."
56 The word "could" is substituted in the transcript for "would."
57 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
58 The word "a" is omitted in the transcript.
59 The word "emergence" is changed to "emergency" in the transcript.
60 The word ''reads'' is substituted in the transcript for
''read.'a The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
61 In the transcript the following footnote was inserted with reference mark after "observations";
"The speech introducing the plan, as above taken down & written out was seen by Mr. Hamilton, who approved its correctness, with one or two verbal changes, which were made as he suggested. The explanatory observations which did not immediately follow, were to have been furnished by Mr. H. who did not find leisme at the time to write them out, and they were not obtained.
"Judge Yates, in his notes, appears to have consolidated the explanatory with the introductory observations of Mr. Hamilton (under date of June 19th. a typographical error). It was in the former, Mr. Madison observed, that Mr. Hamilton, in speaking of popular governments, however modified, made the remark attributed to him by Judge Yates, that they were 'but pork still with a little change of sauce.'"
63 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
63 The word "The" is here inserted in the transcript.
64 The figure "4" is here inserted in the transcript.
65 The figure "6" is here inserted in the transcript.
66 The word "has" is substituted in the transcript for "had."
67 The transcript italicizes the word "individually."
68 The words "in general is" are transposed to read "is in general" in the transcript.
69 The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.
70 The word "as" is here inserted in the transcript.
71 The figure "1" is changed to "In the first place" in the transcript.
72 The figure "2" is changed to "and in the second place" in the transcript.
73 The transcript uses the word "acquittals" in the singular.
74 The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "cd"
75 The word "legislative" is not italicized in the transcript.
76 The word "gave" is substituted in the transcript for "give."
77 The figure "1" is changed to "in the first place" in the transcript.
78 The figure "2" is changed to "in the second place" in the transcript.
79 The word "must" is substituted in the transcript for "may".
80 The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.
81 The gure "3" is changed to "and in the third place."
82 The figures "1," "2" and ''3" are changed to "first," '' secondly," and "thirdly" in the transcript.
83 The figure "4" is changed to "and fourthly" in the transcript.
84 The word "the" is crossed out in the transcript.
85 The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the transcript.
86 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New York, New Jersey, Delaware, no—3; Maryland divided."
87 Found at page 134 instead of page 13, and here printed from the original manuscript deposited in the Department of State by President Washington.
88 Madison's direction concerning Mr. Randolph's Resolutions and the Resolutions themselves are omitted in the transcript.
89 The word "of" is omitted in the transcript.
90 The words "June 13 being before the house" are here inserted in the transcript.
91 The words "in the House" are omitted in the transcript.
92 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
93 The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.
13 The word "Adjourned" is here inserted in the transcript.
14 Madison's printed copy is marked: "As Reported by Com. of Detail viz of five. Aug. 6. 1787." It is a large folio of seven pages. In the enumeration of the Articles by a misprint VI. was repeated, and the alterations in Article VII. and succeeding articles were made by Madison. In Sec. II of Article VI., as it was printed, it appeared: "The enacting stile of the laws of the United States shall be. 'Be it enacted, and it is hereby enacted by the House of Representatives, and by the Senate of the United States, in Congress assembled. ' " which Madison altered to read: "The enacting stile of the laws of the United States Shall be. ' Be it enacted by the Senate representatives in Congress assembled.’” The printed copy among the Madison papers is a duplicate of the copy filed by General Washington with the papers of the Constitution, and Sec. II is there given as actually printed.
Madison accurately transcribed the report for his notes and it is this copy which is used in the text.
15 The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
16* *The word "in" is here inserted in the transcript.
15 The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
17 The word "it" is crossed out and the word "they" is written above it in the transcript.
18 Section II is copied in the transcript as originally printed. See footnote 14 on p. 471.
19 The word "becomes" is substituted in the transcript for "become."
15 The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
15 The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
20 The letter "r" is stricken from the word "officer" in the transcript.
21 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
15 The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
22 The word "the" is changed to "that" in the transcript.
15 The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
23 The syllable "ly" is added in the transcript to the word "subsequent."
24 The word "that" is omitted in the transcript.
15 The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
15 The word, "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
15 The word, "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
15 The word "Article" is here inserted in the transcript.
25 The phrase "in each State" is here inserted in the transcript.
26 In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—5."
27 The word "at" is here inserted in the transcript.
28 See ante.
29 See ante.
30 The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.
31 The words "be therefore" are changed in the transcript to "therefore be."
32 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
33 The phrase "it passed in the negative, the votes being equally divided," is here inserted in the transcript.
34 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, aye—5; Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no—5."
35 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, no—3."
36 The word "inconveniency'' is changed in the transcript to "inconvenience."
37 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; New Hampshire, Connecticut, no—2."
38 The word "election" is used in the plural in the transcript.
39 The word ''the'' is here inserted in the transcript.
40 In the transcript the vote reads: "South Carolina, Georgia, aye—2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8."
41 In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, aye—1; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9."
42 See ante.
43 The words "was then'' are here inserted in the transcript.
44 The words "of the'' are here inserted in the transcript.
99568°—27 32
45 The word "upon" is substituted in the transcript for "on."
46 The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "this."
47 The word "manufacturers" is substituted in the transcript for "manufactures."
48 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
49 The word "which" is crossed out in the transcript and "what" is written above it.
50 In the transcript the following footnote is here added: "See Appendix No. — for a note of Mr. Madison to this speech."
51 In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, aye—I; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—7 ; Maryland, divided; Georgia, not present"
52 See ante.
53 The words "being under consideration" are here inserted in the transcript.
54 The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the transcript.
52 See ante.
55 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
56 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
57 The phrase "among the States" is omitted in the transcript.
58 The transcript uses the word "year" in the plural.
59 The transcript uses the word "case" in the plural.
60 The transcript uses the word "State" in the plural.
61 In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, no—8."
62 In the transcript the vote reads: "South Carolina, Georgia, aye—2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—9."
63 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, no—6; Maryland, divided."
64 See ante.
65 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
64 See ante.
65 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
66 In the transcript the vote reads: "Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, no-7."
67 See ante.
68 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—9; New Jersey, Delaware, no—2."
69 The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.
70 The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "First" and "Secondly" in the transcript.
71 The transcript uses the word "bondages" in the singular.
72 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
73 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
74 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, aye—1; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10."
75 See ante.
76 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
77 The words "was for allowing it" are here inserted in the transcript.
78 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, North Carolina, no—4."
79 See ante
80 The words "was taken up" are here inserted in the transcript.
81 The word "were" is here inserted in the transcript.
82 See ante
83 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
84 The word "Executives" is in the singular in the transcript.
85 The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.
86 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
87 In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, aye—1; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8; Maryland, divided."
88 The word "following" is omitted in the transcript.
89 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
90 In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, no—6."
*In the printed Journal Pensylvania. ay.
91 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
92 The words "first section" are substituted for "Section 1" in the transcript.
93 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, aye—7; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,* North Carolina, no—3; South Carolina, divided."
94 The word "money" is here inserted in the transcript.
95 The words "right of" are here inserted in the transcript.
99568°—27——33
96 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
97 In the transcript the vote reads: "Virginia, North Carolina, aye—2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8; New Hampshire, divided."
98 See p. —.
99 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
1 The figure "2" is omitted in the transcript.
2 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
3 The word "credit" is substituted in the transcript for "merit."
4 The word "and" is here inserted in the transcript.
5 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
6 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—4; Massaehusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no—7."
7 In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: "On the question for thirteen years, moved by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, it was negatived, as above." The vote by States is omitted.
8 The phrase "the votes were the same," is here inserted in the transcript, and the vote by States is omitted.
9 In the transcript the word "a" is stricken out and "the" is written above it.
10 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, no—4; North Carolina, divided."
11 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript
12 See ante.
13 In the transcript this sentence reads as follows: "Article 5, Sect. 4 was agreed to nem, con.”
14 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
15 The word "A" is here inserted in the transcript.
16 The word "for" is here inserted in the transcript.
17 The word "to" is here inserted in the transcript.
18 The word "conveniency" is changed to "convenience" in the transcript.
19 The figures "i" and " 2 " are changed to "First" and "Secondly" in the transcript.
20 See ante.
21 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
22 The words "have not only" are transposed in the transcript to read "not only have."
23 The word "clear" is substituted in the transcript for "cleared."
24 The word "to" is substituted in the transcript for "of."
25 The word "to" is substituted in the transcript for "into."
26 The word "would" is substituted in the transcript for "could."
27 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
28 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Georgia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware,* Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—7."
29 In the transcript the words "be never" are transposed to read "never be."
30 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Georgia, aye—3; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—7."
31 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, aye—6; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, no—5."
32 See ante.
33 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
34 In the transcript the word "of" is crossed out and "a" is written above it.
35 The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the transcript.
36 The word “inconveniency" is changed to '' inconvenience" in the transcript.
37 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
38 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware, aye—2; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no.—9."
39 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
40 See ante.
41 In the transcript this reads as follows: "Sections 4 and 5, of Article 6, were then agreed to, nem. con."
42 The word "for" is omitted in the transcript.
43 In the transcript the vote by States is omitted and the following sentence is inserted: "ten States were in the affirmative, Pennsylvania, divided."
44 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
40 See ante.
44 The words " was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
45 The figures "1" and "2" are changed to "first" and "secondly" in the transcript.
46 Madison's direction is omitted in the transcript.
47 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
48 In the transcript the vote reads: "Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, Georgia, no—8."
49 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, no—3; New Hampshire, divided."
50 The transcript uses the word "proceeding" in the plural.
51 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, aye—2; New Hampshire, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8."
99568°—27—34
52 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
53 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
54 The words "it was" are here inserted in the transcript.
55 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, no—4; New Hampshire, divided."
56 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
57 See ante.
58 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
59 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
60 The word "after" is here inserted in the transcript.
61 The word "mentioned" is substituted in the transcript for "mention."
62 See ante.
63 The figures "1," "2," "3" and "4" are changed in the transcript to "first," "Secondly" etc.
64 The word "will" is here inserted in the transcript.
65 The word "of" is substituted in the transcript for "in."
66 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey,* Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—9; Maryland, no—1; South Carolina, divided."
67 The words "for the reconsideration" are here inserted in the transcript.
68 See ante.
69 The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.
70 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
71 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7."
72 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no-8."
73 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
74 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-8."
75 The words "and on" are omitted in the transcript.
76 The words "their actual" are substituted in the transcript for "being on a."
77 In the transcript the word "new" is crossed out and the syllable "re" is written above it.
78 The word "the" is substituted in the transcript for "their."
79 The words "of age" are here inserted in the transcript.
80 The words "be then" are transposed in the transcript to read "then be."
81 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
82 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—6."
83 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Maryland, Virginia, aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7; Pennsylvania, divided."
84 See ante.
85 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, no—3."
86 See ante.
87 The figure "1" is changed to "First" in the transcript.
88 The word "Secondly" is here inserted in the transcript.
89 The word "them" is substituted in the transcript for "these."
90 The word "ready" is omitted in the transcript.
91 The word "money" is omitted in the transcript. In Madison's notes it is written above the words "originate" and "&" without a caret indicating its position. It appears to have been omitted in all previous editions.
92 The transcript uses the word "sum" in the plural
93 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
94 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia [Mr. Blair, and Mr. Madison no, Mr. Randolph, Colonel Mason and General Washington,* aye], North Carolina, aye—4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7."
99568°—27—35
95 The words "On the" are here inserted in the transcript.
96 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
† In the printed Journ Virga.-no.
97 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia,† North Carolina aye—4; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, no—7."
98 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, aye—1; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—10."
99 See ante.
1 The word 'was' is here inserted in the transcript.
2 The word "of" is omitted in the trancript.
3 The transcript italicizes the word "influence."
4 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
5 The word "be" is omitted in the transcript.
6 The figure "1" is changed to "In the first place" in the transcript.
7 The figure "2" is changed to "In the second place" in the transcript.
8 The figure "3" is changed to "In the third place" in the transcript.
9 The phrase "And finally, in Congress *nine *States" is substituted in the transcript for "4. In Congs. 9 States."
10 The word "on" is substituted in the transcript for "upon."
11 The word "inconveniency" is changed to "inconvenience" in the transcript.
12 The word "as" is substituted in the transcript for "and."
13 The word "are" is substituted in the transcript for "is."
14 The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.
15 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
16 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—5; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, North Carolina, South Carolina, no—5; Georgia, divided."
17 See ante.
18 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
19 The word "it" is here inserted in the transcript.
20 In the transcript the vote reads: ''New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, aye—9; Massachusetts, South Carolina, no—2.''
21 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
22 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Virginia, aye—2; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—9."
23 See* ante.*
24 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
25 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
26 The transcript uses the word "treaty" in the plural.
27 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
28 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, no—5."
29 This paragraph is stricken out in the transcript.
30 Madison's direction concerning the motion is omitted in the transcript and the following sentence is inserted: "Mr. Madison moved the following amendment of Article 6, Section 13." 31
31 See ante.
32 The words "On the " are here inserted in the transcript.
33 In the transcript the vote reads; "Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, aye—3; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8."
34 The word "the" is omitted in the transcript.
*The Executive consists at this time 35 of abt. 20 members.
35 The phrase "consisted at that time" is substituted in the transcript for "consists at this time."
36 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-6; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Georgia, no-4; Pennsylvania,
37 The word "votes" is substituted in the transcript for "States."
38 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Delaware, North Carolina, aye—3; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, no—8."
39 The transcript does not italicize the word "Ten."
99568°—27—36
40 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
41 The phrase "it was agreed to" is here inserted in the transcript.
42 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—9; New Jersey, no—1; Massachusetts, not present."
43 See ante.
44 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
45 The word "that" is here inserted in the transcript.
46 The figures "1" and "2" are changed in the transcript to "First" and "Secondly."
47 The words "laying taxes on" are substituted in the transcript for "taxing."
48 The figures "3" and "4" are changed in the transcript to Thirdly" and "Fourthly."
48 The figures "3" and "4" are changed in the transcript to "Thirdly" and "Fourthly."
49 The figure "5" is changed in the transcript to "And finally."
50 The word "are" is substituted in the transcript for "were."
51 This phrase was erroneously copied in the transcript as "Article 1, Section 1," but was corrected when printed.
52 The words "was then" are here inserted in the transcript.
53 The word "The" is here inserted in the transcript.
54 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
55 In the transcript these three lines are changed to read as follows: ' 'Several clauses,—for coining money for regulating foreign coin,—for fixing the standard of weights and measures,—were agreed to, nem. Con."
56 The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.
57 The word "the" is here inserted in the transcript.
58 In the transcript the vote reads: ''Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—6; New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, no—5.''
59 The word "Mr." is substituted in the transcript for "Col."
60 The word "that" is substituted in the transcript for "which."
61 In the transcript the vote reads: ''New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia,* North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—9; New Jersey, Maryland, no—2.''
62 The transcript italicizes the words "paper currency" and "a tender."
63 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
64 See ante.
65 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
66 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
67 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut, New Jersey, Maryland, no—3."
68 In the transcript the vote reads: "Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, aye—4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, Georgia, no—6."
69 The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.
70 The word "was" is here inserted in the transcript.
71 The phrase "as also the clause" is here inserted in the transcript.
72 The words "do. do." are omitted in the transcript.
73 The word "being" is here inserted in the transcript.
74 In the transcript the following phrase is here added: "after the words, ‘To declare the law.’
75 The words "the question" are substituted in the transcript for "motion."
76 In the transcript the vote reads: "Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Virginia, North Caro lina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, no—3."
77 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—7; Connecticut, Virginia, North Carolina, no—3."
78 The "word "it" is here inserted in the transcript.
79 The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript-
80 The phrase "was next considered" is here inserted in the transcript.
81 The phrase ''it was agreed to'' is here added in the transcript.
82 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-5; Massachusetts, Delaware, Maryland, no-3; Pennsylvania, North Carolina, divided."
83 The words "So agreed to" are omitted in the transcript.
84 The words "The motion" are substituted in the transcript for "which."
85 In the transcript the vote reads: "New Hampshire, Connecticut, Virginia, Georgia, aye-4; Delaware, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, no-4; Massachusetts,* Pennsylvania, absent. So it was lost."
86 The words "The clause" are here inserted in the transcript.
87 The word ''the'' is here inserted in the transcript.
88 The word "a" is here inserted in the transcript.
89 The word "is" is here inserted in the transcript.
90 The transcript here inserts the following: "Connecticut voted in the negative; but."
91 The words "of Cont. are omitted in the transcript.
*On the remark by Mr. King that "make" war might be understood to "conduct" it which was an Executive function, Mr. Elseworth gave up his objection, and the vote of Cont. 91 was changed to—ay.
92 In the transcript the vote reads: "Connecticut,* Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye—8; New Hampshire, no—1; Massachusetts, absent."
93 The word “the” is here inserte in the transcript.
94 The word “was” is here inserted in the transcript.
95 The transcript here adds the following: “it was imanimously negatived.”
96 The vote by States is omitted.
Founders Online: Madison at the Federal Convention, 27 May–17 September 1787 (E …. (2019). Archives.gov. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-10-02-0001